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Cover
The “educational continuum.” The Naval
War College is a part of a seamless process
in the education of naval officers, and
others, for leadership in the twenty-firstcentury security environment. The interrelationships between its sources (policy
and fleet influences), partners (notably
the Naval Postgraduate School in
Monterey, California, and the Naval
Academy in Annapolis, Maryland), and
of course its products, its graduates, are
represented here by their arrangement in
a toroid-like pattern—denoting continuity and suggestive of infinity.
Cover art by Arthur Lamoureux, Naval
War College Visual Communications
Division.
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FROM THE EDITORS
Over the last nine months or so, the Navy has invested significant resources in
developing a new maritime strategy suited to the realities of the contemporary
security environment. Many elements of the Navy and Navy-affiliated organizations have contributed to this effort, but the Naval War College has played a central role in laying the groundwork for the new maritime strategy through an
intensive series of workshops, war games, and analytical exercises. It has also
helped to organize an ambitious series of public meetings around the United
States (the “Conversation with the Country,” as it has come to be known) designed to engage the attention of the broader American public in issues of concern to the Navy and in the future of American naval and maritime power. It is
appropriate, therefore, to start off this issue with two articles that provide some
sense of the current state of thinking on maritime strategy issues within the
Navy educational establishment. George Baer, a distinguished historian of the
U.S. Navy and longtime chair of the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval
War College, offers some broad reflections on how one should approach maritime strategy today. (The article is based on remarks presented by Professor Baer
at the first “Conversation with the Country” gathering, held in Newport in February 2007.) Next, Wayne Hughes of the Naval Postgraduate School offers an
analytical framework for thinking about the requirements of naval force structure at a time when the Navy is seemingly caught between the conflicting demands of immediate low-intensity global threats—principally but not only
the war on terror—and the longer-term yet increasingly formidable high-end
threat posed by the People’s Republic of China and possibly other emerging major maritime powers.
On the subject of China, we continue our focus on “Asia Rising” with articles
by Peter Dutton, a former Navy JAG officer and now a Naval War College faculty
member, on the long-standing and potentially dangerous territorial disputes between China and Japan in the East China Sea, and by Colonel Philippe Rogers,
USMC, on the little-known story of China’s participation in recent UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. We are pleased to welcome this outstanding student contribution to these pages.
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Milan Vego is well known to a generation of Naval War College students as
perhaps the leading historian and theorist of “operational art,” the arena of military action falling between strategy and tactics. The concept of operational art,
deriving ultimately from German and Soviet military thought, has for some decades had a central place in U.S. Army doctrine, but its role in naval thinking and
practice remains problematic, to say the least. Professor Vego here explores the
notion of “major naval operations” as a key component of naval operational art,
with particular reference to the Navy’s (as he argues) still-relevant World War II
experience. This is a subject we intend to pursue in future issues.
In our final feature article, Gary Solis provides a careful analysis of “Targeted
Killing and the Law of Armed Conflict.” This is a controversial subject but one
that cannot be ignored by military professionals; particularly in today’s atmosphere of media sensationalism and emotionally driven political commentary,
we have to be mindful of the increasing interdependence of military operations
and issues of the law of armed conflict and with strategic communications
requirements.
ASIA EYES AMERICA
Asia Eyes America: Regional Perspectives on U.S. Asia-Pacific Strategy in the
Twenty-first Century, edited by Jonathan D. Pollack, is in preparation for release
in late summer 2007. This third book in our Policy Studies Series extends the
East Asia focus of the first two volumes, Strategic Surprise? U.S.-China Relations
in the Early Twenty-first Century and Korea: The East Asian Pivot, also edited by
Dr. Pollack. The highly distinguished international scholars and analysts represented presented these papers at the Naval War College’s Asia-Pacific Forum of
4–5 May 2006. They examine a contemporary Asia marked by increased competence, confidence, and resilience, and in which the U.S. role is a major variable.
This book is a groundbreaking contribution to the study of the contemporary
Asia-Pacific and to the wider debate on fundamental issues of national strategy
and policy. The book will be sold by the U.S. Government Printing Office,
through its online bookstore, at bookstore.gpo.gov/.
EDWARD S. MILLER RESEARCH FELLOWSHIP IN NAVAL HISTORY
The Naval War College Foundation intends to award one grant of $1,000 to the
researcher who has the greatest need and can make the optimum use of research
materials for naval history located in the Naval War College’s Archives, Naval
Historical Collection, Naval War College Museum, and Henry E. Eccles Library.
A guide to the College’s manuscript, archival, and oral history collections may
be found on the Naval War College’s website, at www.nwc.navy.mil/museum
(under Naval History Resources, then Naval Historical Collection Publications).
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol60/iss2/1
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Further information on the manuscript and archival collections and copies of
the registers for specific collections is available online and from the Head, Naval
Historical Collection, by e-mail at evelyn.cherpak@nwc.navy.mil.
The recipient will be a research fellow in the Naval War College’s Maritime
History Department, which will provide administrative support during the research visit. Submit detailed research proposal (with statement of need and plan
for optimal use of materials, curriculum vitae, at least two letters of recommendation, and relevant background information) to Miller Naval History Fellowship Committee, Naval War College Foundation, 686 Cushing Road, Newport,
R.I. 02841-1207, by 1 August 2007. For further information, contact the chair of
the selection committee, at john.hattendorf@nwc.navy.mil. Employees of the
U.S. Naval War College or any agency of the U.S. Department of Defense are not
eligible for consideration; EEO/AA regulations apply.
FORTHCOMING: NEWPORT PAPER 29
U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s and 1980s: Selected Documents, Newport Paper
29, is the third of a series of volumes in which Dr. John B. Hattendorf, the Ernest
J. King Professor of Maritime History at the Naval War College, documents the
history of U.S. naval strategic thinking in recent decades. Newport Paper 29 will
provide the key capstone documents for U.S. naval strategy in the 1970s and
1980s. This is a selection of documents that are described in Professor
Hattendorf ’s Newport Paper 19, The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986, and were the predecessors of the documents that he published in
Newport Paper 27, U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s: Selected Documents.
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Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford was commissioned in
1974 from the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps
program at the University of South Carolina. His initial
assignment was to USS Blakely (FF 1072). In 1979, following a tour as Operations and Plans Officer for Commander, Naval Forces Korea, he was selected as an
Olmsted Scholar and studied two years in France at the
Paris Institute of Political Science. He also holds master’s degrees in public administration (finance) from
Harvard and in national security and strategic studies
from the Naval War College, where he graduated with
highest distinction.
After completing department head tours in USS Deyo
(DD 989) and in USS Mahan (DDG 42), he commanded USS Aries (PHM 5). His first tour in Washington included assignments to the staff of the Chief of
Naval Operations and to the Office of the Secretary of
the Navy, as speechwriter, special assistant, and personal aide to the Secretary.
Rear Admiral Shuford returned to sea in 1992 to command USS Rodney M. Davis (FFG 60). He assumed
command of USS Gettysburg (CG 64) in January 1998,
deploying ten months later to Fifth and Sixth Fleet operating areas as Air Warfare Commander (AWC) for the
USS Enterprise Strike Group. The ship was awarded the
Battle Efficiency “E” for Cruiser Destroyer Group 12.
Returning to the Pentagon and the Navy Staff, he directed the Surface Combatant Force Level Study. Following this task, he was assigned to the Plans and Policy
Division as chief of staff of the Navy’s Roles and Missions Organization. He finished his most recent Pentagon
tour as a division chief in J8—the Force Structure, Resources and Assessments Directorate of the Joint Staff—
primarily in the theater air and missile defense mission
area. His most recent Washington assignment was to
the Office of Legislative Affairs as Director of Senate
Liaison.
In October 2001 he assumed duties as Assistant Commander, Navy Personnel Command for Distribution. Rear
Admiral Shuford assumed command of the Abraham
Lincoln Carrier Strike Group in August 2003. He became the fifty-first President of the Naval War College
on 12 August 2004.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM

An International Forum for Operational and Strategic Leadership

a dramatically altered strategic and
political environment, the Naval War College has been thrust into
a position of increased prominence on the Navy’s agenda. Four
initiatives in particular reflect what can be described as a catalytic role being
played by the College, leveraging its enduring strengths as an academic and research institution to meet the challenges of today’s global security environment:
AS THE NATION CONFRONTS

• Building and sustaining global maritime partnerships
• Bolstering the ability of the Navy and its maritime partners to lead and
support at the operational and strategic levels of war and diplomacy

• Evolving both the theory and practice of decision making and command
and control in globally networked, self-organizing environments

• Developing strategic and operational leaders.
These initiatives are all in execution even as we continue to develop and refine
our concepts of their constituent elements.
Also on the Navy’s agenda is a proposal to establish a venue for the collaborative intersection of the genius and energy behind these efforts—a setting appropriate to the international stature of the Naval War College and the special,
global responsibilities that fall to the U.S. Navy, and indeed, to all its partners in
the maritime domain. The Navy’s Commander Naval Installations Command is
currently crafting a master plan for Naval Station Newport to realize
post-BRAC* efficiencies and respond to associated expanded mission sets. The
major element of this plan is a building to house academic and operational activities relating directly to the four initiatives just listed. This new “International
* BRAC: the Base Realignment and Closure Commission whose work was completed in August 2005.
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Forum for Operational and Strategic Leadership” would—as outlined below—
architecturally reorient the campus and create urgently needed space for additional mission functions, student loading, and faculty and staff associated with
dramatically expanded student throughput and tasking (see my Spring 2006 and
Winter 2006 “President’s Forums”).
Building and Sustaining Global Partnerships
Establishing an international forum for strategic and operational leadership
would provide a permanent, world-class facility where leaders and scholars of
maritime nations could work to develop an increased understanding of the
international security environment, an enhanced appreciation of each others’
interests and issues, a deeper awareness of the critical role that culture plays in
international relations, and effective leadership methods for implementing solutions in both policy and operational arenas. Increased and more robust engagement and dialogue between the military and civilian leaders of these
maritime nations is the linchpin of global maritime partnership and of what is
often referred to as the “thousand-ship navy” (cf. the “President’s Forum” of the
Summer 2006 Review). The International Forum for Operational and Strategic
Leadership would be the global center of excellence for considering the most
sensitive and pressing issues affecting maritime nations.
Activities and functions centered in the Forum would, for example, expand
the very successful concepts associated with the Chief of Naval Operations’
(CNO’s) biennial International Seapower Symposium (ISS) into an ongoing research and problem-solving process. Several elements to support this process
come immediately to mind:

• A state-of-the-art conference facility capable of accommodating events from
small workshops to CNO’s Navy flag officer meetings to conferences for up
to two thousand people, with simultaneous translation of up to eight
languages.

• Language labs to allow students to maintain language currency.
• Working-group facilities, enabling military officers and civilian practitioners
and academics to explore collaboratively issues of interest to the international maritime community and provide working-group reports and
recommendations at the ISS. Overarching themes for working group efforts
could be determined, as an example, through discussion at each ISS.

• A Fellows-in-Residence program would be established to allow the Naval
War College to offer one-year fellowships in Newport. These Fellows,
working with NWC faculty and students, would research pressing regional
issues determined by the CNO and regional maritime component
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11

commanders, such as democratization, defense cooperation, piracy, and
cultural obstacles to regional and international cooperation. In addition to
their research activities, Forum Fellows would support demands for
expertise in the College’s recently implemented, AQD-producing* regional
electives program (and provide regional expertise to courses at other
Newport school commands), as well as be available to brief senior naval
commanders en route to commands in various regions of the world.

• An International Scholars program to allow a select group of recent Naval
Command College and Naval Staff College graduates to remain in Newport
to study regional issues of importance to the officers’ home governments
and the maritime component commanders operating in their respective
regions of the world. These Scholars would also serve on appropriate
working groups in support of the ongoing ISS process and support the
advanced regional awareness training.
The Forum would also house the office and staff of the Associate Dean for
International Programs. As a direct contribution to building partner capacity,
the Naval War College would bring into collaboration and focus the combined
intellectual power of its faculty, the operational leadership mentoring resource
of our new Operational Leadership Department, the vast joint and international
experience and research of its student body, and the war gaming and applied research resident in its research faculty.
Bolstering the Ability of the Navy and Its Maritime Partners to Lead and Support Leaders at the Operational and Strategic Levels of War and Diplomacy
Recognizing that warfighting today is weighted at the operational and strategic
level, Navy operational commanders have begun to insist that their staff officers
be strategically focused, critical thinkers and skilled practitioners of operational
art. At the start of World War II, all but one Navy flag officer in the Pacific had
graduated from the Naval War College in Newport. Then, as today, the curriculum stressed operational- and strategic-level perspectives, processes, risk assessment, decision making, and leadership in peace, policy, and war. Competence at
the operational level of war today is more than thinking jointly; it is long-range
thinking and sophisticated analysis of the combined effects of a host of diverse
actors and factors so as to integrate both military and nonmilitary elements of
national power in order to achieve objectives.
Moreover, commanders at this level must develop skills and instincts appropriate to an operational environment populated by an array of nontraditional
organizations, all able to access and influence mission factors horizontally (vice
* An AQD—additional qualification designator—corresponds to a billet or assignment demand for
a specific set of competencies.
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through the more deliberate, formal, “vertical” structures that have traditionally
organized decision processes). Mission success must be assured with international and national agency and nongovernmental partners—often without
clean, clear, or formal lines of communication and with diverse interests,
charters, and doctrines in play.
Key to this level of command are the know-how, processes, and systems that
enable commanders and their staffs to sort through the blizzard of operational
detail as well as the complex array of diplomatic, political, cultural, and religious
issues to correctly frame and appreciate the mission and its context. Winston
Churchill wrote, “The success of a commander does not arise from following
rules or models. It consists in an absolutely new comprehension of the dominant
facts of the situation at the time, and all the forces at work.” To create an inventory of leaders who can do this, the Navy has established a “continuum” of professional military education (see the “President’s Forum” in the Spring 2006
issue), objectives, and requirements—the content of which is the responsibility
of this College.
At the top end of this continuum are the Joint Force Maritime Component
Commander (JFMCC) and Combined Force Maritime Component Commanders (CFMCC) courses for flag officers. At the junior end of the continuum
is a Maritime Operations Center course for people who will report to maritime
headquarters staffs. Supporting all elements of the continuum is the Senior
Mentor program, created to leverage the wealth of expertise that resides in the
retired flag and general officer community to help build command expertise at
the operational level. The Forum would house the staff for these initiatives and
draw upon the collective intellect and research of others colocated in the facility
to reinforce and strengthen their efforts.
Evolving Theory and Practice of Decision Making and Command and Control
in Chaotic, Networked Environments
Because of the importance of information and knowledge as operational tools
in war and diplomacy, the International Forum would arm students, researchers, and operators with the skills and competencies they need to achieve success
in the new operational environment. In order to harness the power of this new
force multiplier, we must develop new theories of knowledge-based warfare. Practitioners and scholars must work together to create a set of unifying principles and
constructs of the sort that establish new domains of learning—new academic
disciplines.
What has to happen today in the information domain remains a subject of
intense scrutiny vital to evolving the ability of commanders to operate effectively in an effects-oriented environment. Strategists from Sun Tzu to
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Clausewitz to Colonel John Boyd of the U.S. Air Force have recognized the
value of information and, more importantly, use of that information to gain a
relative advantage over an enemy. At issue are the largely intangible conceptual
skills, cognitive abilities, sentient and sensory information, socialization and
acculturation, organizational structures, and interpersonal skills—not just information management—required to be harnessed in increasingly sophisticated ways to frame and appreciate a mission and to marshal diverse actors and
effects to execute it. The Forum would be the focal point for testing, analyzing,
and understanding the complex interdependencies required to produce decisions at the operational and strategic levels. Activity and investigation in the
Forum would be channeled to identify creative ways to share knowledge, to use
that knowledge better, and to generate new knowledge and ultimately create
greater wisdom about complex situations and the innovative methods necessary to cope with them. The Forum would provide the new and expanded
“game floor” that has been the centerpiece of the College since 1884.
The Forum would itself instantiate and exploit knowledge theory and technology through its design and would be the focus for evolving knowledge-based
warfighting as an academic discipline. Coupling the theoretical effort directly
into the “feedback loop” with the warfighters, policy makers, and diplomats routinely involved with the College and its Forum would create huge value for the
Navy and its global maritime partners.
Developing Strategic and Operational Leaders
Going forward, none of these initiatives can bear fruit without a group of leaders of
character who can function effectively and efficiently in a dynamic, self-organizing
environment. The College’s Operational and Strategic Leadership Department,
established under the leadership of a recently retired two-star flag officer, would
also center its administrative functions in the Forum.
To support all these efforts, this facility would host a new Naval War College Library, expanded especially in the area of regional studies, cultural awareness,
and knowledge systems. It would employ cutting-edge technological research
and information capabilities to support the Forum and the broader range of student, faculty, Navy, national, and international needs. Reachback into this resource would be available to all graduates of both our national and international
programs.
Since the International Forum is intended to be a place where the future is the
focus, the building would incorporate environmentally friendly engineering.
Making this building a model for future Navy building design that emphasizes
energy efficiency and environmental awareness—opening outward toward the

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2007

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Spring 2007.vp
Monday, May 14, 2007 3:57:03 PM

19

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

14

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 60 [2007], No. 2, Art. 1

world across the ocean approaches to historic Narragansett Bay—would also
make the building speak to the Navy’s approach to global environmental
concerns.
The International Forum would be more than just another academic building. It would leverage the College’s international reputation for intellectual objectivity and institutional integrity, and it would signal an irrevocable
commitment to effective international, joint, and interagency collaboration. It
would become the venue and resource of choice for U.S. and international operational and strategic leaders searching for a way to bring diverse genius and expertise to bear on the most pressing issues of mutual interest in the maritime
domain. Its activities would serve to bring partner nations together to discuss,
study, experiment, game, and socialize actionable approaches to operational
and policy issues of importance to national, regional, and global security. It
would build regional expertise and cultural awareness among those nations, and
it would establish objectives and operate together with joint, governmental, and
nongovernmental agencies and organizations. It would help all these to learn
how, in other words, to think outside bureaucratic and political boundaries
while expertly working within those boundaries. It would be a fountainhead of
creative thinking and mission impact. The capability, capacity, and mission focus of the Forum would tie together, with mutually reinforcing effect, those four
vital initiatives the College is pursuing with such great energy and focus for the
Navy, and it would serve the current and future needs of the service, the nation,
and our partners around the world for decades to come. It is a proposition worth
pursuing.

J. L. SHUFORD

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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NOTES TOWARD A NEW MARITIME STRATEGY
George W. Baer

A

dmiral Michael Mullen, the Chief of Naval Operations, has charged us with
thinking about how to redefine sea power in this era of hyperglobalization.
He asked us to think of a new vocabulary, a new frame of reference, to consider
what will take our maritime strategy beyond sea combat and enable a sound
public understanding of the Navy’s value. Or, as Vice Admiral John G. Morgan,
Jr., Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information, Plans and Strategy, has
said, the core question for us to answer at the end of this discussion is: “How will
sea power influence history in our time?” Put another way: What is the role of
the ocean, of American maritime armed forces, in securing American safety and
prosperity?
A NEW MARITIME STRATEGY?
This is not new a question. One hundred fifteen years ago, faced with similar
challenges of new technologies, globalization, and new naval threats, the founders of the Naval War College, admirals Stephen B. Luce and Alfred Thayer
Mahan, answered the question with a new maritime strategy for the nation and
the Navy. They called it “sea power,” and it endured for a hundred years, a strategy of sea combat, of sea control, and of power projection. We are following in
this tradition when we ask again today: What is the Navy for?
One goal of the new maritime strategy, then, is to establish and sustain public
understanding of the role we expect sea power to play in our time, to demonstrate
the link between American naval forces and the preservation of our way of life.
Of course, we have some general expectations of our naval policy. The Chief
of Naval Operations (CNO) has listed them: to adapt the service to the country’s
requirements in an era of hyperglobalization; to meet the threat of terrorism; to
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stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction; to deter or control a future peer
competitor on the sea; to support friends and allies; and to address maritime issues in an era that is both transnational and state-centric in nature. These are
jobs the Navy must do to support our national policies.
Beyond these basic and essential naval requirements, is there anything more
that the Navy, and a maritime strategy, may do to help the nation in this era of
hyperglobalization? Establishing
our national maritime agenda is a
Good order at sea will be an international
shared responsibility, shared beconstruction.
tween the public and the military,
between officers and civilians. This is so because we want to give a national answer to the question of what the Navy is for.1
That was Mahan’s question, and it again is ours. Like his, our concerns mix
old and new, traditional maritime services and future needs. Like his, our new
maritime strategy has to have public as well as professional support. Sea power
then and today must be socially construed.
We all agree that the Navy is a combat force and that its missions generally are
to preserve free use of the sea, enhance global commerce, and secure our shores.
The first requirement for our fleet, then, as the basic condition of our new maritime strategy, must be broad preparedness for sea combat. But more may be
asked of it than sea combat.
The Navy must serve homeland defense, and it also must be ready to give humanitarian assistance around the globe. It must support armed interventions
and also position itself for ballistic missile defense. It must deliver “fires” ashore
and also conduct constabulary duties. It must protect fisheries and also be ready
to fight an interstate war. It must enforce sanctions and also assist in sea-use
management. It may be called upon for offshore command and control in case
of a terrorist pandemic and also to monitor the cybersphere. I mention these
many and varied functions—some traditional uses of navies, some new, hardand soft-engagement missions—because all these are what the Navy must prepare for. For all that, for our maritime environment, do we need a new strategy?
The answer is yes.
For starters, I think we should want to establish the widest possible national
understanding of the values we assign to the ocean. A national maritime strategy
will take into account more than just combat. The sea sustains our ecosphere. It
is essential to life on earth. The ocean is a vital venue of our commerce and
global culture, a source of essential protein, a domain of salutary recreation.
Some forty thousand merchantmen of over three hundred gross tons ply the sea
today. The U.S. Maritime Administration estimates that global maritime trade,
travel, and commerce will double in the next twenty years. Entire societies are
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dependent upon maritime commerce and upon food from the sea. More than a
hundred marine reserves have been established worldwide as habitats, reflecting
the need of a productive and resilient ocean. It is an ocean under stress. The
phyloplankton mass is diminishing, acidification is increasing. The number of
dead zones has increased by a third in just the last two years. The number of
these anoxic zones is now two hundred. Public and official discussions must
keep these facts in mind, for commerce and culture, ecology and food sources, as
much as politics and naval power, shape the values we—and others—place upon
the sea.
The ocean has value because it is an essential part of our common space. The
opening words of the recent 2004 report of the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy express our position in the world: we are “a nation surrounded by and reliant
on the oceans.” We are on a water planet. Seen from space, the earth is largely
blue. The ocean is a single whole. The water of Narragansett Bay connects to the
Sea of Japan. Our life and well-being are affected by this global connection. For
that reason, our maritime policy must be holistic. A maritime strategy is America’s face to the sea.
We must now consider the ocean’s value from different perspectives. One is
seeing the ocean as what Mahan called the “wide common,” a space for the
movement of commerce, a place of food, of environmental health, and of recreation, for use by all. Another perspective is to see that same ocean as military water, either as a moat, a protective defensive barrier, or, alternatively, as a water
highway for offensive use. The point is that ocean water can be crossed in all directions, so it can be a medium of trade, of military aggression, or of defense in
depth. It can be a common, a moat, or a highway. Our maritime strategy will depend on what we want it to be.
IS THE OCEAN STILL A COMMON?
Yes. But it is an increasingly restricted and contested common.
It is a place of potential contest because sea space is not just geographical
space. It is also political space. Many states today are developing their own maritime strategies, either for protection or for armed reach. Nations make local economic and security claims. Asian states seek stability near the Straits of Malacca.
Sweden protects the environment of the Baltic. India advances its influence in
the Indian Ocean. China wants to influence East Asian and perhaps western
Pacific seas. Recently President Hu Jintao of the People’s Republic of China
called for the building of a powerful navy prepared “at any time” for military
struggle, a navy fit for what he called China’s “military’s historical mission in this
2
new century and at this new stage.” North Korea threatens ocean movement in
the Sea of Japan. Australia and Spain worry about illegal immigration from the
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sea. Chile and Iceland think about fisheries. New Zealand’s exclusive economic
zone is fifteen times the land area of that country. Norway and Nigeria, to say
nothing of Iran and the Arab states, think about pumping and transporting oil.
As part of its nation, the United States claims almost 11.5 million square kilometers of territorial waters.
Our claims are political as well as commercial: we project naval power across
the sea, throughout the globe, and that power may be contested. Last October a
Chinese submarine surfaced, undetected, within five miles of the carrier USS Kitty
Hawk in waters near Okinawa. It is possible that some states might create formidable sea-denial capabilities and, perhaps, limited sea-control capabilities as well. If
that is the case, America may need
to continue to command the comWe want to give a national answer to the
mons, as only strong maritime
question of what the Navy is for.
power can prevent such denial,
and once in command, influence
how certain ocean-directed states may develop: encouraging them to cooperate
or deterring their expansion. In the present world of many powers, and should
our land and air forces be restricted in access or effect, such influence at sea as
command of the common presents may be our best means of foreign policy
leverage, and hence the key to a future maritime strategy. The sea is and will
remain a political sphere.
But if the sea can be contested, it can also be a space for cooperation. Many
laws and agreements already apply at sea, and all shape, or suggest, a common
concern for the “wide common.” There are environmental protocols, the International Seabed Authority, the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, the UN’s
Law of the Sea Convention. The United States is not a party to the Law of the Sea
Convention, but we recognize the usefulness of cooperation and operate in ways
consistent with its provisions of navigation and overflight. Admiral Mullen
stated his policy on cooperation recently in Venice. It was, he said, “the maritime
forces of many nations working together for global maritime security, while
keeping the sovereignty of territorial waters secure as a core principle.”
“Good order at sea,” then, refers to a framework of agreements for living with
3
the unitary world ocean. A secure global maritime environment is in America’s
interest. Good order at sea will be an international construction, an iterative
process, a network shaped as much by agreement as by naval power. A cooperative attitude is there to develop. For instance, today twenty-two countries participate in the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, a group that is itself a direct
outcome of a suggestion for regional associations made by the American CNO
at an International Seapower Symposium held at the Naval War College twenty
years ago. In the words of Admiral Mullen, “As we build upon ideas like Theater
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Security Cooperation, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Regional Maritime
Security Initiative, we find that every nation has a stake in security, and a distinct,
unique capability—as well as a great desire—to contribute.” If they have a stake in
security, they should have a stake in broader ocean management as well.
IS THE OCEAN A MOAT OR A HIGHWAY?
Of course it is both. The ocean as a moat, a military space, gives security space. It
offers defense in depth. But by the same token, as a body of water it permits offensive use, permits maritime power projection. One can move both ways across
a moat. A moat can become a highway. Naval strategy is what determines how
the Navy will use the ocean, both for defense in depth and for access to foreign
ships and foreign shores.
For two hundred years America was favored by ocean space. We thought of the
sea as our protection, as our safety zone, our natural strategic depth. A French ambassador many years ago observed, “America is blessed with fish on one side, and
fish on the other.” But fish space is not enough: ocean space is again open to those
who master the technology of sea control and have the will to use it.
We are not invulnerable. Attacks against us have happened before. The
United States was founded in the face of the longest seaborne supply route before World War II, the greatest overseas expeditionary force yet seen by history,
launched against us in the War of Independence. We won that one, thanks to our
continental resolution and outside help, but our vulnerability to British sea
power remained as long as we lacked sea control. Depth in itself was not enough.
A few years after independence, in 1814, the British burned down Washington,
D.C.—destroying the Capitol Building, the White House, the National Archives,
and the departments of War, State, and Treasury—all, that is, destroyed by an
amphibious invasion force from across the sea. The United States could not defend its own shoreline.
That is why, in 1890, searching for a new maritime strategy in a new technological age, Mahan said that the Navy had to reshape its force and its doctrine if it
was to be the true shield of the republic. Passive coastal protection was not
enough. We needed oceangoing battleships. The Navy had to become an offensive battle fleet prepared and able to defeat an approaching enemy fleet in blue
water, away from American shores. Mahan’s strategy of sea combat and power
projection dominated American naval policy for the next hundred years. Sea
power meant we could fight our wars “over there” and beat anyone who challenged our use of the sea. The best defense of our coastline, Mahan said, was a
good offense, out to sea.
That strategy of maritime power projection held through World War I, World
War II, and the Cold War. The North Atlantic Treaty was named for an ocean,
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befitting its maritime sponsor. The Cold War was for the United States based on
a global maritime strategy meant to contain a continental opponent. The United
States became the protector of the ocean’s rimlands, a barrier against Soviet expansion to the sea. At the end of the Cold War we had total sea control. The
rimlands of the world were open to trade and to liberal values—our national
policy called for “enlargement and engagement.”
Then on 9/11 violent politics hit our shore with a stunning shock. The ocean’s
vastness and our prodigious military and intelligence forces had not safeguarded American soil. The meaning of security had changed. Now the national
strategy proclaimed that protective actions abroad and at home were indistinguishable and might have to occur simultaneously. The strategic distinctions
were blurred between offense and defense, between means and ends. Strategic
depth had to be established, not just enjoyed. The moat that secured the United
States from direct attack and the highway that secured our strategic access
abroad came to be seen as one and the same, as indeed they have always been.
That is to say, the expanse of the ocean does not in itself guarantee either security or access. Its strategic dimensions must be created. Strategic value is
something that must be imposed upon the sea. This is why our new maritime
strategy must emphasize full maritime domain awareness. That is why the Navy
will have a role in ballistic missile defense. That is why the Navy must operate in
cyberspace. That is why the Navy will rely on the Global Information Grid, on
new command-and-control capabilities, to confer strategic benefits, to use the
sea’s great capacity for maneuver to hit the foe before he hits us, to give us offshore control. Mahan would have approved of forward deployment, forward
presence to maintain strategic depth, to stop a threat before it materialized.
THAT BRINGS US TO: THE NAVY AND A NEW
MARITIME STRATEGY
We can start by remembering the geostrategic values that are conferred upon a
maritime state such as the United States, which is in a position that gives the
4
great strategic advantage of global exterior maritime lines of communication.
A recent workshop at the Naval War College gave us a useful sea power syllogism, emphasizing the value of a naval peripheral approach and what is strategi5
cally required. It was described as “the Periphery Syllogism”:

• Who commands the seas can exploit global maritime exterior lines.
• Who exploits global exterior maritime lines can attain the global exterior
maritime position.

• Who exploits the exterior position can prevent anyone else from
commanding the world.
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To elucidate these issues, Robert Rubel, dean of the Naval War College’s Center
for Naval Warfare Studies, asked the College faculty members three questions.
Is the nation shifting from strategic defense to strategic offense? That is, which
serves the nation better now: The ocean as moat or the ocean as highway? Strategic depth or power projection? Concentration or dispersion of force? The answers to these questions bring into play the main strategic features of ocean use:
mobility, depth, influence, access. In one form or another the Navy will use these
attributes to defend the homeland, secure its economic well-being, and promote
a favorable world order.
There are, however, very substantial economic costs to global influence.
6
Forces “poised” in continuous forward deployment are immensely expensive.
An effective strategy must be sustained by an appropriate budget—hence our
need for public support and for cooperative allies. As Mahan and Theodore
Roosevelt knew, the public had to want to buy those battleships. Preparedness
was a shared responsibility.
The Navy cannot write a sustainable national maritime strategy alone. Admiral Mullen has noted that the Coast Guard and the Marine Corps are direct participants in forming the new maritime strategy. He has called the Coast Guard’s
Evergreen Project the equivalent of the Navy’s maritime strategy. The recent
publication of The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and
Stewardship stresses the Coast Guard contribution to developing regimes supporting American ocean policy, developing maritime domain awareness, and
close integration with the Department of Defense. The subtitle of Sea Power 21 is
Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities.
The nature of war at sea may also change. What kind of force, what kind of
strategy, what kind of friends, and what cost will be required remain open questions. The most recent report of the CNO’s Strategic Study Group 24, located in
Newport, gave a look thirty years ahead and concluded, “Future operations will
more resemble a pick-up game with neighborhood partners, or a street fight
that spontaneously erupts, than a well-planned operation conducted under conditions of the U.S.’s choosing.”
What is the value of navies in preserving economic order? That is, how can the
Navy best protect the benefits we gain from use of the sea in the age of
hyperglobalization? This again suggests the value of creating good order at sea—
a strategy that includes naval force but also the creation of a cooperative framework of like-minded maritime states. Our purpose here is to permit access to
materials and markets, to encourage prosperity and the favoring of political values through trade and social interchange, and to protect the position in the
global economy of our friends and allies. We can use our influence in two ways.
We can help friends—and we can hurt opponents. We can open commerce, and
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we can cut it off. We can seal off another’s moat by blockade, to take away the
value of his seaward protection. We seek to preserve economic order; we may
also be called to disrupt it. Sanctions are under way this very moment against
several states. These sanctions could get stronger. Blockade and interdiction are
traditional naval missions, and they are very serious: blockage is a belligerent act
under international law and may be considered an act of war.
A new maritime strategy must be ready for whatever the government commands: sea control, sea denial, assurance, deterrence, or disruption. Or more: recently the CNO instructed the newly convened Strategic Studies Group 26 to
take as its theme for the year “Fighting in Cyberspace in 2030.” He told the SSG
to “seek an appreciation of the relationship between cyberspace and the traditional maritime domains, including warfare and naval competition.”
This is the new world: naval presence in cyberspace, in the new “wide common”
of our time. U.S. policy seeks an unimpeded flow of information commodities, of
the goods and services of cyberspace. That recollects traditional Navy functions.
There must be free navigation through the sea of ether as well as on the sea of water.
In financial markets, for instance, over 95 percent of all wealth is digitally represented. Information warriors, terrorists, and pirate hackers threaten
What is the role of the ocean, of American
this, and thus also the security of
maritime armed forces, in securing American
military communications. A great
safety and prosperity?
deal of information power, over 90
percent, flows under the ocean,
through fiber-optic cables. Protection is required to ensure reliable movement of
electrons along the seafloor as well as of bulk cargo on the surface. Information
moves as commerce; movement adds value. The Navy is movement, and commercial movement is something navies have always protected, or attacked.
So the Navy of a trading nation might well position itself to protect and monitor bandwidths as well as merchant ships. A mobile, present Navy could grasp a
new form of sea control, guaranteeing free navigation of—if necessary, escorting—
7
the transmission mechanisms of the modern world.
Also, for all-important national defense, the need to track an enemy in
cyberspace, to deprive him of this medium of action, is a top national priority
that the globally deployed and electronically endowed Navy is well equipped to
support. This again is a function of full maritime domain awareness, the basis of
effective sea power.
How can we encourage naval investment by friends and allies? Here the Department of State could well become an active partner. The proposed Global Maritime Cooperation Initiative, an international network of navies that cooperate
in flexible ways on the missions suggested above, will be as much a diplomatic
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project as one just among navies. In short, and for greatest value, all our maritime considerations must be fit together. Our national maritime strategy expresses the whole, not just the parts. We must see maritime strategy whole.
A strategy, then, will show the maritime services what they are to protect,
what they are to pursue, and for what they are to prepare. It will give a common
purpose that will serve to overcome the community-based differences within
the Navy. A new maritime strategy will be an integrated naval combined-arms
concept, envisioning a force ready to fight in integrated space. A new maritime
strategy will express the way we see ourselves in respect to the world ocean and
declare what the fleet can do about it.
These purposes must be clear, and they must be realistic. In the last analysis, the
Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard cannot decline to act, but they must
be able to do what they are asked to do. A strategy is worthless if it cannot deliver
on its promise, if it sets goals without effects. That is why setting policy and strategy is iterative, an interaction of ends and means, between the goal setters and the
men and women at sea. Officers must state the requirements of the maritime services to officials who must set the nation’s expectations. Political officials must listen to the military officers, who must act. Both in turn depend on the support of
the American public. Naval effectiveness means getting the right mix of resources
and need. Naval readiness is about a national obligation to pay for and support the
force. Again: the new maritime strategy is, and must be, a shared responsibility.
A FINAL WORD ON EDUCATION AND THE IMPORTANCE
OF PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING
They say the Naval War College is about “Clausewitz and salt water.” To me, that
equals maritime security and, more broadly, maritime strategy. Let me conclude
with a brief word on the College’s historical role in shaping our understanding
of the sea and the sea services, the importance of ideas and of education in establishing the terms of maritime and national security, the importance of the education of professional naval officers and of creating a broader public awareness
of maritime values.
I mentioned Mahan’s contribution. Eighty years after Mahan, in 1972, Vice
Admiral Stansfield Turner restated the College’s academic purpose in his convocation address to its officer-students. “We must be able to produce military men
who are a match for the best of the civilian strategists, or we will abdicate control
of our profession. Our profession can only retain its vitality so long as we ourselves are pushing the frontiers of knowledge in our field.” That is the mission of
the schoolhouse.
I end with a story about the power of ideas. In 1893 Secretary of the Navy Hilary
Herbert decided to close the Naval War College. His assistant said the College
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was “really only a dancing school” for Newport debutants. The head of the Bureau of Personnel said about Mahan, “It is not the business of a naval officer to
write books,” and ordered him to sea. As Secretary Herbert boarded a dispatch
boat to go to Newport and personally close the school, his aide handed him a
copy of Mahan’s second sea power book, The Influence of Sea Power on the French
Revolution and Napoleon, 1793–1812. Herbert did not close the institution, and
on his return to Washington, he said, “This book alone is worth all the money
that has been spent on the Naval War College. When I embarked on this cruise, I
had fully intended to abolish the college; I now intend to do all in my power to
8
sustain it.” Such is the power of strategic analysis. If you look at Mahan’s book,
you will see in the preface: “Whatever success the book has is wholly and exclusively due to the Naval War College, which was instituted to promote such studies.” That is why—to advance such studies—we are in conversation today.
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A BIMODAL FORCE FOR THE NATIONAL
MARITIME STRATEGY
Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)

W

hile still serving in my first ship, I read a twelve-page article in the Naval
Institute Proceedings entitled “National Policy and the Transoceanic
Navy.” Written by Samuel P. Huntington, this durable and popular essay has
stuck with me ever since. As a source of wisdom for confronting both international communism and the Soviet Union, “Transoceanic Navy” is not as incisive
as public servant George Kennan’s Long Telegram or as sweeping as theologian
1
Reinhold Niebuhr’s book The Ironies of American History. Nevertheless I believe
Huntington’s article, written in 1954, rivaled them as a guide for the Cold War.
1950: The Navy in the National Strategy of Forward Defense
What were the strengths of Huntington’s description of a “transoceanic navy”
for the American nation? They were three. First, he did not speculate on a new
direction for the American navy. On the contrary, he described with a clarity all
might grasp the changes actually under way both in purpose and composition,
and why the changes of strategy and supporting forces should be stable, enduring across changes of administration and military leadership.
Second, Huntington went beyond describing the new maritime strategy then
being embraced by the U.S. Navy. He described the national strategy of forward
engagement that was being fulfilled by the Marshall Plan for Europe, the restoration of Japan, the fight against communist expansion in Greece, and the establishment of the NATO alliance. He pointed to the creation of the Sixth Fleet in
1948 as the most important arrow of seapower’s transoceanic influence, an arrow sunk deeply into the eastern Mediterranean. He emphasized what was increasingly being taken for granted, namely, the exploitation of naval supremacy
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as the cornerstone of a policy of containment and forward defense. He expressed
a national maritime strategy.
Finally, Huntington was explicit that an armed force must be seen by the
American people as relevant and worth supporting financially. He hinted at,
though he did not explore, how the investment in military capability must be
weighed against present and future national and international economic
circumstances.
By the 1960s the roles of the Navy in the forward strategy had become multifaceted. The Soviet Union had achieved its own nuclear weapon capability, and
the bipolar U.S.-Soviet Cold War competition had reached a wary stalemate of
mutual nuclear deterrence. The Soviet Union had also established a significant
air and submarine threat at sea
Will we have a unifying structure as clear and sufficient to challenge an uninhibited “transoceanic” American
long lasting as those enunciated by Samuel
naval influence. The Soviet navy
Huntington and Stansfield Turner?
would no longer tolerate unmitigated American forward operations across secure oceanic sea lines of communications, and the U.S. Navy could no longer take maritime superiority for
granted. Expression of the expanded navy—and national—maritime strategy
had to be updated.
1970: A More Complicated Set of Navy Responsibilities
Starting in 1970, actions by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) reflected the
multiple roles in the design of the fleet. In 1974 Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner,
President of the Naval War College, expressed the changes in “Missions of the
2
U.S. Navy,” published in these pages. In his article Turner described a “redefinition of traditional navy roles that had been in effect since 1970.” He wished “to
force the Navy to think [about itself in these new roles] in terms of output rather
than input.” Like Huntington, he said that a nation of free citizens and skeptical
3
taxpayers was “more interested in what is harvested than in what is sown.” Implicitly he assumed that the United States was a maritime nation exercising a national maritime strategy tied to operations well away from its shores to confront
the Soviet Union—and that the Navy was the enabler of that worldwide confrontation and containment. In considerable detail he explained the logic of
four supporting missions for the U.S. Navy: strategic deterrence of nuclear war,
sea control to safeguard the sea lines of communication, projection of power as
the reward and output of the Navy, and naval presence forward to affirm American commitment to the defense of the free world. He said other states might
have other missions but that these were the four that served our national interests. With varying degrees of emphasis these four missions served the nation
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well, became accepted, and ensured popular support for the Navy until the collapse of the Soviet Union.
What led to that collapse and the next great transition? An important nuance
to the national strategy of patient containment is well described in a recent
book, The Reagan Imprint, by Professor John Arquilla of the Naval Postgraduate
4
School. In the 1980s President Ronald Reagan went beyond containment and
set out to push back against international communism, while establishing in
personal meetings with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that he wanted peaceful competition between the two superpowers and genuine nuclear arms reduction. The U.S. Navy’s contribution had never been greater, its presence around
the world more important, or its support of overseas activities more crucial than
they became during its effort to serve those ends. The Navy was indispensable in
fostering the sequence of economic and political consequences inside the Soviet
Union that, after a decade or more of unsustainable defense expenditures, resulted in collapse.
1990: After the Fall—A Return to Projection of Power
By 1991 the consequences as they affected the Navy were nearly identical to what
Huntington described as the result of the fall of Germany and Japan. The Navy
returned to transoceanic operations to demonstrate its continuing viability and
marshal popular support. The role emphasizing projection of naval power was
described in a series of CNO white papers, beginning with The Way Ahead and
5
the more aptly titled . . . From the Sea. These expressed the projection mission
explicitly and, directly or indirectly, forward presence for peacekeeping. With a
de facto sea sanctuary temporarily assured, the missions were implemented with
large ships for efficient delivery of naval combat potential overseas. The Navy
bought new, more powerful, and more expensive weapons afloat, and the Marine Corps bought the capability to avoid direct, opposed assault with “ship-toobjective maneuver,” as a safer but more expensive way to conduct what had
been its bread-and-butter mission ever since World War II, operational maneuver from the sea.
But forward presence and crisis response became ever more difficult in the
1990s as the nation claimed its “peace dividend” and dramatically reduced the
proportion of the federal budget devoted to defense. Navy fleet numbers took a
nosedive, from almost six hundred ships to five hundred and then to less than
four hundred. Just “being there” was getting harder, and “there” had to be more
and more selective as pressure mounted throughout the 1990s to be in the Adriatic, the Arabian Gulf, and the western Pacific for extended periods.
It is deeply ironic that while the size of the fleet diminished by approximately
40 percent the demand on the Navy for crisis response actually rose. What was
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worse, the duration of the average response increased greatly. This was true
worldwide, but I will cite numbers in the U.S. European Command area of responsibility, because I have studied them the most closely. Before the fall of the
Soviet Union, from 1970 to 1989, the number of crises in the European theater
requiring response was 2.1 per year, with a median duration of less than a
month. From 1990 to 1996 there were 2.6 crises per year, with an average duration of 375 days. At the time of my study (1998) no one knew for sure whether
this rash of trouble spots would continue, but it was obvious that neither the
peaceable “end of history” of Francis Fukuyama’s famous prediction nor the
world harmony anticipated in 1991 was nigh. More and more Sixth Fleet ships
and aircraft were being siphoned off to the Middle East. Nor was there any evidence that the demand for American military presence in Gulf waters was going
to be eliminated after our swift victory in DESERT STORM. The Navy was using
ships that were inefficiently large for the blockade and interdiction roles they
were playing. We needed more but smaller ships and aircraft for what have come
to be called constabulary roles—a multiplicity of activities that are neither quite
6
projection of power, peacekeeping presence, nor sea control.
Meanwhile our forces in the Pacific were similarly strained with demands in
many places, but most notably with respect to the growing influence of China in
East Asia.
What was worse, the coastal sea sanctuary we had enjoyed was in jeopardy.
The inshore environment is replete with islands, shoals, bays, and inlets. It is
cluttered with coastal shipping, fishing boats, commercial aircraft, and oil rigs.
Littoral waters have become dangerous, from mines, coastal submarines, and
7
sudden land-, sea-, or air-launched missile strikes. Crippling attacks on USS
Stark (1987), USS Samuel B. Roberts (1988), USS Tripoli (1990), and most recently USS Cole (2000) illustrated the variety of potential means, surprise being
the one common denominator of every successful attack.
2001: A New Transition
Evidence of the transition under way lies in the almost unassimilable whirlwind
of guidance, visions, operational concepts, appraisals, program guidance, and
decisions flowing from an unparalleled number of statements of strategy—for
starters, a National Security Strategy, a National Defense Strategy, a National
Military Strategy, a National Strategy for Maritime Security, a National Fleet
Policy, and directives associated with the Quadrennial Defense Review. In addition, we published “Naval Power 21,” “Sea Power 21,” the “Naval Operational
8
Concept,” and the “Navy Strategic Planning Guidance.” The other armed services issued analogous documents.
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Where is the staying power of these documents? What convergence, consistency, and cohesiveness? Admiral Michael G. Mullen, the Chief of Naval Operations, is working on a new maritime strategy for the Navy that he hopes can serve
as a steady hand on the tiller to last well beyond his personal tenure as CNO and
even that of the next presidential administration. If it is to be durable it must be
consistent with what de facto has been the long-standing national maritime
strategy of forward engagement, empowered by the U.S. Navy, to allow the nation to sustain its political and military influence overseas.
Will we have a unifying structure as clear and long lasting as those enunciated
by Samuel Huntington and Stansfield Turner? Let us look beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, not to conjecture future changes in force composition but instead
simply to state what is actually occurring and how, almost implicitly, the defense
establishment is responding for the long pull into the twenty-first century.
We cannot put equal weight on all circumstances and crises and be, as the slogan goes, always ready for anything, anytime, anywhere. We should describe an
affordable American armed force that is no more costly in percentage of gross
domestic product (GDP) than now. The present defense budget already costs as
much as those of the next five or seven defense establishments, including
9
China’s. As Huntington and Turner insisted, the American people will want to
know not only what we, the defense establishment, expect to do to serve their interests but also that it will cost them no more than at present.
Let us define a two-pronged national military strategy with two, and only
two, objectives: first, the capabilities to deal with a peer competitor, and second, the means to conduct several small operations concurrently. Next we will
construct in sweeping terms the capabilities of the force components to meet
those two objectives. We must satisfy ourselves that the capabilities of all the
services will probably cost no more and might cost less than our present capabilities. The final step is one I do not take here but merely discuss—to assess
whether this “bimodal force” is capable of dealing with other situations, if with
less efficiency.
The Bimodal Defense Establishment
10
Even the CNO cannot suggest a national maritime strategy. But I can do so, asserting that such a strategy reflects what is happening, is economically viable,
will be popular with the American people, and probes more deeply than a transitory response to present circumstances in Iraq and tensions with China over Taiwan. The strategy will reflect not only what is transpiring as it may be inferred
from external events but also changes in operations and training that in due
course will affect force composition.
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The first mode aims at future peer competitors. But for the indefinite future
there is only one peer of concern, so let us be explicit: the high end of U.S. defense planning should take aim at the People’s Republic of China.
Engaging the Emerging Peer Competitor
Evidently we do not wish to fight China, any more than we wanted to fight the
Soviet Union in the Cold War. We want to influence China. The exact nature of
that influence—whether it be collaboration, containment, or confrontation—is
very important, but it will probably change from decade to decade. The question
is: How can we best design American military capability as one component of a
bimodal force that will be robust across a spectrum of changing relationships
with China?
For example, here are two factors to be weighed:

• Foci of current relations with China are the Republic of China on Taiwan
and the unhealthy situation in North Korea. A durable American military
capability ought to reflect the consequences on force design if an accommodation is reached between “the two Chinas” or if a reunification occurs
between North and South Korea. I will outline an American force structure
that accommodates either the status quo or peaceful, voluntary transformations. Korea north and south is a situation best viewed not as a potential
regional conflict but almost entirely as it relates to China.

• China is in the process of creating an increasingly robust sea-denial
capability that reaches farther and farther off its coast. We must anticipate
that in due course China will attempt to shift its navy from sea denial to a
sea-control capability. This is because it is now beholden to the U.S. Navy
to protect its trade and imports of energy by sea. We ought to anticipate
that China may decide that this vulnerability is unacceptable for a peer of
the United States, or that the U.S. fleet is merely a paper tiger that can no
longer protect the trade of China or of anyone else.
The consequences of these two factors are major but need not affect the force
design criteria. Here is an outline of the high-end force mode, designed against
the only visible future peer:

• We must maintain strong and influential military capabilities in the western
Pacific and Indian Ocean theaters, such that China and its neighbor states
know we do not want Chinese soft or hard power to inhibit the freedom
and independence of those neighbors.

• The first element of U.S. forces is a robust offensive and defensive nuclear
deterrent. China has a nuclear weapon capability. It will grow, as much
because of the probable proliferation of these weapons among other Asian
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states as because it would serve as an instrument of U.S.-Chinese diplomacy
or military confrontation. The offensive and defensive capability also serves
importantly against Russia’s nuclear arsenal, an old role in strategic
deterrence.

• Under no foreseeable circumstances would we invade China. Therefore, as
the second element, we must influence China with American sea and air
power, accompanied by close relationships with friendly states that do not
wish to see Chinese hegemony in Asia. Maintaining the viability of our air
and naval forces into the indefinite future will require adjustment of future
designs in ways not clearly discernable. The designs, however, must
anticipate Chinese aspirations for a sea-control navy.

• As the third element, the American surveillance and reconnaissance advantage
must be maintained. Future designs will probably be a continuation and
evolution of the expensive satellite and other high-tech means at which we
are expert, accompanied by clandestine penetrations with Asia-centered
human and signals intelligence.

• Fourth, we will also need a command and control (C2) advantage using
networking technology. We in the Department of Defense (DoD) have been
self-critical of our own efforts, yet a reasonable appraisal of our information
technology is that the services and American industry have invested great
amounts of money and have achieved an advantage over the competition
that will serve well if edge-of-war tension arises between China and the
United States. But China as a potential peer competitor has the industrial
and intellectual skills to catch up, a situation to be avoided through
constant vigilance.

• Fifth and last is the logistics component that maintains the fighting elements
in the western Pacific. This is an expensive component that takes a
substantial fraction of the defense budget. For example, without its air
wing an aircraft carrier is only a highly efficient and mobile airfield. As a
“logistics” component, the carrier costs roughly the same amount of
money as its aircraft. Long-haul logistical support is the responsibility of
the Navy and the Air Force; thus, with respect to China these services will
be sustaining their own operations. Keying on China makes it easy to see
where to base forward support—in Hawaii, South Korea, Guam, Japan,
Okinawa, and Singapore, for example—and the desirability of warm
friendship with the Philippines.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2007

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Spring 2007.vp
Monday, May 14, 2007 3:57:12 PM

41

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

36

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 60 [2007], No. 2, Art. 1

The Other End of the Spectrum: Small Wars and Peacemaking
By “small wars” I refer to the global war on terror and to constabulary and humanitarian operations. “Stability operations,” “irregular warfare,” and “counterinsurgency” are frequently used terms. A good shorthand word is peacemaking.
The upper limit of “small wars” is arbitrary, but the American forces that have
fought them have constituted no small fraction of military capability, if we call
to mind the Indian wars on the western frontier (1865–90), Army operations
during the Philippine Insurrection (1899–1902), and Marine Corps peacekeeping
11
operations in Central America in the 1920s and 1930s. A superb book covering
the long history of U.S. Army and Marine performance at the small-wars end of
12
the spectrum is Max Boot’s The Savage Wars of Peace.
In small wars, a severe complication is that armed forces are often not in control. Though the DoD must design in advance a capability for a wide range of
peacemaking operations, the forces will neither constitute the entire capability
nor be governed exclusively by a military command. In contingency and
humanitarian operations, DoD
Evidence of the transition under way lies in the influence will be shared with the
State Department, the Central Inalmost unassimilable whirlwind of guidance,
telligence Agency, the National
an unparalleled number of statements of
Security Agency, sometimes the
strategy.
departments of Justice and Homeland Security, and even nongovernment organizations. No one below the
National Security Council can establish, in the several instances going on all over
the world, how U.S. operations are intended to proceed and goals to be accomplished. Further, these will be coalition operations, with host states and other
participating nations.
There is another important distinction. The Weinberger-Powell Doctrine
says American armed forces should not be committed without sure knowledge
of how the operation will conclude. It also mandates the use of sufficient—
implying preponderant—force. Neither criterion can apply to small wars or
constabulary operations, which tend to be open-ended. The war against stateless
terrorists is much more like the never-finished “wars” on crime and drugs than
what Weinberger envisioned—a war between states that ends in capitulation or
13
a negotiated peace after American aims are achieved.
A complementary doctrine for “small” operations is badly needed. The lack
of one does not mean there has been no effort to distinguish between the two
ends of the spectrum of conflict. Three diverse examples will suffice, taken from
thinking now under way at the Naval Postgraduate School. Jan Breemer offers different principles for insurgencies in his prizewinning essay “Statistics, Real Estate,
14
and the Principles of War.” Raymond E. Franck and Terry C. Pierce describe the
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United States as a near-perfect enemy for terrorists and suggest things we could
do to be a tougher opponent, in “Disruptive Military Innovation and the War on
15
Terror: Some Thought for Perfect Opponents.” Commander (now Rear Admiral) Bill McRaven, a Navy SEAL, recognizes that classical theory of war and its
principles need modification for special warfare. His master’s thesis on the sub16
ject was published as SpecOps in 1995.
Despite these complications it is possible to describe the force elements for
small wars and operations. The elements will contrast sharply with—be virtually disjoint from—the forces for use against the peer competitor, at the other
end of the spectrum of warfare.

• Nuclear deterrence that applies against self-governing states—in fact, the
concept of deterrence itself—is irrelevant. A separate, expensive, warlike
campaign is now under way to forestall terrorist attacks of grave consequences. The aspiration of this small-wars force element is to prevent even one
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon attack.

• The second element comprises the forces to engage in small wars and operations,
namely ground forces, with tactical support from the air. The primary role
of the Navy and Air Force here is to deliver the ground forces to the scene
17
of action rapidly and sustain them, often for months or even years.

• The third element, intelligence and surveillance, is primarily based on human
intelligence. “HUMINT” takes time to establish, is difficult to maintain, and
is costly—so much so that it must be placed selectively, for a blanket capability around the world would be unthinkably expensive. High-tech intelligence gathering is also part of the formula. High tech can be more quickly
deployed as we learn how to insert effective “hastily formed networks”
employed by signals intelligence experts, but effective small-wars intelligence and surveillance are different in most respects from the intelligence/
18
surveillance/reconnaissance network against China.

• The fourth element is a command-and-control system to link coalition forces
and agencies outside the American military establishment. Those who tilled
this weed-strewn soil in the heyday of NATO know that even for operations
between semipermanent, treaty-governed forces under international command, the problems of reliable, secure, swift communications are endless.
One way to appreciate the future difficulties in small-wars C2 is to imagine
the challenges as the U.S. Navy develops a highly desirable, multinational
19
“thousand-ship navy.”

• Fifth is the logistics element that delivers, supports, and sustains the forces
operating on land. Sea and air components do the long-haul delivery. Army,
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Marine Corps, and special forces conduct mostly their own in-theater
20
support. Since in small wars there will be hot spots in many places around
the world, agility and adaptability become bywords for these operations,
much more so than for confronting China. Logistics is again a very large
and costly component. The advantage of smallness in scale is offset by the
vast panorama of possible contingencies, the many places they occur, and
their history of ugly longevity.
Observe again the striking contrast with the force composition for the peer
competitor. Operations carried out by a peacemaking force are quite dissimilar.
This is why a force designed for the middle—crudely, the composition that
served well for “two major contingencies” in the 1990s and until the watershed
attacks in 2001 against the Twin Towers and the Pentagon—is badly configured
to handle either the China or small-wars end of the spectrum of conflict.
Affordability
The aim in American competition with China should be to keep that competition economic and political. Each side has advantages and disadvantages. We
watch the Chinese economy warily, on one hand, because strong, sustained
growth will sharpen the competition and, on the other hand, because a collapse
or serious downturn might create internal political chaos there that would without doubt affect the world’s economy as well as our own. At the same time there
are plenty of concerns for the American economy. The short-term causes are
much in the news, but the vital aspect is our long-term economic health. Health
implies not the absence of bubbles and downturns but resilience through exploiting the virtues—some would say the mean-spiritedness—of capitalist
competition. Defense’s contribution, one that assuredly will be demanded by
the American people, is to avoid excessive expenditure.
Economic considerations at the small-wars peacemaking ends of the spectrum must be based on confrontations that cannot be peaceful. Here we will not
infrequently resort to force of arms and must expect to fund a stream of “small”
operations. Inescapably the long war against terrorism will be episodic and
marked by many campaigns, some of them long lasting. What is the expected
economic impact on defense expenditures? I don’t know. Despite much inflammatory rhetoric, the cost of operations in Iraq has been modest compared with
wars like Korea, Vietnam, and upward. Evidence from American history is a
mixed bag. The American economy did not seem to suffer when substantial fractions of the Army and Marine Corps were engaged in many constabulary operations overseas from 1898 until World War II. On the other hand, when the “Two
Ocean Navy” buildup commenced in the mid-1930s during the Great Depression, the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration seemed eager to disengage,
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replacing peacekeeping in Latin America with a Good Neighbor Policy. But if we
are to focus effort on peacemaking around the world, it would be useful to know the
economic history, along with the military history, of small wars of the nineteenthcentury British Empire and of the early-twentieth-century United States.
The often unnoticed expense of the transoceanic strategy is logistical. I know
of no data, but at a guess half the U.S. defense budget is expended just to operate
our forces transoceanically. It is an unavoidable cost at both ends of the bimodal
spectrum. It is a burden borne by no other nation.
A suitable benchmark is a defense budget that does not grow as a fraction of
the gross domestic product. The federal government took its “peace dividend”
and reduced defense expenditures substantially in the 1990s. Expenditures bottomed out at 3 percent of the GDP, their lowest point since the late 1940s. Since
the DoD budget is still by far the largest defense budget in the world, we should
aim to work within the current level, which is now between 3.5 and 4 percent of
GDP. The Congress and the nation should be cautious about increasing it, because economic strength is as important as military capability and international
political influence.
The war on terrorism extends well beyond Defense Department operations.
There are many players, not least the Department of Homeland Security. A strong
homeland defense alone can never be sufficient: first, because with the advantage
of initiative terrorists will sooner or later penetrate any defense; second, because a
disastrous attack would be economically crippling; and third, because as we have
already seen from expenditures for airline, port, and many other forms of domestic security, homeland defense is extremely expensive and plays into the enemy’s
hands economically. Our successful strategy must continue to be a combined
“homeland defense and overseas offense.” The overseas operations, borne mostly
by DoD, are expensive because we must go and often stay somewhere—and that
“somewhere” is many places. Yet conducting overseas operations will be far less
costly in the long run than keeping our guard up only at home.
In terms of affordability, the watchword for influencing China is blend—the
right mix of economic, military, and political astuteness. The watchword for
small wars is caution—awareness that employing forces can become as expensive as procuring them. Wars, big and small, are notorious as a way in which
great powers have destroyed their economies and brought themselves to ruin.
Wars in Between?
After conjecturing a suitable, affordable bimodal force, the final step is to test
how much risk is entailed should there be a theater war for which it is not configured. There should be no concern that the shift is risky. For better or worse, the
forces the Navy, Coast Guard, Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force operate now
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will be the foundation of their capabilities for at least a decade. During the last
fifteen years the armed forces were configured to fight two major contingencies.
Except for the Coast Guard, all were designed for “wars in between.”
In the forty years when U.S. policy was to contain the Soviet Union, the armed
forces were designed against a single foe. With patience, military readiness, and
diplomatic wisdom we and our allies avoided war with the Soviet Union. When we
employed the same forces in many other fights (often to resist Soviet-sponsored
communist expansion around the world), they were ill designed and sometimes
badly trained for such operations, from major theater wars fought in Korea and
Vietnam down to such successful crisis responses as the first Lebanon (1958),
Grenada, and Haiti and unsuccessful ones like the Iranian rescue mission, the
second Lebanon (1983), and Somalia. A future combination of high- and lowend bimodal forces to deal with major contingencies cannot be perfectly suited
either. The combination might be imperfect but sufficient. Or it might entail so
much risk that we would not wish to undertake the operation. I cannot imagine
who the high-risk “in between” enemy can be, so readers must specify their own
foes to conquer—or achieve a negotiated peace with, per the Weinberger Doctrine. They should pick their foes for the 2020–30 time frame, because it will be
that long before a new bimodal force replaces the present two-contingencies
force. The more the reader surveys the world and picks several different foes, the
better the test will be.
The Navy in the Bimodal Force
The American navy is transitioning from a fleet that responded to the 1990s program guidance to handle two major contingencies, nominally centered on
North Korea and Southwest Asia. In that guidance maritime superiority was
taken for granted, there was no peer to influence, and small wars were ignored.
Today the Department of Defense, with the Navy following in its wake, has
transitioned away from two-contingencies force planning.
Half the transition concerns relations with China. I have mentioned the
steady shift of Navy forces from the Atlantic and Mediterranean to the western
Pacific. Although the American people still take sea control largely for granted,
the nations of Asia do not. They welcome the American navy because they depend on it to protect their sea lanes. The Pacific Fleet concerns itself today
mostly with Taiwan and Korea, while supporting friends of the United States
and warily watching the extension of China’s sea-denial capabilities. Just beyond
the horizon is a predictable aspiration in China to achieve sea control in the
western Pacific and Indian oceans, with the prospect that the U.S. Navy must
think seriously again about command of the seas and the share of the fleet designed specifically to retain maritime superiority in the twenty-first century.
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The other half of the transition is a force designed for the large number of
“small” operations, expeditionary in nature, in which the Navy will continue to
participate. Partly these operations are to respond to state crises, instabilities,
and insurrections; partly to resist stateless terrorists, pirates, drug runners, and
illegal immigrants; partly to guarantee energy supplies for the free world; and
partly to answer natural or man-made disasters with humanitarian operations,
in which the Navy has been leader and major contributor. The Navy no longer
regards these many activities as “lesser included cases” of theater war. It now says
they entail forces with unique capabilities and has started to develop fleet components that can be distributed in more and smaller packages and to partner frequently with our international friends.
Huntington and Turner both emphasized the need for popular acceptance
and tied it to affordability. The transition under way will appeal to the American
public but not be so popular that the U.S. Navy’s budget will grow. A rash of recent studies expresses concern about the shrinking size of the fleet.21 These studies point out that at the same time the number of ships in the Navy has gone
down, its total combat capability has gone up in terms of missiles carried to sea,
aircraft sorties flown, accuracy of weapons delivered, and rate of targets attacked. But they conclude that within the current shipbuilding budget—and by
implication the aircraft procurement budget—the current force of only about
three hundred ships must shrink further, barring a change in average unit cost or
a reconfiguration to smaller ships in a more distributed force. The essential
point is that all of these generally Navy-friendly and well-intended studies assume that the shipbuilding budget cannot increase.
We don’t know in detail what the Navy force should look like. We know it will
come from the loom that wove the fabric of the projection-oriented Navy of the
1990s, which in turn was partly composed of the residuals of the four-mission
Navy of the 1970s and 1980s. The existing Navy comprises large, efficient ships
to project power to the land, principally in the form of air strikes, missiles, and
Marine elements. Against China, the need to threaten air and missile strikes will
not change, but China is developing the means to attack large ships at sea. It is
time to explore a more distributed fleet that is offensively disposed yet can suffer
losses and fight on, for no defense at sea can be perfect against a skilled opponent. Marine elements have a muted role, if any, in the naval configuration to influence China. The Marine Corps will continue to win the support of Congress
and the American people as staunch, adaptive fighters, but they will retain that
support by being proficient in small wars and peacemaking operations.
Nor do I mean to say large aircraft carriers and ships for amphibious assault
will soon be useless and should be scrapped. On the contrary, the carriers are efficient and of proven versatility in almost any small-war contingency. Carriers
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are so valuable in fact that one might wish to have aircraft flying from as many as
twenty-five or thirty “airfields” afloat. The nation cannot, however, afford the
cost of building and operating thirty large carriers, the CVNs. The practical approach is to sustain an affordable number of CVNs and supplement them with
smaller, more distributable airfields at sea that carry unmanned aerial vehicles,
helicopters, and (one may hope) STOVL* aircraft—the performance of which
22
may not match CTOL aircraft but are suitable for small wars. Nor should existing amphibious ships be discarded just because the need for opposed, forcible
entry is rare. Their aircraft, small craft, bunk space, and medical facilities give
them proven value in constabulary and humanitarian operations.
The submarine force is a major player in any attempt to influence China. One
can easily envision a “no-man’s-land” in the East and South China seas where
neither warships nor commercial traffic dare to venture on the surface, creating
the “empty ocean” once predicted by John Keegan, who foresaw a time when
nothing could survive on the sur23
face. American submarines deThe Navy was indispensable in fostering the
stroying commercial ships will
sequence of economic and political conserepresent a paradoxical return to
quences inside the Soviet Union that resulted
times past but a logical expansion
in collapse.
of their present missions. As with
aircraft carriers, the issue will not
be having too many submarines but too few of them, because nuclear propulsion is expensive. If this new mission transpires, the construction of nonnuclear
submarines will make sense to complement the present all-nuclear-powered undersea fleet.
Submarines will continue to play a central role in nuclear deterrence. But for
active defense when deterrence fails, missile-launching cruisers on the surface
will, when properly positioned in the right numbers, be able to shoot down
many or most of any enemy’s regional and intercontinental ballistic missiles.
The U.S. Navy has great capacity to adapt its aircraft and missiles afloat. Our
missile cruisers and destroyers update their offense by updating their missiles.
Modernization of the defense is harder, a future problem not yet solved. The solutions will probably be different for a confrontation with China than for small
wars. The Navy is experimenting with mission modularity while simultaneously
taking a cautious step toward a more distributed force with two new Littoral
Combat Ship (LCS) designs and experimentation with other small, high-speed
ships. As the Navy shifts focus to “green-water” (inshore) and “brown-water”
(riverine) operations, a continuation is predictable of the trend toward more
and smaller air and surface combatants inshore.
* STOVL: short takeoff, vertical landing; CTOL: conventional takeoff and landing.
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A very recent Navy role is defense against terrorist attacks in ports and in the
littorals. Still evolving, the role is shared with the Coast Guard, the Department
of Homeland Security, port-city governments, and other agencies domestically.
It is also being worked out with foreign governments internationally. There is no
more clear-cut evidence of a de facto bimodal approach by the Navy than the
sharp distinction between its contribution to nuclear deterrence against responsible states and its commitment to help protect against nuclear, chemical, and
biological attacks by irresponsible stateless entities.
I have emphasized scouting and networking as critical components. Navy
surveillance, reconnaissance, and C2 networks are not hard to put in perspective, for legacy systems—most of them unheralded, invisible, even intangible—
become obsolete much faster than ships and aircraft in the fast-moving world of
information technology. Weighing the cost-effectiveness of updates is a continuing process, quietly going on, because the investment cost is substantial.
Against China, Navy high-tech systems are robust and more or less the right
ones; “Steady as you go” is a reasonable rudder order. At the small-wars end of
the spectrum, there is (in gross terms) simply a vacuum to be filled. A benefit of
concentrating on the need will be to accelerate stronger human intelligence, network security and intrusion against diffuse foes, operational connections with
friendly states, and a structure to work with other American agencies.
Navy personnel are a different, special aspect. The important descriptor of
the people factor is turnover. The downside of personnel turnover is constant,
inescapable turbulence, because of the perpetual need for recruiting, training,
and assignment, which has a much greater effect on military organizations than
on businesses. Associated is the seemingly never-solved problem of balance in
career-long experiential and educational maturation to achieve sufficient numbers of qualified people working in new technologies, foreign relations, strategy,
and the economics of defense. But my purpose here is to point out the rarely noticed upside: that personnel turnover is the way to step out of the past and accelerate a transition. This opportunity to transform people is especially important
for the Navy, whose major pieces of large, expensive equipment sometimes must
last forty or fifty years. The Army and Marine Corps, it seems, are transitioning
faster, because lives now depend on grasping the demands for the tactics and
training of peacemaking. The Navy, because of its sea sanctuary, has not been
shot at much and has had less motivation to change. That is why a rich understanding of the bimodal force’s implications is the path out of the hardware
straitjacket.
Do you doubt that a transition can occur without new sensors and weapons
because new tactics and operations are impossible without new hardware? A little reflection should convince anyone otherwise. Between the attack on Pearl
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Harbor in December 1941 and the start of the great sweep westward to Japan
that began at Tarawa in November 1943, every class of U.S. Navy warship
changed its role, from battleships to aircraft carriers, to heavy and light cruisers,
to destroyers, and even to submarines. They were the same warships, but with a
great sense of urgency the crews were taught new combat roles, and the new
roles were supplemented with almost invisible new capabilities to complete the
24
fighting fleet that would soon carry the war to the Japanese home islands.
Personnel turnover is the opportunity to change, and the training and education to effect the change are explicitly the CNO’s responsibility. From my perspective on the faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School, he will know the
transition is complete when we in the Navy schools are teaching to the demands
of the bimodal force, from language skills to inshore combat.
Transitions and Transformations
The swift changes in the fleet during World War II can be called transformational. They were sudden and radical, only dimly foreseen, and urgent, because national survival was in question. Military organizations—successful
ones, at least—respond quickly when the national jugular is threatened. In normal times, the steady state offers a great power the opportunity for incremental
refinements of its fighting machine’s tactics and equipment that everyone understands and is comfortable with. I have used the term “transitional” to describe changes that are neither transformational nor incremental. A transition is
impelled by external events and is observably occurring. It need not be wrought
in an atmosphere of crisis and desperation, but if the new circumstances are not
recognized or if the flywheel of continuity resists the need for orderly transition,
the eventual result will be a radical, abrupt, financially irresponsible transformation. The Army and Marine Corps have been criticized pitilessly for their less
than perfect peacemaking in Afghanistan and Iraq. I think they deserve more
sympathy than they have received as long as they are in transition, evolving and
25
adapting into what I’ve called bimodal forces. The American armed forces have
never before fought to the standard of perfection of today’s critics. “The
Greatest Generation” that won World War II would by today’s standards be
judged incompetent. The Navy has been transitioning perhaps too slowly, but it
also deserves some slack. First, the need for a bimodal navy is less evident, because the fleet has scarcely been attacked or suffered loss at sea. Second, the current Chief of Naval Operations has already established the foundation for a new,
26
durable maritime strategy.
If Admiral Mullen and the Navy’s leadership succeed, the strategy will lead to
the right education and training, soon followed by an affordable system of ships,
aircraft, sensors, command-and-control systems, and logistical support for a
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bimodal force structure to sustain the Navy’s part of a durable national maritime strategy for well into the twenty-first century.

NOTES

This article was prepared for a Center for Naval Analyses–sponsored conference, “The Future of Maritime Strategy,” held on 26
October 2006.
1. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Ironies of American
History (New York: Scribner’s, 1952). Niebuhr
wrote on the values of Western civilization,
the need to preserve them, the innocent attempts to improve on them, and the malevolent attempts to replace them with fascism
and communism. He said it was absurd to say
the sins of the West were in any way comparable to the crimes of Soviet despotism. He
counseled resistance by patience, temperate
resolution, and economic warfare but never
by the use of nuclear weapons. George F.
Kennan sent what became famous as the
“Long Telegram” from the American embassy in Moscow in 22 February 1946. The
widely read version was that published in
Foreign Affairs in 1947 as “The Sources of Soviet Conduct.”
2. Stansfield Turner, “Missions of the U.S. Navy,”
Naval War College Review 26, no. 5 (March–
April 1974), pp. 2–17, reprinted in vol. 51,
no. 1 (Winter 1998), pp. 87–103.
3. “The people” is the great American tyrant,
the more so because constitutional interpretations grant both the majority and several
minorities enormous and inconsistent influence. It is, however, probably a correct generality that our taxpayers expect their armed
forces to stay ahead in the latest technology
but suspect that building new technology into
every piece of equipment (tanks, ships, aircraft, etc.) is unaffordable.
4. John Arquilla, The Reagan Imprint: Ideas in
American Foreign Policy from the Collapse of
Communism to the War on Terror (Chicago,
I. R. Dee, 2006).
5. These documents are reprinted in John B.
Hattendorf, ed., U.S. Naval Strategy in the
1990s: Selected Documents, Newport Paper 27
(Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press,
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2006), available at www.nwc.navy.mil/press/
npapers/np27/NP27web.pdf.
6. One way to update Turner’s missions for the
Cold War, and one in which constabulary
roles fit more comfortably, appeals to the
four functions of a navy described in Wayne
P. Hughes, Jr., Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,
1999), p. 9: at sea, a navy (1) ensures that our
own goods and services are safe and (2) that
the enemy’s are not; from the sea, it (3) guarantees safe delivery of goods and services
ashore and (4) prevents delivery ashore by an
enemy.
7. Worldwide, by far the largest share of damage
to merchantmen, tankers, and warships since
1967 has been inflicted by missile attacks.
8. For the “Naval Operational Concept” and the
“Navy Strategic Planning Guidance” see
Hattendorf, ed., U.S. Naval Strategy in the
1990s.
9. One wonders whether the closed society of
the People’s Republic of China is as clever in
concealing its actual defense expenditures as
was the Soviet Union. Even if that were true,
U.S. defense expenditures would still dwarf
all others.
10. The Chief of Naval Operations is responsible
for organizing, training, and equipping the
Navy. He does not make strategy, not even
naval strategy, but he cannot fulfill his responsibility without knowing how the navy
he leads will be employed by the combatant
commanders who will fight it. Therefore
CNOs have expressed their design intentions
as “maritime strategies” and the like. These
statements have been welcome and clarifying.
11. Some say Army stability operations in the
Philippines lasted much longer.
12. Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small
Wars and the Rise of American Power (New
York: Basic Books, 2002). Boot disregards humanitarian operations, however.
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13. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger developed the doctrine for the 1980s with the
assistance of his military aide, Colin Powell. It
much influenced Powell’s actions as secretary
of state and is frequently called the “Powell
Doctrine” now. The doctrine says that all the
following six tests are to be met before committing forces to fighting overseas: vital U.S.
or allied interests must be at stake; “combat
troops” should be “committed wholeheartedly . . . to win”; political and military objectives should be clearly defined; objectives and
forces “must be continually reassessed and
adjusted if necessary”; there must be reasonable assurance of support by Congress and
the American people; and commitment of
forces to combat should be the last resort.
There are subtleties in all the tests. For example, they recognize that a great power never
dabbles by going in, getting bloodied, and
backing out; it stays until the “clearly defined
objectives” are met. Combat troops are seemingly specifically at issue here, so that the
doctrine does not extend to bombing or missile attacks from afar.
14. Published in Military Review (September–
October 2006).
15. Appearing in the June 2006 Defense and Security Analysis.
16. SpecOps: Case Studies in Special Warfare Theory
and Practice (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1995).
17. Reflection on the history of peacekeeping and
peacemaking operations will convince the
reader that these four short lines are too cryptic. Seeing that is the beginning of small-wars
wisdom, for “small” operations are in fact extraordinarily intricate and hard to describe,
and require small-wars professionals. Consider merely the past and present inshore and
riverine roles of the Navy. Nevertheless, I
cling to the belief that small wars are first and
foremost operations by the Army, Marine
Corps, and special forces on the ground.
18. “Hastily formed networks” is a term used by
a consortium of Naval Postgraduate School
faculty with practical experience in rapid deployment to several Asian states and in humanitarian support of the 2004–2005 tsunami
and Hurricane Katrina relief operations.
19. “Thousand-ship navy” is a term introduced
by the CNO to foster coalition operations at
sea. The purpose of the slogan is not to create
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a bigger navy on the cheap but to ensure that
the U.S. Navy is not thought of as the policeman of all the world’s coastal waters.
20. It does no harm to point out again the frequent intricacy of small-wars logistics.
“Mostly” admits of in-theater air and river
traffic, too.
21. Five of these are Stuart E. Johnson and Arthur
K. Cebrowski, Alternative Fleet Architecture
Design (Washington, D.C.: National Defense
Univ., 2005); Congressional Budget Office,
Options for the Navy’s Future Fleet (Washington, D.C.: 2006); Robert O. Work, The Challenge of Maritime Transformation: Is Bigger
Better? (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2002); and
Ronald O’Rourke, Potential Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and
Issues for Congress (updated 30 March 2005)
and Navy Ship Acquisition: Options for LowerCost Ship Designs—Issues for Congress (updated 10 November 2005) (both Washington,
D.C.: Congressional Research Service).
22. STOVL aircraft can fly from an aircraft carrier much smaller than a CVN. CTOL aircraft
fly from large carriers. Before World War II
the Army Air Corps demonstrated that carrier aircraft could not match land-based aircraft performance (in operational ceiling,
range, payload, etc.). But the flexibility of a
moving airfield was recognized and valued,
carriers prospered and multiplied, and by
midwar our carrier aircraft performance
matched or exceeded that of Japanese army
and navy aircraft.
23. John Keegan, The Price of Admiralty: The
Evolution of Naval Warfare (New York: Viking, 1988). Keegan’s conclusion (pp. 266–
75) is entitled “An Empty Ocean.” However
he does not do justice to the fact that blue
water “no-man’s-lands” have existed since
aircraft became ship killers and that, sooner
rather than later, control of the oceans’ surface must be established so commerce can
move on it.
24. These tactically influential equipment changes
included radar, the Combat Information Center, a proliferation of short-range antiaircraft
guns, second- and third-generation aircraft,
and torpedoes that worked. Old battleships
were used for shore bombardment, because
they were designed before World War I and
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lacked speed to stay up with the fleet. The
new fast battleships, the first six of which
were commissioned in 1941–42, went with
the fleet but relinquished their capital-ship
role to aircraft carriers. Most of our mine
force, amphibious ships, landing craft, and
PT boats were built from scratch to fill a void.
25. “Bimodal force” is, by the way, an inelegant if
eye-catching term. I will be happy if “bimodal”
does not long survive this article, although I
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believe in the need for the kind of force structure it connotes.
26. Among other things, Admiral Mullen’s tasking for 2006 directs: “Develop adaptive force
packages and flexible deployment concepts to
include NSW, U.S. Coast Guard, and coalition partners in support of operations in
blue, green, and brown water environments
that are aligned with the National Fleet Policy
and the National Strategy for Maritime
Security.”
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CARVING UP THE EAST CHINA SEA
Peter Dutton

As the primitive society pushed ahead and the population of clan groups
increased, the balance between the material requirements of the clan groups
and the total quantity of the natural materials for living in their localities
was upset . . . resulting in the earliest form of war of human society.
THE SCIENCE OF MILITARY STRATEGY

The dispute over the continental shelf in the East China Sea . . . is a battle
of energy and a battle of geography. It is a fight for the benefit of the ocean,
and it is a contest for development of a country and the destiny of its people.
JIANCHUAN ZHISHI

I

t is a timeless and fundamental question: Must competition for scarce resources
inevitably lead to conflict? Today, that age-old question is often asked in reference
to the many sites in the world’s oceans in which neighboring coastal states are
shouldering each other for the authority to claim the
Peter Dutton, a retired Navy commander and judge adpotentially vast sources of hydrocarbons embedded in
vocate, is associate professor of joint military operations
the continental shelf and the fishing rights to the waat the Naval War College and an adjunct professor at
1
ters above it.
Roger Williams University School of Law. Professor
Dutton earned his juris doctorate from the College of
With more than a billion people to feed and a surgWilliam and Mary and a master of arts from the Naval
ing economy that demands ever more energy, the PeoWar College (with honors). While on active duty, he
served as a naval flight officer, taught at the Naval Justice
ple’s Republic of China (PRC) has become one of the
2
School and the Defense Institute of International Legal
world’s fiercest competitors for the ocean’s resources.
Studies, and served as operational law adviser to ComChina’s oil consumption, already the second largest in
mander, USS John F. Kennedy Battle Group, during
Operation SOUTHERN WATCH. In 2004, Professor
the world after the United States, is forecast by some to
Dutton became the Naval War College’s Howard S. Levie
grow to 590 million metric tons in 2020 (up from 220
Chair of Operational Law. He is a founding member of
million tons in 2000), nearly three-quarters of which
the College’s China Maritime Studies Institute and
3
writes on issues related to U.S. and Chinese perspectives
will be imported by that time. By some estimates, gas
on maritime international law as they relate to security.
and oil deposits in the central area of the East China
Naval War College Review, Spring 2007, Vol. 60, No. 2
Sea could go a long way to alleviating the energy
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deficit the country faces: the Chunxiao Natural Gas Development Project, an
area of hydrocarbon exploitation by the Chinese, is publicly estimated to contain a reserve of 65.2 billion cubic meters of natural gas and 12.7 million tons of
4
oil. This development project, which involves American and European oil companies as minority stakeholders, lies in the heart of the disputed zone in the East
5
China Sea. China has accommodated and cooperated to develop disputed areas
with several other of its maritime neighbors and even to resolve some of those
disputes amicably—most notably those with Vietnam, the Philippines, and Ma6
laysia, with whom it shares overlapping claims in the South China Sea; nonetheless, the competition between China and Japan over the resources in the East
China Sea remains confrontational, causing some concern that the competition
for regional predominance between these two powerful nations could spark
armed conflict if not carefully managed.7
In the recent statements of Chinese leaders—such as the conciliatory meeting
in early August 2006 with the Chinese ambassador to Japan, Wang Yi—and in
the recent decrease in Chinese research in the disputed zone, there are glimmers
8
of hope that China will pursue policies of cooperation with Japan. Additionally,
China reopened talks with Japan in July 2006 to attempt to resolve competing
9
claims to the gas reserves in the East China Sea. In the South China Sea, by contrast, China completed cooperative development agreements with Vietnam and
10
the Philippines in March 2005; it did so again recently with Malaysia, in a manner that implicitly accepts Malaysian, rather than Chinese, sovereignty over the
11
disputed portion of the South China Sea. These latter decisions reflect Beijing’s
active wooing of support from Association of Southeast Asian Nations
12
(ASEAN) members as part of its “peaceful rise” strategy. However, the strategic situation between China and Japan is significantly different. Even with
China’s accelerated economic development, Japan still possesses the secondlargest economy in the world and consumes a proportional share of global petroleum resources—resources China may also need to continue its economic
13
rise and the rejuvenated international status it desires. More important, however, is the fact that Beijing sees Tokyo as a potential rival for predominance in
Southeast Asia, a perception that despite a recent thaw in relations makes the
possibility of long-term cooperation and compromise in the East China Sea less
14
likely.
The focus of the dispute between China and Japan in the East China Sea is an
expanse of nearly seventy thousand square nautical miles of water space that
constitutes the overlap between China’s claim—which reaches from the mainland eastward to the Okinawa Trough just west of the Ryukyu Islands chain—
and Japan’s claim along a line equidistant from the shores of each state (see chart
1). China asserts its claim to the full continental shelf—and the waters above
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol60/iss2/1
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it—on the basis of the continental shelf provisions in the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and Japan correspondingly
points to the provisions related to the exclusive economic zone as the legitimate
starting point to determine a maritime boundary.
In part the dispute arises from the fact that UNCLOS essentially imported existing international law related to the continental shelf without also incorporat15
ing the pre-UNCLOS maritime delimitation standard based on equidistance.
Alongside it, UNCLOS set new law governing the creation of exclusive economic
zones—that is, the waters above the continental shelf extending to two hundred
nautical miles from the shoreline—stating only that “an equitable solution”
should be achieved in delimiting maritime boundaries for both the continental
16
shelf and the exclusive economic zone. UNCLOS provides no guidance as to
just what factors constitute an equitable means of dividing between two claimants the seabed with its resources and the water column with its resources. Many
international courts and tribunals have reverted to the equidistance standard
with corrections for factors such as offshore islands, disparate lengths of oppos17
ing coastlines, and economic considerations. Still, because signatories to
UNCLOS are bound only to its provisions and not to the decisions of international tribunals, no unified standard exists to bring stability and predictability to this volatile area of international law.
THE CHINESE POSITION ON THE EAST CHINA SEA
Since the period of negotiations that led to the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea, China has advocated that the “middle line” principle should
be considered merely one delimitation method out of several, rather than the
mandated means to achieve a fair and reasonable result, especially in cases that
involve both continental shelf boundaries and exclusive economic zone boundaries.18 China has consistently adhered to this position, and today, with virtually
a unanimous voice, Chinese scholars and political actors alike argue that the
“principle of fairness” and the “principle of natural extension”—referring to the
coastal state’s automatic authority over the continental shelf as the natural extension of its continental territory—are the most equitable means of resolving
19
their maritime delimitation disputes in the East China Sea.
Out of this legal perspective arises a theme that recurs with remarkable consistency in the statements of Chinese scholars (and government authorities): the
sense that the continental shelf off the coast of China is actually historical Chinese territory, not simply an area to be claimed under the international regime of
oceans law. One discussion of the topic by Chinese oceans scholars refers to the
regression of water during the Ice Age, extending the Yellow and Yangtze and
other rivers out onto the continental shelf, where they deposited silt from the
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Chinese mainland. On this basis, the scholars claim that “the East Sea continen20
tal shelf is a natural extension of Chinese territory.” This emphasis helps to put
in context the strength of feeling by many Chinese, who seem to view competing
claims on the continental shelf as actual encroachments on their rightful repossession of the continental shelf and its resources. Accordingly, the Chinese position on delimitation is that the entire continental shelf under the East China
Sea—from the mainland coast to the Okinawa Trough just west of the Ryukyu
Islands chain—should be Chinese and that delimitation of the maritime bound21
ary should therefore occur in that area (see chart 1).
These same scholars view compromise on the economic resources in the water column above the continental shelf through a different lens. Their position
that China should also rightfully claim the majority of the waters in the East
China Sea is based on concern for the Chinese fishermen who “would lose their
traditional fishing grounds . . . [causing] unacceptable losses to the Chinese fish22
ing industry.”
Just as nationalism is reflected in the Chinese view of the continental shelf,
there is also a nationalist aspect to China’s view of its exclusive economic zone
claim over the East China Sea. The language of UNCLOS recognizes coastal state
sovereignty over the territorial sea and implicitly conveys the full jurisdictional
authority of the state in that area. However, it affords coastal states only specified
sovereign rights in the exclusive economic zone and no more jurisdiction than is
23
necessary to enforce those rights. UNCLOS specifically provides all states the
right to high seas freedoms in the exclusive economic zone of a coastal state, sub24
ject only to the “due regard” standard that is also applied on the high seas. Chinese commentators, however, treat the concepts of sovereignty and sovereign
rights as if the distinction were insignificant and argue that coastal states have,
for instance, “sovereignty . . . over the natural resources,” as opposed to the sov25
ereign right to harvest them.
Using this approach, the Chinese assert that “it is perfectly justifiable, reasonable and legal for the coastal State to exercise exclusive jurisdiction within [the
exclusive economic zone, and] although other states enjoy freedoms of navigation, overflight, and the laying of undersea cables and pipelines within this zone,
26
such freedoms are conditional and restricted.” The view that a coastal nation
has authority in the exclusive economic zone that approaches full sovereignty—
at least over the resources—may be contrary to the purposes of the drafters of
UNCLOS and a novel approach to maritime law, but it is a view that is widely
held among influential Chinese and one that informs their positions on boundary disputes. They view maritime boundary negotiations as essentially “winner
takes all” endeavors, which actually result in enhanced or depleted sovereignty
27
for the coastal state.
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CHART 1

The shaded area marks the disputed zone in the central East China Sea. Japan claims delimitation should be based on the median
line; China views the Okinawa Trough as the appropriate boundary.

THE JAPANESE POSITION ON THE EAST CHINA SEA
Japan too, as a major importer of energy resources and one of the world’s strongest economies, has interests in the resources of the continental shelf.28 Nonetheless, Japan bases its claim to water space and the continental shelf resources
under it on provisions in UNCLOS related to the exclusive economic zone,
which have significant differences from the continental shelf provisions and
allow Japan to make a legitimate claim on more of the East China Sea than do
the provisions on which China relies. Specifically, while China relies on the
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“principle of natural prolongation” (found in Article 76) on the continental
shelf and refers to the Okinawa Trough just off the Ryukyu Islands as a natural,
geomorphological dividing point, Japan relies on the “equidistance principle,”
as articulated in many of the maritime delimitation decisions of international
29
courts. Japan is critical of China’s claim, with some support from the International Court of Justice, which has ruled out geomorphology as a relevant basis
30
under international law for most maritime delimitations. Thus, Japan asserts
that neither in law nor in fact should the Okinawa Trough form the basis for a
maritime delimitation, since geomorphologically it is just an “incidental impression in an otherwise continuous continental shelf ” and therefore not a true
boundary.31 Accordingly, Japan concludes, an equitable division of the East
China Sea should be devised through an equal division of the waters created by
drawing a line equidistant to the baselines of the Chinese coast and the baselines
32
of the Ryukyu Islands chain (see chart 1). The legal basis for the dispute between the two states is therefore one of interpretation of the text of UNCLOS and
of the relevant factors, as developed through the application of international maritime law by other states and international bodies, that should sway in favor of one
interpretation or the other in the particular case of the East China Sea.
THREE OPTIONS FOR PEACEFUL DELIMITATION
Despite the legal difficulties, there are reasons to hope that the political will for a
peaceful and lasting compromise may be developing. For instance, both sides
have agreed to cooperation;33 both sides have agreed to seek an equitable solu34
tion through negotiation; both sides agree that shared fishing rights are mutu35
ally beneficial and have agreed to a joint fishing regime; both sides express an
interest in joint development of the hydrocarbon resources of the East China
36
Sea; and perhaps most importantly, both sides recognize the potential for undesirable conflict and agree to exercise self-restraint and apply international law
37
as expressed in and through UNCLOS in formulating a solution. These areas of
agreement provide a substantial basis upon which to forge cooperation and
compromise, reached in accordance with international law of the sea, which will
serve to decrease tensions in the region and increase the efficient use of the East
China Sea’s resources.
A Single Integrated Boundary: The Gulf of Maine Case
Perhaps the single best guide to the international law that governs resolution of
maritime boundary disputes like the one in which the Chinese and Japanese find
themselves engaged in the East China Sea is the 1984 Case Concerning the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (the Gulf of Maine Case),
38
decided by the International Court of Justice. In that case, as do the Chinese and
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the Japanese today, Canada and the United States found themselves in a dispute
involving overlapping continental shelf claims, overlapping exclusive economic
zones, and the proper means of drawing a maritime boundary in resource-rich
39
waters with historical use by the people of both countries. The international
law of boundary delimitation was at the time (and remains, as we have seen)
fraught with ambiguity that encouraged parties to stake out and stand by irreconcilable approaches to drawing a common and accepted maritime border.
Canada and the United States were unable to resolve their differences through
negotiation because there was no commonly accepted set of principles from
which to start realistic negotiations. However, the factors considered and the approach taken by the International Court in the Gulf of Maine Case can shed light
on a fruitful path forward in the East China Sea.
Canada and the United States disputed the appropriate basis on which to demark the international maritime boundary in the Gulf of Maine (see chart 2).
Canada’s position was based on a straightforward rendering of the principles of
the equidistance line (for laterally adjacent coasts) or the median line (for opposite coasts), which hold that unless there are special circumstances, an equal di40
vision of the areas of overlap is the most equitable result.
The American position was that holding strictly to the equidistance principle
would lead to an inequitable division of the waters; accordingly, the United
States urged the Court to apply a more nuanced balancing of relevant factors to
41
achieve an equitable result. Specifically, the American side argued that the
Court should blend considerations of continental shelf delimitation and economic zone delimitation. In such blended situations, the United States argued,
international law requires the Court to apply equitable principles, such as consideration of the geographic features of the relevant coastlines; ecological features, including the nature and location of commercial fish stocks; and special
circumstances, such as the historical dominance over the area by American fisher42
men and government authorities for more than two hundred years.
The Court began its analysis of relevant international law and the parties’ positions with an important observation—that it was not determining a true
boundary between sovereign states but merely delimiting zones of jurisdiction
43
or sovereign rights outside each state’s sovereign waters. The Court recognized
that the international community had relevant rights in these areas that would
not be affected by whatever the Court decided, since, presumably, the international rights in these waters were predominant and would therefore remain
unchanged regardless of which coastal state ultimately possessed the rights to
the resources in the disputed area.44
The key to the Court’s ultimate decision was an essential acceptance of the U.S.
position that geographic circumstances are relevant to maritime delimitation
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CHART 2
GULF OF MAINE: FISHERY ZONE AND CONTINENTAL SHELF CLAIMS

International Court of Justice Year 1984, 12 October 1984, Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of
Maine Area (Canada/United States of America). The solid line represents the boundary set by the Court to delimit both the exclusive
economic zone and the continental shelf.

decisions. In an unexpected move, however, the Court decided to define what the
parties had not: it took an expansive view of what constitutes the Gulf of Maine, to
include the protrusions caused by Cape Cod Bay and Massachusetts Bay on the
American side and the Bay of Fundy on the Canadian side (see chart 2), a position
45
that neither party had apparently anticipated.
Fundamentally, the Court rejected delimiting a maritime boundary based
solely on either the basis of the continental shelf or the exclusive economic zone.
In doing so, it determined that international law requires that delimitation in
such complex, overlapping zones be based on equitable criteria in relation to the
46
geographical features of the region. Having rejected either geomorphological
or resource-related attributes as a basis for delimitation, the Court drew a
boundary based on the geography of the adjacent and opposing coastlines, adjusting it for relevant special circumstances in order to achieve an equitable result. The first special circumstance of which the Court took note was the
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presence of the adjacent Bay of Fundy, which it used to increase the overall allocation of space to Canada. The Court also took note of a few very small Canadian islands in the Gulf of Maine and adjusted the line slightly to give them only
half effect, in order to avoid cutting into the U.S. allocation of space by an
amount disproportionate to the islands’ diminutive size. Finally, the Court
chose to divide the Georges Bank between the parties, because “a decision which
would have assigned the whole of Georges Bank to one of the Parties might possibly have entailed serious economic repercussions for the other,” given the historical dependence of the inhabitants of both countries on the fishing resources
47
in that area.
Applying to the East China Sea the same rules that the International Court of
Justice applied to the Gulf of Maine, China and Japan can negotiate agreement
of a single maritime boundary. An equitable division of the space can be
achieved using geographical features as a starting point and taking into account
the special circumstances. One special circumstance is the dispute over the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands; another is historical patterns of use by each country. In
order to achieve an equitable result that does not harm the long-term interests of
either party, accommodation of these issues must be considered.
One omission in the Chinese literature—and a fairly curious one, in light of
the Gulf of Maine Case—is any assertion that the Yellow Sea should be taken
into account as a special circumstance in addressing an appropriate ratio to
guide allocation of water space between the two countries. The International
Court having held that the adjacent presence of the Bay of Fundy as a dependent
body of water of the Gulf of Maine should weigh in Canada’s favor when delimiting the maritime boundary, one would think that the Chinese might make the
same claim for the effect of the Yellow Sea on China’s rightful allotment of the
waters of the East China Sea. But recently the description by a pair of Chinese
oceans scholars of the northern border of the East China Sea as “the Yangtze
River’s entrance at Qidong to the southwest corner of the Korean peninsula”
specifically excluded the Yellow Sea, thus excluding that sea as a consideration in
48
this context.
Delimiting a single boundary to mark both the exclusive economic zone and
the continental shelf between China and Japan has the benefits of clarity and
certainty, and it therefore minimizes the potential for future conflict over resource rights and sovereign jurisdiction. However, given the suspicion that
hangs over the relationship between the two countries because of the history of
Japanese use of force against China to pursue territory and resources, the likelihood that this kind of comprehensive solution to the boundary dispute can be
successfully negotiated is remote. The positions of these states are too divergent;
agreement on relevant factors and the weight to be given them is unlikely; and,
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2007

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Spring 2007.vp
Monday, May 14, 2007 3:57:20 PM

63

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

58

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 60 [2007], No. 2, Art. 1

because of the confused state of the law, each side has at least some legal support
for its position as to the proper location of a unified boundary. Therefore, other
approaches to boundary delimitation should be considered.
Multiple Functional Boundaries: The Australia–Papua New Guinea Treaty
Chinese scholars have been considering another potential model for peaceful and
equitable resolution of the boundary dispute: delimitation of nonidentical bound49
aries for the continental shelf and for the economic zones in the waters above it.
An example of this type of dispute resolution can be found in the Australia–
Papua New Guinea Border Treaty, which set a precedent for creativity in international dispute resolution and founded the practice of cooperative jurisdiction
between interdependent states.50 The two states, which share only a maritime
boundary, agreed to four distinct types of boundaries between them: sovereign
boundaries between territorial waters in the narrow Torres Strait, in which overlapping territorial water claims existed; a seabed boundary; a fisheries boundary
in the water column; and a special reservation area for aboriginal peoples living
on the islands in the Torres Strait. This agreement broke new ground, so to
speak, in that the two states agreed to exclusive jurisdiction in separate forms
over the same space. Additionally, the two states recognized the special status of
islands with cultural and historical significance and accommodated those values
by carving out a special zone for them.
The preamble to the treaty addresses the fundamental values that the two
states applied in coming to the creative solution and that they sought to protect
and preserve by accepting multiple boundaries. It especially emphasizes freedom of navigation and overflight, conservation and sharing of fishing resources,
regulation of seabed mineral resources, the importance of preserving the marine environment, and the desire to protect the historical way of life of Torres
Strait Islanders and indigenous coastal peoples.
The multiple boundary approach helps resolve the tension left within
UNCLOS between delimitation of exclusive economic zones and delimitation of
the continental shelf. Although the Australia–Papua New Guinea Treaty was negotiated before the convention, it presaged at least one answer to the thorny dilemma presented by the two approaches to maritime delimitation. As one
Chinese scholar has noted:
Although the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea adopted a compromise position
between the “natural extension principle” [of continental shelf delimitation] and the
“centerline principle” [of exclusive economic zone delimitation] . . . it only provided
guidance in the most general terms saying that states should proceed in accordance
with international law . . . in order to attain an equitable solution. Although this stipulation sets down the principle of peaceful and equitable dispute resolution . . . it is
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nonetheless overly general and simplistic and lacking in rigorous standards, and as a
result the two sides engaged in a border negotiation often wind up offering widely divergent or even contradictory interpretations of this principle in actual practice. . . .
And with regard to whether the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf
should share the same boundary or have two different boundaries, the Convention
51
on the Law of the Sea was completely silent.

Although this scholar probably overstates the “silence” of UNCLOS concerning boundary delimitation methods where both exclusive economic zone and
continental shelf boundaries are under consideration, if the Chinese and Japanese governments were to apply this multiple boundary method to the dispute
in the East China Sea, each principle could be applied to its own zone.52 The delimitation of the seabed boundary may be based on the continental shelf approach of “natural extension,” taking into account primarily geomorphological
factors of the seabed to delimit this boundary and adjusting for “special circumstances” such as the presence of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which will be discussed below. With regard to the exclusive economic zone, a separate boundary
could be established using the median line principle, achieving an equitable result by again adjusting for such special circumstances as the ratio of the length of
each state’s coastline, the presence of the Yellow Sea adjacent to and arguably a
part of the East China Sea, and the historical use of the waters by each state’s
53
coastal population for fishing and harvesting of other resources. Boundaries
thus established would have the benefit of resolving a long-standing source of
friction between China and Japan, and they would allow for the exploitation of
hydrocarbon resources in the wide expanse in the middle of the East China Sea
54
that each side has agreed not to develop.
In the negotiated compromise reached by the Australians and the Papua New
Guineans each side was confident of future stable relations between them, but
future stability across the East China Sea is less assured. The most significant aspect of the treaty between Australia and Papua New Guinea is clearly the implementation of a delimitation system of overlapping jurisdictions, which will
require substantial and perpetual cooperation between the two states to implement effectively. In other words, Australia’s ability to exploit its seabed rights
will be forever dependent on Papua New Guinea’s acquiescence to Australia’s
presence in the waters over which Papua New Guinea has economic jurisdiction,
and vice versa.
In the Gulf of Maine, another location in which international stability between the negotiating states was reasonably assured, the parties chose to implement a single boundary in order to guarantee future peaceful relations
concerning the maritime space and the resources contained within it. Jurisdictional authority in the Torres Strait region was also successfully separated, but
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between Australia and Papua New Guinea the possibility for friction continues
unless each state habitually accommodates the other. Habitual accommodation
has worked reasonably well between Australia and Papua New Guinea, which
have no long history of antagonism and neither of which is presently vying for
regional predominance. It might have worked well between the United States
and Canada, but each side wisely chose to avoid even the possibility of friction.
However, in the case of China and Japan, hope for such accommodation over
time is rather far-fetched, given the long history and recent geopolitics. Chinese
scholar Li Yi of the College of Political Science and International Relations at
Beijing University, in commenting on this multiboundary approach, has suggested a compromise that may help to reduce tension in the East China Sea—
that the area of overlap formed by the two different boundaries (continental
55
shelf and exclusive economic zone) be designated a joint development zone.
Although such an agreement would move relations a step closer to the harmony
each side professes to desire, it still relies on political compromise to diffuse tension, and history suggests that such compromise, if ever achieved, would be
fleeting, since the fundamental bases for mistrust have not been addressed. That
said, a third approach to maritime delimitation—creation of a zone of shared
jurisdiction—is worth examining to determine whether any agreement in existence could offer a stability-building compromise.
Agreement and Cooperation: Joint Jurisdictional Zones
The idea of creating a zone of mutual jurisdiction was to some degree taken up
in the Australia–Papua New Guinea Treaty, in relation to “reservation zones” set
aside for free use by the indigenous population. In that case, neither state party
to the treaty is authorized to exercise jurisdiction—except its seabed or fishery
56
rights—without the concurrence of the other state party. This is an approach
to boundary and resource disputes well known to the Chinese. In May 1979, for
instance, Deng Xiaoping, then vice premier, proposed to Japan that the dispute
over the sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands be resolved “through bilateral negotiations and joint development, without touching upon the issue of
57
territorial sovereignty.”
Joint Use and Development: The China-Vietnam Model. On Christmas Day in
2000, Vietnam and China signed a comprehensive—and creative—maritime
delimitation agreement for the waters of the Tonkin Gulf (Beibu Gulf, to the
58
Chinese). The Tonkin Gulf is a stretch of water bounded by Vietnam on the
west, mainland China on the north, and China’s Hainan Island on the east. The
agreement created the first finalized maritime border between China and a
neighboring coastal state. It divided the waters roughly equally, delineating territorial waters and exclusive economic zones and allocating continental shelf
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rights. In this case, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf
boundary are conterminous. The creative aspect of the agreement is the establishment of a joint fisheries zone in waters with historical significance to both
60
countries in the middle of the gulf (see chart 3). Fishing vessels of both states
have the right to fish for a period of twelve years—with three years of automatic
extensions—after which the waters will revert to full sovereign control on either
side of the agreed-upon line. Since the agreement came into effect on 30 June
2004, China and Vietnam have begun joint maritime research and joint patrols
61
in the fisheries zone.
CHART 3
TONKIN/BEIBU GULF CO-FISHING AREA

Creation of the fishing area constituted a key aspect of maritime boundary negotiations
between China and Vietnam.

This agreement demonstrates that the two states, which have engaged in open
conflict over border and resource disputes in recent decades, can move beyond
the past to peaceful resolution of their differences, to mutual benefit. As one
Chinese commentator noted,
The delimitation and fishing agreements between the two countries are mutually
beneficial. It shows that the two sides are fully capable of resolving historical problems through friendly consultation. It will also boost the development of bilateral ties
and promote lasting stability, neighborliness, amity and overall cooperation between
the two countries. At the same time, it will further strengthen mutual political trust
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and their cooperation in other fields, which are favorable to the peace and stability of
62
the [Tonkin] Gulf area.

Indeed, China and Japan had a similar burst of bilateral sentiment in 1997,
when they signed an agreement for cooperative fisheries management in the
East China Sea. However, unlike the growing cooperation between China and
Vietnam in the Tonkin Gulf, the intervening years since the China-Japan East
Sea Fisheries Agreement have been unproductive in reaching a larger settlement
and are better characterized by reported tense, armed standoffs between the two
63
powers. Even if the political circumstances do not currently permit the 1997
agreement to serve as the starting point for cooperative compromise across the
East China Sea, the possibility of a broader, long-term solution could be improved
if China and Japan took smaller confidence-building steps toward that goal.
Joint Business Development: The PRC/Vietnam/Philippines Model. One such
confidence-building step was taken in the form of a business arrangement by
China, the Philippines, and Vietnam to develop jointly the hydrocarbon resources under the South China Sea. Although each state maintained its rival
claim of sovereignty over all or portions of the Spratly Islands, the three countries agreed in March 2005 to perform a joint survey of potential hydrocarbon
64
deposits in the disputed areas of the South China Sea. Each country claims sovereignty over some or all of the Spratly Islands, which pepper the South China
Sea, and accordingly each claims rights to the continental shelf and exclusive
economic zone that would pertain to the islands under the UNCLOS framework. The tripartite agreement authorizes the state-owned oil companies of
each country (China National Offshore Oil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil Company, and the Vietnam Oil and Gas Corporation) to engage in
joint seismic exploration, sharing costs equally, as a commercial transaction
65
specified to last three years and to have no effect on political claims.
Cooperation among state-owned oil companies is certainly not new, but an
agreement among rival claimants—whose rivalries led to armed skirmishes in
the 1970s, ’80s, and ’90s—to cooperate in the development of maritime resources while postponing final agreement over sovereignty is a potential model
for cooperation between China and Japan in the East China Sea. One of the
stumbling blocks to a final agreement between China and Japan is a lack of
shared information about the nature of likely resources under the East China
Sea’s continental shelf. Suspicion by each of the exploratory activities of the
other is in part responsible for the heightened tensions and increased potential
for military conflict.66 Joint exploration in the East China Sea using the Spratlys
cooperative business plan as a model could lead to joint development with mutual benefits and will at least afford a more complete picture of the resources
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available for negotiation. Even though it may be a small step in a much longer
process, an agreement on joint exploration would form the basis for increased
trust and confidence and demonstrate a real desire by each side to move forward
cooperatively. Additionally, China and Japan have each stressed the importance
of the resources in and under the East China Sea to their respective economies,
and joint exploitation may result in more efficient use of the oil and natural gas
resources available to lessen each country’s dependence on external energy
supplies.
Establishing a joint development zone in the East China Sea, either through a
business-based agreement or a mechanism that allows for joint resource exploitation for a period of time, has the benefit of building upon the factors upon
which China and Japan both already agree. It helps alleviate each country’s need
for resources without touching the “third rail” of sovereignty, the issue on which
neither side seems ready to compromise. Perhaps most importantly, joint development could serve as the foundation of trust and confidence necessary to move
forward on a comprehensive delimitation agreement. That said, the potential for
conflict remains as settlement of the key issue of sovereignty is once again put
off for another day. Perhaps that is the most that can be hoped for, given the
complicated political factors that make negotiations in the East China Sea so
difficult.
TAIWAN AND THE SENKAKU/DIAOYUTAI DISPUTE AS
COMPLICATING FACTORS
Significantly complicating factors in the delimitation of the maritime boundary in the East China Sea are the dispute over the sovereignty of the Senkaku
67
Islands (Diaoyutai, to the Chinese) and the unique status of Taiwan. The
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are a group of five small uninhabited rocky islets, the
68
largest of which is 3.6 square kilometers in area. Historically, they were
known to the Chinese and mentioned in official documents as early as the
Ming dynasty (1368–1644), but there is no evidence they were ever taken under effective administration or control by the Chinese, the necessary element
under international law for a state to assert legitimate sovereignty over terri69
tory. They have been administered and controlled by Japan since 1895—with
the exception of the post–World War II occupation by the United States between 1945 and 1972—based on Japanese claims of discovery in about 1894.
China’s view is that they were stolen from Chinese control as a result of the
1895 Sino-Japanese War and should have been returned to China after World
70
War II. Military posturing between Chinese and Japanese naval forces in the
waters around these islands has been intense in recent years, including aggressive Japanese tracking of a Han-class Chinese nuclear submarine in the area in
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November 2004 and joint U.S.-Japanese naval exercises to practice defending
71
the islands in November 2006.
Resolution of the issue of sovereignty and the naval tensions that attend it,
however, are only the first complicating factors concerning these islets. An
equally strident argument is ongoing over the extent of water and continental
shelf space to which this small but crucial group of outcroppings is entitled—
regardless of which side receives final sovereignty over them. The crux of the
problem is, again, ambiguity in the language of UNCLOS, which states that if
these outcroppings can be considered islands—that is, if they can support human habitation or commercial activity—they should normally receive a full
two-hundred-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone. However, if they are
merely rocks—that is, if they cannot sustain human habitation or commercial
activity—they receive no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.72 Although the islands have never been inhabited and have not sustained commercial activity of any kind in approximately eighty years (they were used briefly
around the turn of the last century to harvest guano and perhaps at various
times as a refuge for fishermen) the dispute remains whether they could support
human habitation or commercial activity, and thus whether the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf boundaries in the East China Sea should be
73
adjusted for them. The difference is not insignificant: perhaps as much as eight
thousand square miles of ocean space—and the rich resources in and below the
water that go with it—are at stake.
Taiwan’s status is another complicating factor to boundary delimitation,
given the visceral way in which Beijing reacts to any suggestion that Taiwan has a
74
legitimate status apart from the rest of China. Nonetheless, Taiwan maintains
an independent claim over the Senkaku Islands (called the Tiaoyutai by the Taiwanese), and Taiwanese fishing boats have historically plied the waters around
the islets and continue to do so regularly with nationalistic support from por75
tions of the Taiwanese population and their representatives in government. Japan’s geostrategic support for Taiwan will remain an obvious irritant to the
prospects of a lasting peaceful compromise in the East China Sea, but on a practical level, Taiwan’s nonacceptance of any agreement between Tokyo and Beijing
could prevent meaningful application of confidence-building measures that
would form the necessary first step of any lasting agreement.
The Chinese reaction to these two concerns—the Senkakus and Taiwan—
demonstrates that unresolved territorial claims remaining from the period of
Japanese aggression during World War II still evoke strong Chinese memories of
suffering as a nation at the hands of outside colonial powers. This in turn may
limit the freedom of the Chinese government to compromise with the Japanese
and at the same time maintain legitimacy in the eyes of its populace.
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ANOTHER COMPLICATION: CHINA MAY NOT WANT TO
RESOLVE THE DISPUTE
It is entirely possible that regardless of the overtures of friendliness recently extended to the Japanese by Chinese leaders, the Chinese may not actually see it as
in their best interest to settle these disputes. The tension between China and Japan over resources, boundaries, and sovereignty in the East China Sea—and especially the confrontation over Japanese administration of, and claim of
sovereignty to, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands—provides to the PRC government a
lever of nationalism with which to divert the attention of the Chinese people
from domestic difficulties and shore up support for the central government dur76
ing times of domestic political competition. In this context, Chinese leaders
have historically used economic advantage and territorial nationalism as two
sources of legitimacy—emphasizing economic progress during periods of pros77
perity and blaming outside powers during times of instability.
One reason why China has successfully negotiated a path forward in its disputes with Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines in the South China Sea but
has refused to do so with similar disputes with Japan in the East China Sea is that
China has never been dominated by the former states: accommodation with
them allows China to portray itself as internationalist and cooperative with its
neighbors. Put simply, Japanese aggression within the living memory of many
Chinese makes Japan an easy object for nationalist fervor. Whenever Chinese
leaders desire to enhance Chinese nationalist sentiment, they need only remind
their people of the territorial disputes in the East China Sea to call to mind Japan’s occupation of large portions of Chinese territory only decades ago. This,
combined with an unbending stand against Japanese encroachment on China’s
maritime claims, demonstrates to the Chinese people that the PRC government
will never again allow outside powers to humiliate them. Thus, by negotiating
cooperatively with its other neighbors but remaining in controlled conflict with
Japan, China balances its domestic and regional political messages in a way that
contributes both to domestic stability and regional rise.
It is likely that there exists a spectrum of contending causal forces that move
international relations between China and Japan along a sliding scale between
78
cooperation and competition. Domestic political concerns, international
power dynamics, resource requirements, economic fluctuations, and even major
events like the 2008 Summer Olympics can move their relationship from a static
competitive dynamic toward cooperation. Perhaps Hu Jintao’s recent signals of
rapprochement with Japan after the election of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe reflect confidence by Beijing in China’s economic future and a desire for international goodwill before the Olympics and that the time may indeed be right to
move forward on the East China Sea dispute. Perhaps. But China’s long-term
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strategic interests are still captive to its geographic position, bounded as the
mainland is by the island chain that runs along China’s coastline from the
Kuriles to the archipelagoes of the South China Sea. As James R. Holmes and
Toshi Yoshihara have observed,
China’s naval and air modernization efforts point to a build-up toward a strategy of
sea denial against U.S. forces seeking to intervene in Asian waters. . . . [In time of
conflict], the closer U.S. military forces get to [Chinese] territory, the more competitive the [Chinese] will be. This arises from a combination of political, physical, and
technological facts. These facts combine to create a contested zone—arenas of conventional combat where weak adversaries have a good chance of doing real damage
to U.S. forces.79

In other words, because it provides the Chinese with a larger operational
space within which to contest legitimately the presence of non-Chinese warships, it may be to China’s military advantage to maintain its claim over the full
breadth of the waters of the East China Sea, from the mainland to the Okinawa
Trough and the doorstep of American bases on Japanese territory, rather than to
reach a compromise with the Japanese that might restrict China’s legitimate
freedom of action during any future conflict.80 Still, China has no short-term interest in allowing the dispute over maritime boundaries in the East China Sea to
get out of hand and spill over into actual conflict. Only if its assertion of sovereignty over Taiwan were severely threatened would China be likely to take military control over the full extent of its East China Sea claim.
CHARTING THE COURSE
Before agreement can be reached, China must conclude that it is genuinely in its
interest to compromise with Japan. This is no small hurdle. Beijing may perceive
managed conflict as an essential tool in maintaining political legitimacy as
China develops the “harmonious society” that Hu Jintao intends to build.81 Accordingly, until China’s domestic growing pains are eased and Taiwan’s status is
settled, there may never be a policy toward Japan that is fully cooperative. Still,
effective interim steps can be taken that will ensure that the current competition
does not unintentionally escalate into open conflict.
First, agreement should be reached that the Senkaku/Diaoyutai dispute is to
be removed from the equation through agreement that no matter how the sovereignty question is ultimately settled, the islets will receive no territorial effect beyond the twelve-nautical-mile territorial sea. The waters around the islands
could be designated a joint fisheries zone on behalf of China, Taiwan, and Japan,
with a cooperative approach to policing—perhaps on a rotating basis. Stakeholders with hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation concessions in the area
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could be given financial compensation for affected rights. Deng was right: the
way forward requires both sides to “shelve the dispute over sovereignty and pro83
ceed with mutual development.”
Additionally, first steps toward building trust and confidence for mutual development could be undertaken by an agreement to abide scrupulously by the
provisions of the 1997 Fishing Agreement and to build a joint enforcement team
composed of both Chinese and Japanese officials to police the East China Sea
fisheries zone. This should be followed by a new agreement, similar to the existing agreement between China, Vietnam, and the Philippines, to develop jointly
the hydrocarbon resources in the disputed area of the East China Sea. Furthermore, both sides should agree that during the period of joint development, final
84
boundary delimitation will be negotiated in good faith. Negotiators should
consider the advantages and disadvantages of delimitation of a single boundary
as opposed to multiple boundaries, paying special attention to solutions that
promote permanent avoidance of friction.
If a negotiated settlement cannot be reached during that period, both sides
could demonstrate their commitment to the rule of international law, as Canada
and the United States did in the Gulf of Maine, by agreeing to submit specified
questions to an international tribunal as called for in UNCLOS. The stated commitment of both states to resort to the rule of law rather than to confrontation
and intimidation would offer hope that the region can move beyond the
geopolitical rhetoric that has informed public discourse to date and would serve
as a model of accommodation and cooperation between former competitors.
So far, China and Japan seem to be talking past each other rather than to each
other in their public discourse surrounding their dispute over the East China
Sea. However, the stakes are high, given the possibility that supposedly “man85
aged” conflict can always result in unintended war. Substantial economic and
political benefits could be derived from a cross-sea détente, but this would require both sides to choose to set aside old grudges and move forward cooperatively rather than competitively. The examples provided by the agreements
between the United States and Canada and between Australia and Papua New
Guinea demonstrate that international law charts several productive paths for
this way forward. Tokyo and Beijing should begin this journey by developing a
trusting and cooperative spirit through step-by-step implementation of precursor agreements similar to the tripartite agreement for hydrocarbon exploration
in the Spratlys and to the joint fisheries agreement between China and Vietnam.
Only then will East Asia be able to demonstrate that competition for scarce resources need not inevitably lead to conflict.
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CHINA AND UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS IN AFRICA
Lieutenant Colonel Philippe D. Rogers, U.S. Marine Corps

China comes to Africa in the 21st century with not only a need for
natural resources but also with the financial resources and political
influence to pursue its objectives vigorously. China has altered the strategic context in Africa.
ANTHONY LAKE, MORE THAN HUMANITARIANISM

I

n February 2007, President Hu Jintao of the People’s Republic of China completed a much-publicized visit to Africa. The trip fulfilled a promise made at an
Africa-China summit in Beijing in November 2006, where forty-eight African
heads of state heard him pledge to double aid to Africa by 2009 and create an investment fund of five billion dollars over the next three years. This 2007 tour—
which included Cameroon, Liberia, Sudan, Zambia, Namibia, South Africa, Mozambique, and the Seychelles—was the third such high-visibility visit to Africa
President Hu has made since 2000, and it reflects China’s growing interest and
1
influence in that continent.
Indeed, China has developed for Africa a comprehensive strategy reflecting
its own wide-ranging economic, diplomatic, political, and military engagement
there. Beijing’s burgeoning presence in Africa has
Lieutenant Colonel (colonel selectee) Rogers, an F/A-18D
Weapon Systems Officer, is currently a senior-course stubeen fueled by a combination of its own economic
dent at the Naval War College. He is completing his fourth
growth, its need for resources, more sophisticated
master’s degree and has completed his predoctoral work at
the University of the Sorbonne, Paris, in conjunction with
leadership, better scholarship on Africa, and a domes2
the French War College. Lieutenant Colonel Rogers served
tic public more confident in China as a global actor.
as a military observer and team site commander in
Additionally, China has notably enhanced its interMINURSO, the UN peacekeeping mission in the Western
Sahara, from July 2000 to January 2001. His operational
national standing with a dramatic increase in parexperience includes deployments in support of combat opticipation in United Nations peacekeeping missions
erations in the Persian Gulf War, Bosnia and Hercegofrom Haiti to East Timor, and as part of this larger
vina, Kosovo, and Iraq (OIF III). His next assignment will
be at Marine Corps Special Operations Command at
engagement it has become a significant contributor
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.
to UN peacekeeping missions in Africa. This peaceNaval War College Review, Spring 2007, Vol. 60, No. 2
keeping presence represents just one, but nevertheless
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important, facet of growing Chinese influence in Africa, which needs to be understood and appreciated by American policy makers.
CHINA’S RISING INFLUENCE IN AFRICA
China’s pervasive influence in Africa is manifest not only in its burgeoning economic trade with the continent, forecast to surpass $100 billion by 2010, but
in its energy strategy, its diplomatic presence, its cultural exchanges, and its
growing military presence and security cooperation.3 Over seven hundred Chinese companies operate in forty-nine African countries, in markets ranging
4
from textiles to fishing to extractive industries. It has established seven regional
trade and investment centers throughout Africa to seek new economic and
5
infrastructure-development opportunities. China, currently the world’s secondlargest net importer of oil, imports from Africa 25 percent of its oil (forecast to
6
increase to 40 percent within the next decade). Not only President Hu but other
top Chinese leaders have visited Africa extensively since 2000, and Chinese diplomatic representation to African regional organizations is growing exponentially. China has sharply increased its foreign aid and floated multibillion-dollar
loans, at low or no interest, to a variety of countries. It has aggressively promoted
cultural and educational exchanges involving Chinese universities and tens of
thousands of African students. It has also increased its military presence in Africa, selling small arms and fighter aircraft to several nations, increasing its
number of military advisers, and building small-arms factories in Sudan and
other countries.
At the November 2006 China-Africa Economic Forum, hosted by Beijing and
attended by forty-eight African nations, President Hu promised that China
would double economic aid to the continent by 2009, increase trade and infrastructure development, train fifteen thousand African professionals, provide
scholarships to four thousand African students, and develop increasingly closer
7
ties over the succeeding decade. This forum and China’s actions with respect to
Africa send a loud and clear message—that China has seized the initiative in Africa, altering the continent’s strategic landscape.
China has used what it calls an “independent foreign policy” (a term by which
Beijing connotes independence from American power) to achieve its considerable influence in Africa, seeking diplomatic, military, and economic influence in
exchange for unconditional foreign aid, whatever the human rights record or
8
political practices of countries that benefit. However advantageous it is for
Beijing, this foreign policy undermines U.S. and international promotion of
good governance, market reform, and regional security and stability while concomitantly diminishing the influence of the United States and other countries in
Africa. China’s relationships with Angola and Zimbabwe, for instance, have
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol60/iss2/1
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enabled these countries to ignore international pressure and have frustrated efforts to isolate, coerce, or reform them.
China’s strong influence in Africa and what it might portend for the international community is underscored by its relationship with Sudan. Sudan’s internal conflict has been roiling for decades. A seemingly intractable domestic
9
conflict with age-old roots has become a full-scale “ethnic cleansing.” The international community, collectively sworn not to allow another Rwanda-type massacre, is finding a solution elusive. Worsening the situation is China’s refusal to
yield to international pressure and condemn Sudanese actions, insisting on Sudan’s
right to govern its own internal affairs irrespective of the ongoing genocide. The
disturbing reality is that China is heavily invested in Sudan, whence 20 percent
of its African oil comes and where Chinese oil firms are deeply entrenched. Over
10
ten thousand Chinese workers live and work in the Sudan. Instead of using its
considerable influence in Sudan to work for a solution, Beijing has cast a blind eye
on Sudanese inaction and complicity—all but endorsing its actions. Chinese refusal to address the situation appropriately is the primary reason for the watered11
down character of UN resolutions with respect to Sudan.
Against this contextual background of China’s influence in Africa, let us now
explore Chinese involvement in UN peacekeeping missions in the continent. After a short history of China’s contributions to UN peacekeeping missions in general, this article examines its perspectives on peacekeeping and its involvement
in peacekeeping missions in Africa (with particular focus, based on first-person
accounts, on the peacekeeping mission in the Western Sahara). It closes with an
examination of the significance of Chinese contributions to peacekeeping in
Africa.
CONTRIBUTIONS TO UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) officially joined the UN and became a
permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) in 1971. Peacekeeping
missions have been authorized by the UN since 1948, but China initially chose
not to participate in them. China’s reluctance to contribute to UN peacekeeping
missions was primarily driven by its belief that the sovereignty of nations gave
them an inherent right to control their own internal affairs without third-party
interference—an issue that had been vital to the early survival of the PRC itself.12
In 1989, however, China began its first exploratory foray into UN peacekeeping
missions, sending nonmilitary observers to join the UN Namibia Transitional Period Aid Group overseeing a general election. In 1990, China dispatched military observers to the Middle East in support of the UN Truce Supervision
Organization (UNTSO). It was this act that marked the beginning of its official
13
participation in UN peacekeeping operations. Over the ensuing decade and a
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half, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) became increasingly involved with
peacekeeping, sending more than 6,500 peacekeepers to thirteen UN missions in
Burundi, Cambodia, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, East Timor, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Geor14
gia, Haiti, Lebanon, Liberia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Sudan.
Today, China sends more peacekeepers to more UN missions than any other
permanent member of the UNSC besides France—in fact, China was only recently surpassed by France’s commitment of forces to Lebanon in August 2006.
As of January 2007, over 1,861 Chinese military and civilian personnel were deployed to twelve UN missions; this number is expected to climb in the near future as China sends additional peacekeepers into Lebanon and Sudan. In
comparison, France has 2,049 personnel in ten missions, the United Kingdom
360 in eight missions, the United States 316 in eight missions, and Russia 298 in
thirteen. Of the 114 nations now contributing 81,992 personnel to sixteen
peacekeeping missions worldwide, China ranks twelfth overall (France tenth,
the United Kingdom fortieth, the United States forty-third, and Russia
forty-fourth).15 In fairness to other UNSC permanent members, China’s dues
represent only 3 percent of the UN budget (the American share is 22 percent);
nonetheless, Beijing’s willingness to support UN peacekeeping missions with
personnel—a low-density/high-demand commodity—paints China as a “re16
sponsible stakeholder” on the international stage. China’s readiness as a permanent Security Council member to contribute large numbers of people also
lends important credibility to the very missions the council approves, funds, and
supports.
China, then, has certainly made up for a slow start in peacekeeping involvement. It has contributed not only United Nations military observers (UNMOs)
but engineer battalions, police units, medical teams, and transportation companies as well. In fact, it has committed itself to providing permanently “one UN
standard engineering battalion, one UN standard medical team, and two UN
standard transportation companies to ongoing missions”—essentially estab17
lishing its own designated expeditionary niche.
Chinese UNMOs are usually officers, selected or volunteering from a variety
18
of specialties and backgrounds. Staffs in the Beijing area are often drawn upon
19
for intelligence, logistics, infantry, and personnel officers to fill these positions.
Tours normally last eight months to one year before units or personnel are relieved and replaced by follow-on units or personnel.
The Chinese engineer battalions dedicated to UN missions normally deploy
as units, sometimes with reinforcement or augmentation. They frequently come
from the engineer brigade stationed at Nankou, Northwest Beijing, in the
Beijing Military Region. Other regions augment the engineer battalions as necessary. 20 The Nankou brigade, being in a constant state of training and
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol60/iss2/1
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preparedness for peacekeeping, with units either deployed or preparing to deploy, and because of its familiarity with and repeated experience of such opera21
tions, has issued a UNMO handbook, Logistics Support for Peacekeeping Forces.
Chinese civilian policemen are sent to the Chinese Peacekeeping Civil Police
Training Center, in Langfang, Hebei Province, fifty kilometers southeast of
Beijing, the largest such center in Asia. The training center is run by the People’s
Armed Police (PAP); however, there have been no PAP deployments as such in
22
support of peacekeeping operations. Prospective civilian police normally receive advanced peacekeeping training in thirty-one courses in the months before deploying. Training includes anti-riot procedures, searching techniques,
protection of very important persons, combat techniques, psychology skills,
physical agility, driving, and vehicle maintenance.23 Training is also conducted at
24
a base in Nanjing in Jiangsu Province. Chinese police units, medical teams, and
transportation companies deploying to UN peacekeeping missions are drawn
from various military regions. Units of these types have deployed to missions
25
alone and in combination.
Since 2000, China has supported numerous missions on many different continents, sending UNMOs, police units, and troops to every clime and place. Of
note, in 2004 China sent a 125-man police company to Haiti—the first time a
complete Chinese police unit had been sent to a Western Hemisphere mission.
China has seven staff officers serving in the UN Department of Peacekeeping
Operations at the UN Headquarters in New York City. Nine Chinese peacekeepers
have died during UN missions to date. Chinese participation in UN peacekeeping missions as of January 2007 is represented in the table.
CHINESE PERSPECTIVES ON UN PEACEKEEPING
China has clearly established itself as a credible UN peacekeeping contributor,
reversing an earlier policy of nonparticipation. What brought this sea change
about?
One of the main roots of the dramatic upswing in Chinese peacekeeping can
be traced to the PLA actions in Tiananmen Square in June 1989. The events of
Tiananmen damaged ties that had developed between the PLA and the people of
China since the revolution in 1949. The People’s Liberation Army determined
that it needed to restore a congenial relationship with the broader society and
the world. The actions it chose included disaster relief, domestic security, and
other measures, but also, very importantly, participation in UN peacekeeping
26
operations.
China’s attitudinal change with respect to UN peacekeeping was eventually
captured in a white paper, China’s National Defense in 2004. Chapter 9, “International Security Cooperation,” in a section entitled “Participation in UN
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2007
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CHINESE PARTICIPATION IN UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS
(as of January 2007)
MINURSO (UN Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara)
14 military observers
MINUSTAH (UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti)
129 civilian police
MONUC (UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo [DROC])
218 troops and 12 military observers (total 230)
UNIFIL (UN International Force in Lebanon)
392 troops
UNIOSIL (United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone)
1 military observer
UNMEE (UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea)
7 military observers
UNMIK (UN Mission in Kosovo)
18 military observers
UNMIL (UN Mission in Liberia)
565 troops, 18 civilian police, 5 military observers (total 588)
UNMIS (UN Mission in Sudan)
446 troops, 9 civilian police, 14 military observers (total 469)
UNMIT (UN Mission in Timor Leste [East Timor])
2 military observers
UNOCI (UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire)
7 military observers
UNTSO (UN Truce Supervision Organization)
4 military observers
Total 1,861
Source: United Nations Peacekeeping, “Contributors.”

Peacekeeping Operations,” specifically lays out the new position on peacekeeping missions:
China has consistently supported and actively participated in the peacekeeping operations that are consistent with the spirit of the UN Charter. It maintains that the UN
peacekeeping operations should abide by the purposes and principles of the UN
charter and other universally recognized principles governing peacekeeping operations. China will continue to support the reform of the UN peacekeeping missions,
hoping to strengthen further the UN capability in preserving peace.27

This section is unique among other permanent members’ national defense strategies. No others specifically list involvement in UN peacekeeping missions and or
28
classify them under “theater security cooperation,” an important distinction.
The importance that China now gives peacekeeping is emphasized as well in
China’s Foreign Affairs, an annual foreign-affairs compendium compiled by the
Policy Planning section of the Foreign Ministry to promulgate and explain the

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol60/iss2/1

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Spring 2007.vp
Tuesday, May 15, 2007 8:28:02 AM

84

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

Naval War College: Full Spring 2007 Issue

ROGERS

79

government’s foreign policy and affairs. The document asserts that “UN peacekeeping operations are an important means developed over many years of UN
practice for the maintenance of international peace and security” and that “always
valuing and supporting PKO [peacekeeping operations] consistent with the UN
Charter, China has gradually expanded its involvement in these endeavors and
29
thus projected an image of a peace-loving and responsible major country.”
In support of this fundamental foreign policy change, the Chinese media has
portrayed PLA and civilian police participation in UN peacekeeping missions
positively. Further, the media devotes a great deal of attention to peacekeeping
troops, since they are the only forces deployed externally. These missions are an
opportunity to place China in a favorable light domestically and internationally,
30
which is important to the PLA and its role in society.
Likewise, the populace follows the exploits of its peacekeepers closely. The
cremated ashes of a Chinese peacekeeper, Lieutenant Colonel Du Zhaoyu, who
died during an Israeli air raid on Lebanon in 2006, were interred at the
Babaoshan Revolutionary Cemetery in Beijing. President Hu Jintao; the vice
chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), Guo Boxiong; the
CMC’s vice chairman, Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan; Foreign Minister Li
Zhaoxing; and Liang Guanglie, chief of the General Staff of the PLA, all presented wreaths and paid personal respects. Du’s body was covered with the flag
of the Communist Party of China and surrounded by white roses and cypress
leaves. Hundreds of people, including Du’s colleagues, schoolmates, teachers,
31
and neighbors, attended the service. This story, like many other touching ones
32
like it, seems to have strengthened the bond between the people and the PLA.
CHINA AND UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN AFRICA
China’s participation in UN peacekeeping missions in Africa (1,316 personnel)
outweighs its total contributions elsewhere (545), a reflection of its keen interest
in peacekeeping efforts in Africa. Beijing has also stated to the UN that enhancing regional peacekeeping capacity in Africa in order to meet ongoing challenges
to security and stability is a Chinese priority.33
Furthermore, China’s African Policy, as defined by China’s African Policy: A
White Paper, specifically addresses a desire for “enhancing solidarity and cooperation with African countries” as part of “an important component of
China’s independent foreign policy of peace,” promising that China will “continue
to appeal to the international community to give more attention to questions
concerning peace and development in Africa.” China’s African Policy specifically
mentions UN peacekeeping as one of its security cooperation tools, as does the
defense white paper: China, it declares, “will urge the UN Security Council to
pay attention to and help resolve regional conflicts in Africa” and “will continue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2007
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its support to and participation in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa” as
34
part of “Enhancing All-Round Cooperation between China and Africa.”
China is currently involved in all seven UN missions in Africa: in the Côte
d’Ivoire (UNOCI), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), Ethiopia
and Eritrea (UNMEE), Liberia (UNMIL), Sudan (UNMIS), Sierra Leone
(UNIOSIL), and the Western Sahara (MINURSO, discussed at length below). The
Chinese have also been involved in past missions in Namibia in 1989–90
(UNTAG), Mozambique in 1993–94 (ONUMOZ), Liberia in 1993–97
(UNOMIL), Burundi in 2004 (ONUB), and both past Sierra Leone missions, in
35
1998–99 (UNOMSIL) and 1999–2005 (UNAMSIL).

Courtesy UN Dept. of Peacekeeping Operations, Cartographic Section

The seven Chinese UN military observers in the UNOCI mission (Côte
d’Ivoire) form part of a larger force comprising over 8,990 uniformed personnel.
UNOCI is charged with monitoring the cessation of hostilities and movements
of armed groups and with the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repa36
triation, and resettlement of military personnel and militias.
In MONUC (Democratic Republic of the Congo [DROC]), 230 Chinese
troops and UNMOs serve among 18,410 uniformed personnel deploying and
maintaining a presence in the key areas of potential volatility in order “to promote the reestablishment of confidence; discourage violence, by deterring the
use of force to threaten the political process; and allow United Nations person37
nel to operate freely, particularly in the Eastern part of DROC.” The Chinese
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have several times rotated (for eight-month tours) troops and UNMOs to this
mission, including engineer companies of 175 personnel and medical platoons
38
of forty personnel.
In UNMEE (Eritrea and Ethiopia), seven Chinese UNMOs serve with 2,280
military personnel monitoring the cessation of hostilities and helping ensure
39
observance of the security commitments agreed between the two countries.
In UNMIL (Liberia), the Chinese contingent of 593 troops is part of a mission of 15,200 military personnel observing the implementation of a cease-fire
agreement, investigating violations and maintaining liaison among all Liberian
40
military forces. Past Chinese deployments to Liberia have been very successful.
For instance, the 1st PLA Construction Engineer Company from Shenyang Military Region, a medical team from the Nanjing Military Region, and a transportation team from the General Logistics Department deployed in 2003–2004. The
construction company, actually a reserve water-supply unit, underwent a threemonth buildup and training period in preparation. These units built a 1,200kilometer road, four camps, two parking aprons, and twenty-one bridges, and
leveled off over seventy thousand square meters of ground. The medical team
treated over 2,300 outpatients, hospitalized over 250 people, and operated on
fifty. The transportation team moved over thirty thousand tons of material and
41
over seventy thousand people. Chinese peacekeepers are now in their fourth
42
tour to Liberia; in all, China has sent over 2,243 to that country.
In UNMIS (Sudan), 469 Chinese serve as part of a mission of 9,980 supporting implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by warring
43
parties. Laiyang, in Shandong Province, sent a 275-man engineer detachment,
a hundred-person transportation detachment, and a sixty-man medical detachment in 2005. Their principal missions were to construct roads, bridges, and air44
ports; provide water and power supplies; and transport personnel and water.
There is a large Chinese presence in Sudan, and it is not uncommon to see signs
in Chinese along with Arabic and English.
In UNIOSIL (Sierra Leone), one Chinese UN military observer serves in a
278-person mission mandated to help the government of Sierra Leone consoli45
date peace, strengthen democracy, and sustain development.
CHINESE PEACEKEEPERS IN THE WESTERN SAHARA (MINURSO)
The following commentary is based on the experiences of three American UN
military observers (including the author) who have served with Chinese peacekeepers in the Western Sahara. The three were attached to MINURSO for sixmonth deployments between 1998 and 2001.
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The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara
MINURSO was established by Security Council Resolution 690 of 29 April 1991,
in accordance with “the settlement proposals for la Liberación de Saguia elHamra y de Río de Oro.” As agreed by the belligerents—Morocco and the Front
for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO)—the implementation plan provided for a transitional period during which a special representative of the United Nations secretary-general would have sole and
exclusive responsibility over all matters relating to a referendum in which the
people of the Western Sahara would choose between independence and integration with Morocco. The Special Representative would be assisted in his tasks by
an integrated group of UN civilian, military, and police personnel, to be known
as the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara.46
The current military force is headed by a two-star general officer; as of January 2007 over twenty-five nations were represented. Fourteen Chinese UNMOs
serve in a contingent of 215 military personnel (twenty-eight troops, four police, 183 unarmed military observers), along with 101 international civilian personnel, 138 local civilian staff, and twenty-three United Nations volunteers to
the mission. The UNMOs are distributed among nine sites east and west of the
dividing line between the belligerents, a liaison office in Tindouf (Algeria), a
staging area in Dakhla, and the UN headquarters in Laayoune. The team sites’
areas of responsibility range in size from twelve thousand to forty-seven thousand square kilometers. A team site’s UNMOs carry out an average of eighteen
patrols each week (some of them at night), each team site covering a minimum
of two thousand square kilometers. Approximately thirty-five UN helicopter re47
connaissance flights are conducted each month in the areas of responsibility.
Since 1991, MINURSO has been effectively monitoring the cease-fire.
UNMOs patrol both sides of the dividing line and the demilitarized zone that
cuts across the Western Sahara, verifying compliance with military agreements
signed by both parties to the conflict. They monitor entry into the zone and such
activities as tactical reinforcement, redeployment of troops, infrastructure improvement, or other matters requiring prior approval. Military observers have
48
the right to visit the belligerents’ units and conduct patrols at any time.
The Military South Sector Commander: The Chinese Colonel
The military mission in 2000 was co-led by the French and Chinese, who contributed the largest numbers of UNMOs (twenty-one each). The operation is
split into North and South sectors for span-of-control purposes. The North Sector was led by a French colonel, who had approximately ninety-four UNMOs at
five team sites. The South Sector was led by a Chinese colonel in charge of the
same number of UNMOs and sites. These sector commanders had challenging
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jobs: they were personally responsible for all their UNMOs and operational considerations in their sectors. Their responsibilities included all logistics, medical
care, aviation, and UN team sites and equipment, as well as the complaints and
infractions of the treaty parties. Threats to their forces included the possibility
of hostile acts by treaty parties, extreme weather (sandstorms, 150-degree heat,
49
etc.), and millions of mines laid during the Western Sahara conflict.
The Southern Sector commander was based at Oum Dreyga (see map). The
Chinese colonel in 2000 was an extremely intelligent and capable officer who
spoke fluent English. He was very comfortable in his operational environment
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despite its challenges and handled all aspects of the mission smoothly. He was
very safety conscious, insisting especially upon driving safety—car accidents
50
were the number-one source of injuries and death for the mission.
The Chinese UN Military Observers
The twenty-one Chinese peacekeepers in 2001 were capable, proficient, dedicated, intelligent, and professional. Like any other country’s UNMOs, the individual Chinese officers’ capabilities varied with personal experiences,
51
intelligence, personality, and communication skills.
Operationally, the Chinese observers were sound. Most spoke English (the official MINURSO language) well enough to accomplish the mission, though
some did so with only limited ability. A few were fluent not only in English but in
French, Russian, and other languages as well. Language facility was important
when it came time to assign billets and leadership positions; also, those who
spoke English well were assigned the rewarding jobs (e.g., team site commander,
deputy team site commander, operations officer, information officer). Chinese
UNMOs filled each of these positions at one team site or another. Of note, the
Chinese were sometimes used by sector commanders to pass information in
their own language over open radio nets so the belligerents would be unable to
intercept it; Spanish, French, Arabic, and Russian were in common use by the
Moroccans and the POLISARIO.52
The Chinese officers were tactically proficient, displaying a solid grasp of expected skills: navigation, information gathering, communication, and basic military knowledge, among others. Again, these skills varied between individuals,
but most officers were technically capable. For instance, as the Smara team site
commander in the North Sector from July 2000 to January 2001, I appointed a
Chinese officer as my operations officer due to his UNMO skills. He was a very
sharp major from the logistics field who spoke English very well and had fine interpersonal skills. When I left the mission he assumed command of the Smara team
53
site and by all accounts performed well.
No particular “niche” capabilities or skills made the Chinese collectively
stand out from the rest of the MINURSO observers, but they did have one noticeable and universal weakness—poor driving skills. China’s vehicle population at
that time was small; also, presumably, officers from the big cities would not have
needed to drive in China, and if they did, trained military drivers would usually
have been available. Whether for these or other reasons, however, the Chinese
officers were not car owners, by and large, and they had a particularly difficult
time (though they were not the only ones) handling the MINURSO four-byfour, standard-transmission vehicles in desert conditions. The Chinese officers
had evidently been put through a quick course in driving and maintenance, but

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol60/iss2/1

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Spring 2007.vp
Monday, May 14, 2007 3:57:38 PM

90

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

Naval War College: Full Spring 2007 Issue

ROGERS

85

this did not replace a lifetime of driving experience. The driving conditions in
the Sahara were brutal, and the vehicles, although modified to meet the harsh
54
terrain, were not indestructible.
As a matter of pride, the Chinese would not admit to their poor driving skills
but to a man resolutely tried to improve. Many took up the offer of additional
driving instruction from American UNMOs, and the latter were impressed with
their motivation. One U.S. officer successfully taught a Chinese UNMO the difficult mission of backing up the team’s pickup truck with the site trash trailer
hitched behind; the Chinese officer insisted on being the “permanent trash
55
driver” for the rest of the mission.
Chinese Military Observer Personalities
As one would expect with any country, the personalities of the Chinese UNMOs
varied greatly. One American UNMO’s experiences with two Chinese officers (a
captain and a major) with whom he served in 1997 at a team site on the
POLISARIO side captures this observation. Both of the Chinese officers spoke
English well, and both were terrible drivers (though they thought the opposite).
Here their similarities ended. The captain, an infantry officer, was very approachable and genuinely liked by all team-site members. He had an outgoing
personality, a great sense of humor, a genuine interest in everyone at the site, and
was without question a team player. He was reliable, worked hard, and never
caused disputes.
The major was a bit different. He was not introverted or reserved, but neither
was he as amiable a character as the Chinese captain, and he befriended no one,
even the captain. He was very opinionated and did not mind prodding his fellow
UNMOs. According to the American observer, he deliberately antagonized the
Russians by insisting that communism was flourishing in China, that it had
failed in Russia, and that now Russia was failing with its new system as well. True
diplomats, the Russians wrote off the remarks, but they were convinced this officer was not a real major in the Chinese army. They were certain he was a political
agent, like a Soviet-era KGB rezident. They were quick to point out that the Chinese captain not only never argued with the major but kept his distance from him.
In terms of reliability, punctuality, and work ethic, the major was everything
he should have been, but his personality was perhaps not well suited for a UN
mission. For instance, he once almost got the team site in serious trouble on patrol by his tendency to pontificate on the merits of communism. On this occasion he and two other UNMOs on patrol visited a POLISARIO logistical unit
commander and his small staff, all Muslims. Over tea and small talk, the major
started on communism and all its aspects; before long he was declaring that religion is just a manifestation of mankind’s collective imagination, manipulated by
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the capitalists and adhered to by only the less intelligent. This quickly drew
glares from the POLISARIO soldiers, who were astounded if not shocked. The
major, realizing his faux pas, abruptly ceased, and the UNMOs hastily concluded
56
the meeting.
Specialty, Rank, Money, and Time Off
UNMOs, regardless of nationality, are led to believe that the UN military observers of other nations are intelligence officers expressly sent for intelligence
(or in UN parlance, information) collection. Whether this perception is true or
not is irrelevant; the belief is engrained in all UNMOs. In the end, everyone perceives everyone else as an intelligence collector or intelligence officer.
The Chinese were naturally inquisitive and curious about Americans, and in
light of that perception it was difficult to tell if their questions were purely for
curiosity’s sake and thus benign or were truly aimed at developing profiles on
American (and other) officers. I believe the case was a little bit of both. The Chinese questions sometimes ventured into technical and military realms, but cultural and linguistic differences meant that it was never clear if they wanted us to
divulge secrets. In any case, there was not much strategic value to be gained from
U.S. military observers who categorically assumed the Chinese to be either political or intelligence officers. However, the Chinese may very well have been what
they claimed to be—infantry, engineer, or logistics officers, or whatever special57
ties they professed.
Another pervasive belief is that other countries’ militaries send senior officers
to UN missions but reduce them in rank for the mission, either to fill assigned
rank quotas or to allow senior officers to take part (there are only so many colonel leadership billets in each mission). Although I met officers from other countries who admitted to voluntary demotions, it was not clear whether the Chinese
used this practice. Most American UNMOs assumed the Chinese were of higher
58
rank than advertised.
All UN member states are legally obligated to pay their shares of peacekeeping
costs under an established formula. The top ten providers of assessed contributions to UN peacekeeping operations were (as of January 2006) the United
States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Canada, Spain,
59
China, and the Netherlands.
Troops serving in UN peacekeeping operations are paid by their own governments, according to their own national ranks and salary scales. The UN offers
payments, at standard rates approved by the General Assembly, to compensate
for pay and allowances of all troops and as supplements for specialists (that
is, within infantry and logistics contingents and formed police units). In addition, contributing countries are reimbursed for the wear to clothing, gear and
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equipment, and personal weaponry. The current rates per peacekeeper per
month are $1,028 for pay and allowances; $303 supplementary pay for specialists; $68 for personal clothing, gear, and equipment; and five dollars for personal
weaponry. Countries volunteering military contingents and formed police units
are reimbursed by the UN for transport to and from the mission and for wear
and tear to (and replacement if necessary of) “organic” equipment. Countries
are either reimbursed directly or arrangements are made to transport, equip, or
60
sustain their troops on a case-by-case basis.
The Chinese UNMOs would each have received, tax free, eighty dollars (U.S.)
a day in cash, paid at the end of each month during the mission. This was the
same rate paid to all UNMOs in the mission. For a Chinese officer this repre61
sented a significant additional income.
All UNMOs on UN missions work every day, with no time off. However, the
UN uses a “compensatory time off ” system to award days off for accumulated
workdays—that is, for every five days worked, the UNMO earns one day of compensatory time off. Once an UNMO has accumulated approximately twelve days
off, he can, through prearrangement, schedule some “liberty” somewhere in the
MINURSO area of responsibility (Laayoune, Morocco, or the Canary Islands). It
was common for nationalities to schedule compensatory time off together in
one of these locations. The Chinese UNMOs had a favorite destination in Morocco, a town called Agadir. Evidently Agadir is home to a large Chinese fishing
community; eight to ten Chinese officers would head north to Agadir to enjoy a
62
week of Chinese food, fun, and fellowship.
A Final Word on MINURSO
Perhaps the most endearing part of the mission for any officer in the Western Sahara was the sharing with fellow UNMOs of national-day festivities, such as the
Fourth of July. Invariably this led to each nation’s taking its turn trying to outshine others with elaborately prepared national feasts, songs, and toasts. The patriotic fervor of the Chinese was no less fierce than any American’s, and their
national day was a great event followed by a wonderful feast.
One year, when the team was gathered at the UN headquarters in Laayoune to
celebrate China’s national day, this patriotism was particularly evident. The Chinese national contingent gathered to sing its national anthem and to raise its flag
in the headquarters square. As the national song played and all stood at attention, the flag was unfurled and duly hoisted—upside down. The nervous Chinese officer who had unwittingly committed the error fainted in formation. His
fellow countrymen and others stifled smiles. One thing was made clear—all UN
63
military observers are the same, no matter what uniform they wear.
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CHINESE PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA: WHY DOES IT MATTER?
China’s recent rapid increase in UN peacekeeping missions and its willingness to
expand its participation in them speaks volumes to how it views their importance. The Chinese have performed well, and their strict discipline and high efficiency have earned accolades, but what does China gain from this experience at
64
different levels?
The Strategic Value to China of Peacekeeping in Africa
China’s recent UN peacekeeping track record reinforces its role as a responsible
stakeholder in the international community and gives it more global influence.
This influence is parlayed into prestige and clout, both of which are attractive in
the eyes of African countries, especially those inclined to search for alternatives
to partnerships of the kinds traditionally offered by Western nations. That
point, coupled with an overarching Chinese strategic approach to Africa that
features “an independent foreign policy,” $1.8 billion in African aid to date with
no apparent strings attached, and diplomatic, economic, and military ties with
90 percent of Africa (unshadowed by any colonial history on that continent),
make it unsurprising that it is quietly but steadily building a significant presence
65
there.
The influence China gains from African nation support in international fora is
important to its “One China” policy; to its energy future, commerce, and militaryindustrial complex; and to the advancement of its international agenda. This
mutually beneficial relationship is reinforced, in turn, by China’s participation
in UN peacekeeping missions—which it considers, as we have seen, a form of security cooperation. The more China advocates and participates in UN peacekeeping missions, the more influence it creates with regional organizations (e.g.,
the African Union) formulating Africa’s future.
China has or is developing strong ties with the African nations to which it deploys UN peacekeepers. This may be coincidental, but Beijing’s disproportionately large contribution to African missions suggests otherwise. As
demonstrated, China has a vested interest in the strategic security and stability
of the African continent, and long-term involvement in peacekeeping missions
there should be expected.
The Operational Value to China of Peacekeeping in Africa
Having little power-projection capability and a policy not focused on overseas
deployment at the present time, for China UN peacekeeping operations represent one of the most important ways it can gain distant operational experience.
With these deployments, the Chinese gain exposure to the operational practices
and methods of foreign military forces as well. There are also benefits gained in
the areas of operational logistics, multinational operations, combat and civil
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engineering, and through a working knowledge of the operational environments in the deployment areas.
Moving a battalion or large echelon of personnel overseas, with all of the
predeployment training, support requirements, and logistics required, is not a
simple feat. Operating in a hostile or austere environment is also challenging,
and the preventive medicine and security measures necessary to safeguard the
force once there are not intuitively obvious. The value of being “on the ground”
in a foreign territory for an extended period cannot be easily duplicated, and such
experiences are more useful and practical than any other foreign-area training
imaginable. Unit cohesion is also an immediate benefit. The fact that Chinese
units are redeploying multiple times to Africa means that a ready force of African
operational experts is being built—something the United States does not have.
This last point is very important. PRC troop deployments in support of UN
missions such as those in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sierra
Leone, and the Sudan are giving Beijing an advantage in operationally deploying
to these vastly different and difficult countries. This advantage comprises invaluable knowledge about logistics, ports of debarkation, lines of communication, lines of operations, operational intelligence, local “atmospherics” and
modus operandi, and means of sustaining forces in Africa over prolonged
periods.
Chinese UN military observers who command at any level of UN peacekeeping
operations in Africa (such as the MINURSO colonel we have described) are
privy to a unique operational opportunity available to few other non-African officers in the world. This alone is an invaluable operational commodity derived
from UN peacekeeping missions in Africa.
The Tactical Value to China of Peacekeeping in Africa
Chinese peacekeepers who serve in Africa on UN missions also enjoy a unique
opportunity as well: nothing can replace “boots on the ground” knowledge
learned in such missions. Any MINURSO UNMO who has navigated with GPS
across thousands of kilometers of desert, talked to local Bedouin, and survived
the harsh Sahara and the extremes of desert weather will have a decided advantage in such operational environments, whether in Africa or elsewhere, UN related or not.
Repeated deployments to UN missions in Africa by China will enable the PLA
to build an extensive knowledge base. The Chinese major who succeeded me as
the Smara team site commander returned to Africa in 2006 for another one-year
deployment, this time to Sudan, as a colonel. As far as African expertise goes, he
has likely already twice the knowledge base that I possess in all things pertaining
to African operational missions.
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Now multiply that advantage by the one thousand personnel whom China is
rotating through missions every year in support of UN peacekeeping in Africa.
This effort is outpacing Washington’s efforts dedicated to operations in Africa
66
by a considerable margin. Conceivably, the United States will one day turn to
the Chinese military for help and expertise in missions in Africa.
One unintended consequence of China’s substantial participation in UN missions relates to Beijing’s stance on sovereignty, as regards intervention in foreign
states. It appears that China is slowly being conditioned by the humanitarian efforts in which it has been participating. Whereas China once might have seen
UN intervention as a potential threat to its own internal affairs, it now sees the
intrinsic value of UN efforts in peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace building
and perhaps appreciates more than it once did how interventions can promote
regional stability and security.67
If so, this means China will continue to support UN peacekeeping efforts
globally for the foreseeable future, which would be important to all members of
the international community. China’s willingness to send significant numbers
of personnel eases the strain on others, and its position as a permanent member
of the United Nations Security Council lends a valuable impetus to peacekeeping
in general.
Thus China will continue to send UN peacekeepers worldwide, but it will do
so specifically with a keen eye to regions that correspond to its strategic vision.
Beijing will continue to view peacekeeping as a valuable security cooperation
tool in Africa, and it will take every opportunity to contribute to missions on the
continent due to the strategic, operational, and tactical benefit and influence it
gains from them. The United States needs to comprehend Beijing’s multifaceted
and increasingly significant presence in Africa, take account of its contributions
to UN peacekeeping operations, and grasp the positive and negative ramifications of this Chinese engagement.
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ON MAJOR NAVAL OPERATIONS
Milan Vego

M

ajor naval operations are the principal methods of combat force employment by which operational or strategic objectives are accomplished in a
conventional high-intensity war at sea. The U.S. Navy and other major Western
navies planned and executed a large number of major naval operations in World
War II as part of maritime and, in several cases, land campaigns. However, such
major operations have been conducted on few occasions since 1945. The main
reason for that is that none of the numerous regional conflicts fought in the past
sixty years have involved large navies on both sides.
Dr. Vego has been professor of joint military operations
The U.S. Navy and other major navies are currently
at the Naval War College since August 1991. A native of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, he obtained political asylum
involved in operations short of war, such as peacein the United States in 1976. Dr. Vego was previously
keeping and peace enforcement, maritime intercepadjunct professor at the Defense Intelligence College
tion operations (MIO), and protection of friendly
(1984–91) and a senior fellow at the Center for Naval
Analyses in Alexandria, Virginia (1985–87) and at the
shipping against various hostile acts on the high seas,
former Soviet Army Studies Office in Fort Leavenworth,
such as piracy or transnational terrorism. Among
Kansas (1987–89). He earned a master’s degree in
other things, they are also employed in preventing ilmodern history (1973) at the University of Belgrade
and a PhD in European history from the George Washlegal immigration and drug smuggling. In some cases,
ington University (1981). He has been a licensed master
employment of one’s naval forces, such as support or
mariner since 1974. Dr. Vego has published seven
counterinsurgency (COIN) or MIO, might be aimed
books, including The Battle for Leyte, 1944: Allied and
Japanese Plans, Preparations, and Execution (2006)
at achieving operational objectives. However, such acand the textbook Operational Warfare (1st ed. 2001,
tions lack many attributes of conventional major naenlarged and revised 2nd ed. 2007), as well as numerous
articles in various professional journals.
val or joint operations. The focus here is exclusively on
those planned and conducted in a conventional
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WHAT IS A MAJOR NAVAL OPERATION?
There is no common agreement in the United States or the West on a definition
of what constitutes a major naval operation. The term “naval operation” so often
used by the U.S. Navy and other Western navies is too broad and imprecise. For
example, “naval operation” is explained in the U.S. military as pertaining to “a
naval action or the performance of naval missions, which may be strategical, tactical, logistical, or training.” This definition apparently does not make any distinction between objectives to be accomplished at sea and corresponding
methods of combat force employment. It confuses the issue by mixing the combat employment of naval forces with logistics and training. An alternative meaning of the same term is “the process of carrying out or training for naval combat
1
to gain the objective of any battle or campaign.” The absence of the term “major
naval operation” is a clear proof of the lack of a coherent theory of operational
warfare at sea. The U.S. Navy also still does not have a servicewide doctrine focused on the operational level of war at sea. Yet operational art is the principal
focus of all joint doctrinal documents in the U.S. military.
In comparison, the former Soviet navy devoted extraordinary efforts to developing a theory of what it called “naval operations” in the early 1930s and
through the 1980s. Naval operations constituted the very heart of the Soviets’
naval operational art. Yet the Soviets were distinctly unsuccessful in applying
their theories in practice during the war with Nazi Germany, 1941–45. From
1945 until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Soviet navy was never involved in real combat. Hence, one can only speculate whether its actual performance would have been any better than it was during World War II.
In one of the many Soviet definitions of the term, a naval operation
(morskaya operatsiya) was described as a series of naval battles, engagements,
and strikes coordinated in terms of objective, place, and time and conducted in
an assigned area (zone) of an oceanic or sea theater of military action (TVD in
the Russian acronym, theater of operations in Western terms). It was carried out
by specially established groups, independently or in cooperation with formations,
forces, or troop units of other services, according to a common idea and plan for
accomplishing a single and especially important operational or operational2
tactical task. Naval operations are controlled by a fleet commander.
In generic terms, a major naval operation can be understood as a series of related major and minor naval tactical actions conducted by several naval combat
arms and combat arms of other services, in terms of time and place, and aimed to
accomplish an operational (and sometimes limited strategic) objective in a given maritime theater. Major naval operations are planned and conducted in accordance with
an operational idea (scheme) and common plan. They are normally an integral
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part of a maritime or land campaign, but they can sometimes be conducted outside
of the framework of a campaign.
The best (and proven) way of avoiding attrition at the operational and strategic levels is by planning and executing major operations and campaigns, respectively. With a major naval operation, the stronger side at sea can defeat the
weaker in a place and at a time of its own choosing. Major naval operations are
normally planned and conducted when decisive results have to be accomplished
3
as quickly as possible and at the least loss. Successful major naval/joint operations can contribute considerably to shortening a war at sea.
The Roots
In the era of sail and until the late nineteenth century, the principal method of
combat employment of one’s fleet to attain an operational or strategic objective
was the “decisive naval battle.” Some decisive battles—for example, the battle of
Trafalgar on 21 October 1805—led to drastic changes in the strategic situation at
sea. Combat employment of naval forces gradually changed with the technological advances of the middle and late nineteenth century. The steady improvement in the performance of ships’ steam propulsion plants and the internal
combustion engine had made it possible to fit powerful engines in even small
ships. The introduction of torpedoes and mines led to the design of new small
platforms capable of posing a serious threat to the survivability of larger ships.
This, in turn, led to a proliferation of small warships of all types and classes. The
numerical strength of the major navies steadily increased. In addition to battleships and cruisers, they also included a large number of smaller surface combat4
ants, such as destroyers, torpedo craft, gunboats, and auxiliaries.
By the end of the nineteenth century the importance of a decisive battle had
been steadily reduced because of the increased size and changing composition of
the major navies. Instead of single decisive battles to achieve an operational or
even strategic objective, war at sea between two strong opponents was fought
over a large area and almost continuously. Numerous tactical actions were conducted by both large and smaller surface combatants. Operational deployment
of combat forces became an integral part of a major clash between opposing
fleet forces instead of something separate. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904–
1905 was the first conflict at sea in which diverse naval actions were conducted
almost continuously. These actions occurred over large parts of the Yellow Sea, the
5
Sea of Japan, and parts of the Pacific Ocean. In retrospect, the battle of
Tsushima in May 1905 was the last “decisive” naval battle in history. Yet this was
not grasped by the theoreticians or practitioners of the day. Up to the beginning
of World War I, all the world’s major navies planned to seek a decisive battle
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(also called “general fleet action”) and thereby obtain command of the sea in a
single clash of battle fleets.
In the last decade before the outbreak of World War I, the major navies continued to build both large and small naval vessels in quantity. For example, by
1914, the Royal Navy had in service 542 warships, including sixty-eight battleships, 110 cruisers, and 218 destroyers. The Imperial German Navy then had 301
ships (thirty-seven battleships, forty-eight cruisers, 142 destroyers, forty-seven
6
torpedo boats, and twenty-seven U-boats). The advent of submarine and aircraft added second and third dimensions to the maritime battlefield. The ability
to control the movements and actions of fleet elements over large ocean areas
was considerably enhanced by new signaling devices and wireless telegraph.
Fleet commanders were able to communicate with subordinate tactical commanders many hundreds of miles out at sea. The cumulative effect of all these
technological advances was to make major navies of the day capable of conducting actions almost continuously, over large sea or even ocean areas, and employing diverse platforms and weapons. The very size of the major navies of the day,
with their widely dispersed bases and installations, made it increasingly difficult,
if not impossible, to achieve decisive results by a general fleet action.
During World War I several large-scale fleet-versus-fleet actions took place,
in the North Sea, the Mediterranean, the Adriatic, the Baltic, and the Black Sea.
Of these, the battle of Jutland, fought on 31 May–1 June 1916, came closest to
what can be considered a major naval operation. It comprised a series of small
engagements and attacks aimed at operational objectives. Admiral Reinhard
Scheer (1863–1928), the commander of the German High Seas Fleet (Hochseeflotte), planned to sail out from Wilhelmshaven at about midnight on 30 May
and then proceed northward, staying well off the Danish coast, and arrive the
next afternoon off the western entrance to the Skagerrak. Afterward, the main
body of the High Seas Fleet and Vice Admiral Franz von Hipper (1863–1932),
commander of the Scouting Group (battle cruisers), would jointly launch an attack on the British merchant ships and cruiser escorts that German intelligence
believed to be in the area. Afterward, Hipper with his battle cruisers would head
north and advertise his location by steaming very close to the Norwegian coast
in broad daylight, while Scheer would sail some fifty miles to the rear but out of
sight of shore. Scheer was confident that as soon as the British learned the
whereabouts of Hipper’s battle cruisers they would send their battle cruisers on
a high-speed dash across the North Sea to cut off Hipper’s retreat to his home
base. Scheer’s plan was to attack the enemy battle cruisers jointly with Hipper’s
7
force next morning. In short, the German plan was to bring the strength of the
8
British Grand Fleet down to parity with that of the High Seas Fleet. By coincidence Jellicoe also planned a sortie with his Grand Fleet to the Skagerrak area on
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1 June 1916. His main objective was to lure the German High Seas Fleet to the
north and fight a general fleet action. As it turned out, Scheer sortied only one
9
day earlier than Jellicoe planned.
In the ensuing clash of the opposing forces, the Germans won a tactical victory in terms of losses in materiel and personnel inflicted on the Grand Fleet.
The British lost fourteen ships (three battle cruisers, three armored cruisers,
eight destroyers/torpedo boats) and some 6,100 men (out of a total of sixty thousand), while the German losses amounted to eleven ships (one predreadnought
battleship, one battle cruiser, four light cruisers, and five destroyers/torpedo
10
boats) and about 2,550 men (out of thirty-six thousand). However, operational
success was clearly achieved by the British. In the aftermath of the battle the situation in the North Sea and adjacent sea areas remained essentially what it had
been before the battle. Both opponents continued to watch each other and acted
essentially as active fleets-in-being. The Entente’s blockade of the Central
Powers was not weakened. The Royal Navy continued to ferry troops and supplies across the English Channel to France. The Germans retained their naval
control of the Baltic theater.
The first major naval operation against the enemy coast was conducted by the
Austro-Hungarian fleet, shortly after Italy’s decision to enter the war on the side
of the Entente Powers on 24 May 1915. This operation had been planned by the
Austro-Hungarian navy’s commander in chief, Admiral Anton Haus (1851–
1917), in 1910, even though Italy was formally his country’s ally at that time. The
main objective of that raid was to cut off Italian rail communications along the
eastern coast of the Adriatic leading to the front on the Isonzo River. Another
objective was to create fear and possibly panic among the Italian populace living
11
in the coastal area. The Austrian assumption was that the Italians would try at
the very outset of the hostilities to achieve a decision by employing their entire
fleet in the northern Adriatic. Hence, the Austrians also decided to employ a ma12
jor part of their fleet in the operation. The action would be successful only if
full surprise was achieved, and that meant it had to be carried out shortly after
13
the beginning of hostilities.
The Austro-Hungarian fleet carried out the raid as planned and employed
rather large forces: four battleships, one armored and five protected cruisers, six
large destroyers, seven destroyers, and thirty torpedo boats. The Austrian ships
and naval aircraft bombarded fourteen ports and the coastal railroad from Venice to Brindisi. Targets included ports Porto Corsini (near Ravenna), Senigallia,
Rimini, Ancona, the Potenza estuary, and Venice.14 The Austrian aircraft conducted raids against Venice and airship hangars at Chiaravalle. The Austrian
ships also sank three Italian destroyers. This was the largest action of the
Austro-Hungarian fleet during the entire war. The Austrian bombardment of
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the coastal settlements and rail lines caused little material damage; Italian morale, however, was significantly depressed. There was a widespread belief among
the Italian populace that their navy could not prevent such raids in the future.
Moreover, it was believed that the Italian fleet was incapable of conducting simi15
lar actions against the Austro-Hungarian coast.
During World War I, the first major joint naval operations emerged: the Entente’s amphibious landing at Gallipoli in April 1915 and the German landing
on the Latvian coast in October 1917 are the best known examples. The principal objectives of the Gallipoli landing operation were to take Turkey out of the
war, open a direct link with the Entente’s embattled ally Russia, force the Germans to shift troops from the Russian front, and influence Greece to side openly
16
with the Entente Powers. The allied attack on the Dardanelles was poorly
planned and executed. The naval plan prepared by Admiral Sackville Carden
was approved on 13 January 1915, and a formal decision for the attack was made
on 28 January. Carden’s plan was to use twelve old battleships, three battle cruisers, three light cruisers, one flotilla leader, sixteen destroyers, six submarines,
four seaplanes, twelve minesweepers, and some miscellaneous craft for the naval
17
attack on the Dardanelles. In a major omission, Carden was never directed to
18
integrate the naval attack with the landing of ground forces. Naval bombardment started on 19 February; and bombardment of the outer forts started on 25
February. The initial attacks were fairly successful. However, the Turkish resistance proved to be much greater than anticipated. The Turks also heavily mined
the straits, and the allied minesweepers were unable to clear the mines. On 18
March, out of sixteen battleships that ultimately took part in the bombardment,
three battleships—two British and one French—ran into mines and were sunk,
19
and three others were heavily damaged. The British and French losses included
seven hundred sailors killed in a single day.
After the failure of the naval attack, the allies finally made a decision to commit ground troops to capture control of the straits. The initial forces for ground
assault consisted of about seventy-five thousand British troops under General
Sir Ian Hamilton. Specifically, this force comprised the British 29th Division and
the Royal Naval Division, and the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps
(ANZAC), composed of the 1st Australian Division and the New Zealand and
Australian Division. In addition, the French made available on 10 March some
20
eighteen thousand colonial troops of the 1st Division. The Turkish defenses
of the straits were greatly improved after 24 March when the German general
Liman von Sanders took command of the Turkish Fifth Army at the Dardanelles.
He had to defend a coastline of 150 miles with just eighty-four thousand men (of
whom only sixty-two thousand were combat ready) organized in six divisions.
Only about twenty thousand men were defending the Gallipoli Peninsula.
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The main landing at Cape Helles was carried out by about thirty-five thousand men of the 29th Division and elements of the Royal Naval Division on 25
April. Smaller, diversionary landings took place the same day, involving some
seventeen thousand largely untrained troops of the New Zealand and Australian
Corps, farther north at Ari Burnu (later renamed Anzac Cove). The 6th Colonial
Regiment of the French 1st Division conducted a temporary landing at Kum
21
Kale at the neck of the peninsula.
The allied troops seized the initial lodgment ashore but were unable to enlarge it because of stiff resistance by the Turks. The fighting evolved into trench
warfare. Neither side was able to gain much ground, and both suffered heavy
losses. By August 1915, the allied forces amounted to twelve divisions. A new
landing was conducted in early August at Suvla Bay aimed to link with the
ANZAC forces at Anzac Cove. After some gains, the entire operation ultimately
failed, and the Turks recaptured Suvla Bay.
Despite all these efforts, the Allied troops were unable to make much progress
on land. In the end, there was no other option but to abandon the entire operation. The evacuation was carried out in two stages: on 18–19 December 1915
and 8–9 January 1916. Losses on both sides were heavy. The allies eventually
committed a total of about 490,000 troops (including seventy-nine thousand
French) to the operation and suffered 252,000 casualties (including about
44,100 killed). The Turks employed some 500,000 troops and suffered about
22
251,300 casualties (including some 86,700 killed).
A more successful amphibious landing operation was Operation ALBION,
conducted by the German navy and army in October 1917. This was the first
German joint operation of such size and complexity. The operational objective
was to seize control of the island of Oesel and thereby open the Gulf of Riga and
thus threaten the rear of the Russian Twelfth Army, defending the Baltic coast.
The aim was to land one reinforced division on the island of Oesel. Tagga Bay
was selected as the landing objective area. Based on the lessons learned from the
Entente’s failure in the landing at Gallipoli, the Germans committed about
23
24,600 men, supported by a large naval force. The Germans achieved complete
surprise, and the entire operation was a resounding success. The Twelfth Army
was eventually destroyed, and the threat to the flank of General Oskar von
24
Hutier’s German Eighth Army was eliminated.
World War I at sea proved that the fleets of the major opponents were too large
and deployed too widely to be destroyed during a single general fleet action or
even two. It signaled the final demise of the decisive battle. It also demonstrated that
operational objectives in the theater could be accomplished primarily by a series of
related major and minor naval tactical actions sequenced and synchronized in
time and place—in modern terms, a major naval operation. Deployment,
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clashes of opposing forces, pursuit, and withdrawal/redeployment were meshed
to constitute a seamless whole. The entire naval operation was planned, prepared, and conducted by a single commander. It was based on a definite idea and
a common plan.
In the interwar years, most major Western navies, and also the Japanese navy,
focused almost exclusively on the practical application of operational warfare,
through planning, war gaming, and exercises at sea. In 1927, the U.S. Naval War
College adopted for the first time the study of “operational” problems in addition to “strategical” and “tactical” ones. This practice continued in the 1930s. In
war games held at the Naval War College in the 1930s the U.S. Navy repeatedly
tested its plan ORANGE for operational employment of fleet forces in a hypothetical war with Japan. In the early 1930s, the U.S. Marine Corps embarked on
an intensive effort to create its first operational doctrine for large-scale amphibious landings. The result was the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations, issued
in 1934. This manual borrowed heavily from the proper lessons learned in the
Entente’s unsuccessful Gallipoli landing in 1915 and the successful German
ALBION operation. After 1935 this document was used as a guide for amphibious
25
exercises and research and development.
The German navy used planning games, war games, and exercises extensively
in preparing for a future war at sea. By the early 1930s it had introduced “operational,” in addition to strategic and tactical, war games. In the late 1930s, as a result of these games, the German naval high command became convinced of the
prospective need to seize parts of the southern Norwegian coast and the French
Atlantic coast in order to escape the constraints imposed by the geography of the
North Sea and to be able to employ its forces operationally in the Atlantic. The
tactical concept of using U-boats at night and on the surface was first described
in 1922 in a study by two German naval officers. Their ideas were refined during
26
war games in the early 1930s and became part of the U-boat doctrine in 1935.
This innovative concept was tested for the first time during the large-scale
Wehrmacht exercises held in the fall of 1937. Doenitz used shortwave radio from
his flagship in Kiel and directed the employment of submarine groups in the
Baltic. Afterward, the concept was tested during another, larger exercise held in
the North Sea. In May 1939 the U-boats operated in groups in the Atlantic off
27
Cape Finisterre and in the Bay of Biscay for the first time.
In contrast, the Soviets focused on developing a theory of naval operations as
part of their emerging theory of operational art. Their theories were incorporated into the Red Navy’s doctrine. The Soviet Field Manual of 1930 (BU-30) was
the first doctrinal document to spell out the rudiments of joint operational employment of naval forces and ground troops. Afterward, the Soviets developed
the theory of what they called “naval operations”—specifically, reconnaissance,
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amphibious landings and anti-amphibious operations, and operations on sea
lines of communications. Five years later, the Soviet navy adopted the new Combat
Manual of Naval Forces (BU-MS-37). Here for the first time was presented an elaboration of “naval operations” and “day-to-day (routine) activities” as the principal methods by which the combat employment of naval forces and aviation would
accomplish operational objectives. The new manual envisaged a dozen types of
naval operations, aimed at destroying the enemy forces at sea, against coastal “objects” (installations), on sea communications and blockade, in support of own sea
communications and counterblockade, landing operations, antilanding operations, and operations in support of the army flank. The day-to-day activities of the
fleet forces would accomplish operational objectives by establishing what the
Soviets called a “favorable operational regime” in their coastal waters and deployment areas.28 Soviet views on the nature of modern warfare at sea and operational
art were incorporated into the Provisional Manual on Conduct of Operations
(NMO-40), issued in 1940. However, the Soviet theory of naval operations was
very poorly applied during the country’s war with Nazi Germany.
In World War II, all the major navies conducted, independently or in cooperation with other services of the armed forces, a large number of major naval operations in all the maritime theaters of war. Among many major naval
operations, a few stand out because of their importance to the course of the war.
Major clashes of opposing surface forces in the Pacific (notably the battles of the
Coral Sea in May 1942, Midway in June 1942, the Philippine Sea in June 1944,
and Leyte in October 1944) were not “battles” as such but major naval operations. In the Atlantic Ocean, the Germans in May 1941 conducted a major naval
operation (RHEINUEBUNG), with Combat Group Bismarck (the 42,600-ton battleship Bismarck and the fifteen-thousand-ton heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen), aimed at
interrupting Allied maritime traffic in the North Atlantic. The escape in February 1942 of two German battle cruisers (Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, of 38,100
tons at full load) and one heavy cruiser (Prinz Eugen) from Brest to Kiel through
the English Channel (Operation CERBERUS) was a major naval operation. The
purpose was to redeploy these heavy ships away from where they had been
threatening Allied maritime traffic in the southwest approaches to England,
moving them to Norway to strengthen German defenses against possible Allied
invasion. The British carrier attack on the Italian naval base at Taranto in November 1940 (JUDGMENT) and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 (HAWAII) were also major naval operations aimed at destroying major
parts of enemy fleets at their bases. The Allies also conducted many major amphibious landing operations in all theaters during World War II, especially in the
Pacific.
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Since the end of World War II only a few major naval operations have been
conducted. One reason is that most regional wars in that time have not involved
major navies. Two exceptions, however, were the blockade of North Korea’s coast
during the Korean War (1950–53) and the American blockade of the South Vietnamese coast (MARKET TIME, March 1965–December 1972). The Israelis
planned and conducted what can be considered a major naval operation to obtain local sea control off the Egyptian and Syrian coasts during the Yom Kippur
(Ramadan) War of October 1973. The British recapture of the Falklands in 1982
(Operation CORPORATE) was a major naval/joint operation with a limited strategic objective. The operations of the coalition naval forces in the Gulf War of
1990–91 and also in the war against Iraq in 2003 (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM),
to establish and maintain control of the northern part of the Arabian (Persian)
Gulf, constituted a major combined naval operation.
Purpose
In terms of its principal purpose, a major naval operation can be offensive or defensive. Offensive major naval operations are normally conducted by the stronger
side at sea, but they also can be planned on the defensive. The stronger side would
mount a single major naval operation or several in succession to obtain and then
maintain sea control. Such operations can also greatly reduce or eliminate threats
posed by numerically larger forces and thereby facilitate operations in other parts
of a maritime theater, as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor illustrates. An offensive major naval operation can also be planned as part of a defensive campaign, as
was the Japanese commitment of a major part of the Combined Fleet in defense of
the Philippines in October 1944. Major naval operations against enemy maritime
trade and amphibious landing operations are inherently offensive in their
purpose.
A major naval operation with an offensive purpose is usually planned and
conducted in the initial phase of the war to obtain sea control and afterward in
exercising sea control. It can also be conducted when one side has only local and
temporary control, as Allied amphibious landings in the Pacific in World War II
illustrate. Major naval operations in enclosed and semienclosed seas (collectively called “narrow seas”) can be conducted within either a strategically offensive or a strategically defensive framework. For either one, limited, temporary
sea control should be obtained first. Major naval operations aimed at protecting
maritime trade can be conducted even when command of the sea is in dispute.
The main factor for success then is at least control of the sea, the subsurface, and
the air in the proximity of a large convoy. For example, the Royal Navy mounted
several major operations in 1942 to supply the besieged island of Malta, although Axis forces possessed overwhelming strength in the air. The Allies

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2007

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Spring 2007.vp
Monday, May 14, 2007 3:57:40 PM

109

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

104

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 60 [2007], No. 2, Art. 1

suffered extremely high losses in these operations from Axis land-based aircraft
and submarines. It is also possible to conduct a major naval operation when
friendly forces control only the air and the subsurface, as the Germans did in
capturing the key bases and ports in the initial phase of their invasion of Norway
in April 1940.
A defensive major naval operation is usually planned and executed when one
side is forced onto the defensive at sea by permanent or temporary weakness.
Then, the weaker side may conduct major defensive naval operations to oppose
attacks on its naval bases and anchorages, enemy amphibious landings and attacks on coastal installations or facilities, and to carry out major evacuations of
friendly troops and civilians. Both sides in a war at sea will occasionally mount
major naval or joint operations in defense and protection of maritime trade.
A major naval operation is conducted as an integral part of a maritime, and
sometimes a land, campaign. It is aimed at bringing about a radical or drastic
change in the operational situation in a maritime theater; if a major naval operation is only partially successful, the operational situation is likely to remain as it
had been, as the battle of Jutland in June 1916 illustrates. A major naval operation can have a strategic effect as well. This usually occurs when a surprise attack
on a major part of the enemy’s fleet is carried out at the very onset of hostilities,
to accomplish a strategic objective in a principal theater of operations. For example, the operational objective of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 was to destroy enough of the U.S. Pacific Fleet to prevent it from
interfering with the Japanese invasion of the Philippines. However, the unintended and highly negative (for Japan) effect was to shift American public opinion from isolationism to unequivocal support for complete victory over Japan.
A war at sea predominantly consists of a large number of tactical actions conducted in coastal waters, on the high seas, and also on the open ocean. Such major
and minor tactical actions can accomplish specific operational objectives, but only
after a longer time. However, the key to ultimate success in war at sea is avoiding situations in which objectives must be accomplished predominantly—or even worse,
exclusively—through force-to-force encounters or attrition. Attrition warfare not
only results in much higher losses, even for the stronger side, in terms of lives and
materiel but is inherently protracted. One’s forces are tied down, and until given operational objectives are accomplished they cannot be employed for other urgent
tasks in other oceans or sea areas. This happened to the Allies in the struggle for
Guadalcanal between August 1942 and February 1943. The initial major naval operation—the amphibious landing on Guadalcanal (Operation WATCHTOWER) on 7
August 1942—was highly successful. Afterward, however, the Allies became progressively involved in a series of small but costly tactical actions with Japanese forces
on land, at sea, and in the air. This included seven major naval battles, most of them
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fought in the night, and numerous smaller tactical actions at sea. The U.S. Navy
lost most of these battles, because the Japanese were much more proficient in night
gunnery and torpedo tactics. However, both sides lost approximately the same
30
number of ships. This attrition phase lasted almost seven months before the Japanese decided to give up their attempts to regain control of Guadalcanal. By then, the
Allied operational tempo had been considerably slowed; no further major landings
up the Solomons chain had been possible with Guadalcanal not yet secure. A good
argument can be made that had the Allies been able to conduct a consecutive major
naval or air operation to consolidate initial operational success, the struggle for
Guadalcanal would have ended much earlier and with far smaller losses in ships, aircraft, and personnel for the Allies.
Types
Based on the degree of participation of various services and arms, naval, joint
(multiservice), and combined (multinational) major naval operations can be
differentiated. A major naval operation, as such, is conducted predominantly by
a navy, although air or even ground forces can take part as well. Examples of major operations conducted by naval forces are the battles of Cape Matapan
(March 1941), the Coral Sea (May 1942), Midway (June 1942), and the Philippine Sea (June 1944).
A major naval/joint operation is planned and conducted by forces of the navy
but with substantial participation by other services. In a maritime theater encompassing a large ocean or sea area, major naval operations would involve significant air forces, and maybe ground forces as well. In contrast, major naval
operations in littoral waters are likely to require participation of all three services. All major amphibious landing operations are inherently joint, as are major
operations against enemy maritime trade or in defense of maritime trade in the
littorals.
A major naval/combined operation is conducted with two or more navies or
services of the armed forces of two or more countries. Today, major combined
operations constitute a frequent method of employing naval forces in lowintensity conflict. In fact, because of the downsizing of most navies, they might
well become routine for major regional contingencies or even general war. A
major amphibious landing operation is sometimes combined with it, as was the
case in the invasion of Sicily (Operation HUSKY) in July 1943, the landing in
Normandy (NEPTUNE) in June 1944, and the UN amphibious landing at Inchon
(CHROMITE) in September 1950.
Sometimes several major naval/joint operations can take place in a single
maritime theater of operations. Such a situation would occur in the initial phase
of a new campaign when several operational objectives must be accomplished
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sequentially or simultaneously. In that case, the one aimed at the most important operational objective will be the main or principal operation, and the others will be supporting (ancillary) operations. For example, the Allied
amphibious landing at Leyte on 20 October 1944 was the main or principal major naval/combined operation. The actions of Task Force (TF) 38 as distant
cover and support between 17 October and 27 November constituted a supporting major naval operation.
In terms of their timing, one can distinguish between initial, successive, and
preliminary major naval operations. The initial major operation is planned and
conducted to accomplish the first, and most operational, objective in a campaign. For example, the Japanese Operation MI (that is, the battle of Midway)
was the initial major naval operation in a projected maritime campaign in the
Central Pacific. The Allied invasion of the Gilberts in November 1943 (GALVANIC) was the initial major joint operation in a series of major operations
within the Central Pacific campaign (November 1943–September 1944). A successive (or consecutive) major operation normally starts during or shortly after
the initial major operation. Its purpose is to consolidate or expand the operational success of the preceding major operations. The U.S. invasions of the Marshals (Operations FLINTLOCK and CATCHPOLE) and the Marianas (FORAGER)
are examples. A preliminary major naval operation is usually planned to isolate a
maritime area of operations in which a new campaign or major operation is to
be conducted. The purpose is often to prevent the arrival of enemy reinforcements in troops, aircraft, or materiel. Another purpose might be to deceive the
enemy as to the intended sector of main effort. For example, TF-38’s series of air
strikes and other actions against the Ryukyus, Formosa, and Luzon between 10
and 17 October 1944 constituted a preliminary major naval operation—that is,
with respect to the invasion of Leyte.
Major naval operations can be conducted on the open ocean or in the littorals
(waters contiguous to the continental landmass, and peripheral, enclosed, and
semienclosed seas, respectively). Most major naval operations have taken place
fairly close to continents, large islands, or oceanic archipelagoes. Many have
taken place in enclosed or semienclosed seas (collectively called “narrow seas”).
Today, because of enormous advances in the range and lethality of weapons,
even coastal navies composed of small surface ships, submarines, and landbased aircraft can conduct major naval operations.
Major naval operations in the littorals are generally more complicated to prepare and execute than those on the open ocean, because they involve diverse
forces and assets of all services of the country’s armed forces. They also differ
from major naval operations on the open ocean because of the much smaller operational space involved and the smaller forces used.
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The initial position used by one’s forces in the initial phase of a major naval or
joint operation often considerably affects the course of the operation as a whole,
sometimes even its outcome. In general, the force can operate from a central or exterior position. In the case of employment of multiservice or multinational forces in
the same operation, some forces can operate from central positions, others from exterior positions. Each position has some advantages and some disadvantages in respect to the employment of naval forces and aviation. It would be a mistake to
believe that a central position is inherently more advantageous than an exterior one.
Experience shows that not only victories but also defeats have ensued for forces operating from a central position.
A major naval/joint operation can be conducted along interior or exterior lines
of operations. Interior lines are completely or partially enveloped by the enemy;
hence, they originate from a central position. The opposing force, then, operates
along exterior lines.31 Admiral Alfred T. Mahan (1840–1914) observed that interior lines are in fact a central position prolonged in one or more directions. “Interior line” implies that from a central position one can assemble more quickly
on either of two opposite fronts than the enemy can and therefore can utilize
32
forces more effectively.
Moving along interior lines, one’s naval forces can be interposed between two or
more parts of the enemy force, concentrating against one as quickly as possible in
order to destroy the bulk of the enemy force, while holding the others in check with
a force that is possibly inferior. Interior lines are inherently shorter than those the
hostile force occupies on the periphery, a fact that can be used effectively in both
offense and defense. The key prerequisites for the success of major naval operations on interior lines, then, are sufficient physical space and ability to move
33
forces quickly. For example, in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 the Japanese fleet occupied a central position between the Russian major naval bases at
Port Arthur and Vladivostok and checkmated both places. The Japanese armies
could be transported across the Tsushima Strait and through the Yellow Sea because the Japanese fleet was interposed between the Russian Far Eastern Squadron in Vladivostok and the force in Port Arthur. Thus, the Japanese fleet
commander, Admiral Heihachiro Togo (1846–1934), could prevent the junction
of the Russian squadrons to interfere with Japanese communications. In another example, TF-58 and TF-38 operated along interior lines during the battle of
the Philippine Sea (June 1944) and the battle for Leyte (October 1944), respectively.
A force is said to operate along exterior lines when its lines of movement are
separated by those of the enemy. These lines are generally longer than the shortest line the enemy force can use. A major naval/joint operation conducted along
exterior or converging lines comprises concentric advances from several sea or
ocean areas toward common physical objectives. The most important prerequisite
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for the proper use of exterior lines is sufficient combat strength in each part of
34
one’s forces.
The advantages and disadvantages of exterior lines are the reverse of those of
interior lines. Exterior lines allow simultaneous concentric actions from several
35
directions against the enemy’s center. A force moving along exterior lines can
select the point of attack along the enemy’s periphery. Exterior lines generally facilitate the shifting of forces to meet an external threat while maintaining communications and covering distances to approach the enemy’s force. The inherent
advantage of a force moving along exterior lines is that it can threaten the enemy
with envelopment. However, such a force moves along longer lines of operations
than its opponent does. The greater the distance between the base of operations
and the attack objective, the longer the lines of supply. Also, unless each force element is stronger than the enemy force opposed to it, there is a constant danger
of defeat in detail. An inherent feature of all amphibious landings is that the attack forces initially operate from an exterior position. Once the amphibious
forces land ashore, they operate from a central position and along interior lines.
Not only must a force operating along exterior lines move faster than its opponent moving along interior lines, but also its adjacent elements have to keep within
mutual supporting distance, if, again, the force is to avoid being defeated in detail.
Sometimes forces can operate beyond mutually supporting distance, provided that
each prong of the advance is stronger than possible opposition, as illustrated by the
Japanese conquest of the Netherlands East Indies in December 1941–April 1942.
A major naval or joint operation from an exterior position also requires precise
synchronization of movement and actions by one’s forces. This is difficult to
achieve, especially when the distance between one’s base of operations and the
physical objective is great. For example, in the Leyte operation, the Japanese First
and Second Diversionary Attack forces and the Mobile Force (Main Body)
started their movements toward the Philippines from exterior positions. Likewise, the TF-38 carrier force operated from the exterior in regard to its targets on
Luzon, the central Philippines, and adjacent sea areas. The Allied amphibious
force that landed at Leyte also operated from an exterior position during its
transit and approach phases.
MAJOR NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WAR
In generic terms, the main purposes of a major naval/joint operation today in
the case of a high-intensity conflict at sea can be to

• Destroy the enemy fleet at sea or in its bases
• Conduct an amphibious landing on the opposed shore
• Destroy enemy coastal installations and facilities
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• Attack enemy maritime trade
• Defend and protect one’s own maritime trade
• Destroy enemy sea-based strategic nuclear forces
• Protect one’s own sea-based strategic nuclear forces
• Support friendly ground forces on the coast.
A major operation aimed at destroying an enemy fleet at sea or in its base is the
quickest and most effective—but most difficult—way to establish sea control in
a given maritime area of operations. These operations can be conducted on the
open ocean or in narrow seas. Historically, several major operations have been
aimed at destroying an enemy fleet at sea or in its bases at or shortly before the
outbreak of hostilities. Most fleet-on-fleet encounters in World War II took
place when one fleet provided distant cover and support of a major amphibious
landing, as happened at Leyte in October 1944, or when the stronger fleet used
the landing to lure an inferior force into a “decisive” battle, as the Japanese Combined Fleet attempted in Operation MI, which led to the battle of Midway in June
1942.
A major naval or joint operation to destroy an enemy fleet might be necessary
when the attacker provides support of the flank to his forces operating in the
coastal area or when the enemy fleet is forced to operate in a certain sea or ocean
area. If the stronger side at sea attempts to isolate certain sea/ocean areas, then
the objective could be the destruction of major parts of the enemy fleet forces.
Likewise, though a major operation to destroy the enemy fleet at sea is difficult
for a numerically weaker side, that side might decide to plan one in order to
weaken or lift a blockade. In a typical enclosed or semienclosed sea, such an operational objective could be accomplished by massive strikes by surface combatants, submarines, and land-based aircraft. Preparation time would have to be
short because of rapid changes in the situation at sea and in the air. Such an operation would most likely encompass a single phase, with one or several synchronized strikes by naval forces, aircraft, and coastal missile or artillery
36
batteries.
Major naval/joint operations in distant ocean areas are not likely to be conducted in the near future, because there are no longer two or more major potential opponents at sea. A more likely scenario is a conflict between the navies of
riparian states in an enclosed or semienclosed sea, or between a blue-water navy
and a coastal navy operating in the littorals. Hence, attacks on naval bases or anchorages, combined with attacks at sea, seem to be the most likely method open
to a stronger navy to destroy or neutralize a smaller fleet.
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A prerequisite for success in a major naval operation to destroy an enemy fleet
in its bases is usually local, temporary sea control. However, this is not always
necessary. In the past, the best results were achieved by striking from beyond the
effective range of the enemy’s defenses. Today, nuclear-powered attack submarines, modern conventionally powered submarines, land- and carrier-based
aircraft, and surface ships armed with long-range cruise missiles are the most effective platforms for destroying enemy ships in their bases. Attack submarines
armed with antiship missiles or land-attack cruise missiles can strike enemy naval bases from several hundred nautical miles away. For example, in the first few
days after the start of the air offensive against Iraq on 17 January 1991, American
carrier-based aircraft and attack submarines deployed in the Arabian Gulf and
the Red Sea repeatedly struck Iraqi naval installations near Umm Qasr and Basra
37
with “smart” bombs and Tomahawk missiles.
Air strikes against enemy naval bases in an enclosed sea, such as the Arabian
(Persian) Gulf, can be far more effective than those mounted from the open
ocean, because of the much shorter distances and the larger number of
land-based aircraft that can be used. These strikes can be conducted with high
intensity and repeated at short intervals. In some instances, not only fixed-wing
aircraft but also missile-armed helicopters can be effectively employed.
In the initial phase of a war in an enclosed sea theater, the principal objective
of a major naval operation would be to obtain the desired degree of sea control,
thereby creating favorable conditions for carrying out other operational tasks—
specifically, supporting friendly ground forces on the coast. An absolute prereq38
uisite would be air superiority in the maritime theater. The objective would be
accomplished by destroying the enemy’s surface forces and submarines; destroying or suppressing tactical air forces at their airfields; destroying enemy antisubmarine forces at sea, in their bases, or at airfields; suppressing or destroying
enemy air defenses; and suppressing or interfering with command posts and
electronic surveillance. In the second phase of the operation, the fleet forces
would carry out strikes against enemy forces at sea and their bases and airfields
39
in the sea’s only exit and its approaches.
Amphibious landing operations are the most effective ways of projecting
power on an enemy shore. They are also extremely complex to plan and execute.
They are inherently joint in character, regardless of their purpose or the size of
the forces involved. Amphibious assault landings within enclosed or semienclosed seas would take place across much shorter distances and are normally
smaller than those mounted against coasts on open oceans. Sometimes, however, an invasion mounted across a narrow sea can exert a strategic influence, in
the case of the opening of a new front, as was true of the Allied Normandy
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invasion of June 1944, or causing a radical change in a strategic situation, as in
the case of the UN landing at Inchon in September 1950.
Today, a large-scale amphibious landing in an enclosed or semienclosed sea
would be difficult to execute if the defender effectively used land-based aircraft,
submarines, and combat craft in combination. Amphibious landings are aimed
at seizing an area of enemy-controlled coast that gives access to a military operational objective inland; speeding the advance of one’s troops along the coast or
the end of the war itself; eliminating or taking control of a large naval base or
port; preventing the adversary from seizing a base or port; cutting off an enemy
army’s avenue of escape; and countering enemy evacuation efforts across the
sea. A credible amphibious capability may also help to tie a sizable enemy force
to the defense of a large stretch of its mainland coast or offshore islands.
In U.S. terms, the emerging doctrine of Operational Maneuver from the Sea
(OMFTS) developed by the Marine Corps represents the application of operational art in planning and conducting amphibious landings. The tactical component of this concept, the ship-to-objective maneuver (STOM), envisions
moving Marine air-ground task forces directly to the assigned operational objective deep in the enemy’s rear. Such an action will be carried out without stopping to seize, defend, and build up beachheads or landing zones. STOM is
40
predicated on the existence of a sea base deployed in international waters.
A major naval operation aimed to destroy enemy coastal installations and facilities can be conducted as a preliminary to an amphibious landing or as an integral
part of a naval blockade. Such major operations can be conducted with naval or
air forces or with both jointly. The primary purpose of attacks can be destruction
or neutralization of the enemy naval or commercial ports, airfields and airports,
shipbuilding and ship-repair industries, rail and road traffic, shore/offshore oil
and gas production, and refining industries. For example, the main purpose of
TF-38’s attacks in mid-October 1944 was to destroy Japanese ports, shipyards, and
airfields in the Ryukyus and on Formosa and Luzon. Today, longer-range and more
capable carrier- and land-based aircraft, armed with cruise missiles and “smart”
bombs, make it possible to attack the enemy coastal installation and facilities
along a large part of the enemy coast and far into the depth of his defenses. Major
navies today have a much greater ability than in the past to attack a variety of targets far in the enemy’s operational and even strategic depths.
Major naval operations on the open ocean and in littoral waters are conducted
to interrupt or cut off enemy maritime trade or to defend and protect one’s own mari41
time trade. Maritime trade is conducted almost continuously for the duration of
a war at sea. Each convoy or independent sailing ship represents only a fraction
of the traffic volume in a maritime theater at a given time. Correspondingly,
most naval actions attacking the enemy’s or defending and protecting friendly
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2007

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Spring 2007.vp
Monday, May 14, 2007 3:57:41 PM

117

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

112

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 60 [2007], No. 2, Art. 1

maritime trade will be tactical in character. Major operations will be conducted
only occasionally and then only in a certain part of the sea or ocean. When a major
effort must be mounted to attack or protect a large convoy, its objective is an operational one.
To be effective, actions against the enemy’s military-economic potential must
be conducted systematically over a relatively large area and against all the elements of the enemy’s maritime trade. Specifically, this includes attacks on enemy convoys, independently sailing ships, ports, and cargo loading and
off-loading facilities; rail and road junctions in the littoral area; shipyards and
ship-repair facilities; and shipping-related industries. In enclosed seas, attacks
on enemy maritime trade and protection of one’s own are usually made with the
full participation of not only one’s naval forces but also land-based air and, in
some cases, coastal defense forces and ground forces. Such a major operation
would usually consist of a single phase, but it would be conducted with high intensity. Some such operations could be divided into phases, with short pauses
between.
A major naval operation aimed to interrupt or cut off enemy traffic would
normally be conducted when sea control is in dispute or the enemy has slight superiority. Such an operation would consist of a series of massive missile, torpedo,
air, and artillery strikes, plus offensive use of mines. Some theoreticians claim
that enemy maritime traffic can be considered interrupted when traffic in a certain area is reduced by 20 to 25 percent, while cutting off maritime traffic means
42
dropping total volume by 40 to 50 percent.
An attack on the enemy’s maritime traffic in the littorals would consist primarily of smaller naval tactical actions conducted over relatively large areas of
the maritime theater and over time. Such actions would be aimed at interrupting enemy shipping traffic to such a degree as to have an effect on land-front
combat. A major naval operation would usually be planned and executed when
there was significant enemy traffic in a certain area. It could also be aimed
against ships carrying raw materials. Such an operation would be unified by a
common concept and carried out in several phases. The prerequisite for the success of such an operation is full knowledge of all elements of the enemy’s maritime trade. Aviation, submarines, special forces, and coastal defense forces
43
would take part in such an operation.
One of the most effective methods of preserving the maritime component of
one’s military-economic potential is a major naval/joint operation to defend and
protect maritime trade. Specifically, such an operation is aimed at preventing interruption or cutoff of shipping carrying troops, weapons, military equipment,
or strategic raw materials. In some cases, such an operation can be aimed to protect friendly shipping lines in coastal waters.44 It is indicated when shipping
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lanes must be made secure or when friendly convoys must be protected from attack. Normally such an operation can be executed in a single phase. Its duration
depends on the length of the shipping routes, how long ships stay in ports and
anchorages, and convoy-assembly time. Smaller convoys and individual ships
45
can sail independently, without protection.
Today, only large navies have the capability to mount major operations aimed
at destroying the enemy’s sea-based strategic nuclear forces—that is, ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) and their supporting elements. Such major operations
might be focused on destroying enemy SSBNs either in their basing areas, in their
patrol zones, or in transit between them. Likewise, a major naval operation might
be conducted to protect one’s sea-based strategic nuclear forces. Such major operations would most likely be carried out predominantly by naval forces, specifically
nuclear-powered attack submarines in the open ocean and patrol aircraft overhead. However, in areas closer to one’s own or the enemy’s coast, such operations
will probably be more joint, because air forces will be expected to take part.
Major naval operations in support of ground forces on the coast are conducted
both in marginal seas of oceans and in semienclosed or enclosed seas. They may
become most frequent in the seas bordering continents (e.g., the Black Sea, the
Baltic, or the Arabian Gulf). Tactical actions are a dominant method by which
fleet and air forces support troops on the coast. However, a major naval operation can be planned to destroy a hostile fleet threatening one’s troops operating
along the coast; to seize, by an amphibious landing, a major island, strait, or part
of the enemy-held coast; to defend one’s own coast against an amphibious landing; to attack the enemy’s or protect one’s maritime trade; to conduct a largescale evacuation of troops or civilians; and so on.
One’s naval forces would play the principal role in major anti-amphibious
operations. Such operations would be carried out against enemy landings regardless of the ratio of forces. Success would depend on timely detection of the
enemy movement to land, activation of coastal defense systems, and deployment
of forces. A major anti-amphibious operation would normally consist of four
main phases: strikes against the assembly areas of the enemy invasion forces, actions to destroy enemy forces at sea, the battle for the bridgehead, and engagements in the depth of the landing objective area. For each phase, the defender
46
should determine an objective to be accomplished.
Major Naval Operations vs. Naval Tactical Actions
Major naval operations differ considerably from naval tactical actions in terms
of the level of command that plans, prepares, and executes them; the decisionmaking and planning processes; force composition; the size of the sea or ocean
area in which combat takes place; its duration; and the scale of combat support.
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Major naval operations should be planned, prepared, and conducted by the
naval component or functional commanders (e.g., in U.S. terms, numbered fleet
commanders and joint/combined force maritime component commanders, or
JFMCC/CFMCC) subordinate to a theater commander (that is, commanders of
theaters of war or of operations). Sometimes an operational-tactical commander (or joint task force commander) and staff can plan and conduct major
naval/joint operations. Unlike a tactical commander, the operational commander also has overall responsibility for logistical support and sustainment.
The decision to fight a naval tactical action is based upon a short-term estimate of the situation, while determination upon a major naval operation requires what is known as a “long-range estimate.” In preparing that estimate,
especially for a major naval/joint operation in the littorals, the operational commander must take into account all aspects of the situation in a given theater—
military, political, economic, sociological, ethnic, and climatic—projecting
them for several weeks or months. Because of the resulting much wider range of
uncertainty and the larger scope of a major operation, in comparison to a tactical action, a long-range estimate of the situation will necessarily contain more
assumptions. In turn, the more assumptions a plan contains, the more likely it is
to require alteration, modification, or radical changes, or even have to be abandoned during the execution phase.
In contrast to a naval tactical action, major naval/joint operations are invariably planned ahead of time. They are normally prepared, except for the initial
phase of a war at sea, only when forces have at least local superiority over their
opponent, whereas tactical actions can be conducted regardless of the ratio of
forces. Major operations and campaigns are planned using a “regressive”
method, in which the ultimate operational objective is determined first and
then, working backward, several major tactical and some minor tactical objectives are determined.
A major naval/joint operation normally requires larger and more diverse
forces than a naval tactical action. For example, in the battle of Midway in June
1942, the Japanese Combined Fleet employed four separate elements totaling
47
165 warships. The U.S. forces that took part in the battle of Midway consisted
of seventy-six warships and about 110 land-based Army, Navy, and Marine air48
craft based on the island of Midway. However, some major naval operations in
World War II involved fewer ships and aircraft. In the “Bismarck Chase”
(RHEINUEBUNG, for the Germans) the Germans directly employed the Bismarck
group, six escort tankers, and one supply ship; three destroyers, two patrol ships,
two blockade breakers (Sperrbrecher), one minesweeper flotilla, thirteen U-boats,
49
one Italian submarine, and three Luftwaffe air groups were also used, in support.
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For its part, the Royal Navy employed directly or indirectly five battleships, three
battle cruisers, two aircraft carriers, eleven cruisers, thirty-three destroyers, and
50
eight submarines to defeat Combat Group Bismarck.
Enormous increases in mobility and in the range and lethality of weapons allow operational objectives today to be accomplished with smaller forces than
would have been possible only a few decades ago. Today’s major blue-water navies possess far fewer ships than they did during World War II or the early 1950s.
A major naval operation in littoral waters will include more small ships and
51
land-based aircraft than would those on the open ocean. Such an operation requires the employment of a variety of naval combat arms and often of air forces;
in the littoral waters, such operations would also require the participation of
ground forces.
Forces taking part in a major operation on the open ocean are deployed over a
large part of a theater of operations, even though the majority of its constituent
tactical actions take place in a single maritime area. For example, the forces that
took part, in some way, in the battle of Midway operated from the Japanese
home islands to the American West Coast and from the Aleutians to the Central
Pacific. The battle for Leyte, in the larger sense, covered an area of about 432,000
square miles (including the eighty-five thousand square miles of the Philippines) and encompassed a major part of the western Pacific and smaller sectors
of the central, southern, and southwestern Pacific. The actual fighting, however,
encompassed only about 110,000 square miles.52
Major naval/joint operations in the future are most likely to take place in enclosed or semienclosed seas, such as the Arabian (Persian) Gulf, or in such peripheral waters as the South China Sea. Yet a blue-water force like the U.S. Navy
would deploy its forces, other than those already deployed forward, from bases
in the continental United States or other maritime theaters.
A major naval operation lasts considerably longer than a naval tactical action.
While a naval battle or engagement is fought in several hours or less, a major naval operation can last a week or more. In general, a major naval operation in a
high-intensity conflict lasts longer if the distance between the base of operations
and the operating area is great or if the opposing force is difficult to destroy or
neutralize because of its size or peculiarities of the physical environment. Such
an operation also takes much longer to the extent that the objective is nonmilitary in nature, as would be the case in counterinsurgency or peace enforcement.
Characteristics
The main characteristics of a modern major naval/joint operation are the complexity of its planning, preparation, and execution; the involvement of diverse
naval combat arms and often combat arms or branches of other services;
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diversity of tactical actions in a relatively large part of the theater; high intensity
of combat and proportionately high losses; extensive use of electronic warfare
techniques; and the complexity of combat support required.
Because of the enormous increase in the combat potential of platforms, major naval operations of the future are likely to be highly intense indeed. This will
be especially true in a littoral environment, because of the small area and correspondingly short distances. For that reason, in major naval operations today extremely high consumption rates of fuel and ammunition should be expected.
A major naval or joint operation in the littorals differs considerably from one
on the open ocean because of the much more complex physical environment
and, as noted, short distances between points. Among other things,
geomorphological and hydrographic (or oceanographic) features in narrow seas
greatly affect the employment of naval platforms, weapons, and sensors. The
coast in a typical narrow sea is usually highly indented and fronted by a large
number of islands and islets. This configuration greatly restricts the maneuverability of surface ships, especially major surface combatants and submarines. In
shallow waters, large surface ships have to reduce their speeds sharply. Navigational conditions in narrow seas are often difficult because of shoals, reefs,
strong tides, and currents.
A major naval operation in an enclosed or semienclosed sea will most likely
encompass the entire body of water. The combat will take place on the surface,
subsurface, on the coast, and in the air. Diverse combat arms of the navy and
other services will be extensively employed. Covertness of action and opportunities for achieving surprise are considerably enhanced by the combination of
modern long-range and highly lethal weapons, such as antiship missiles and torpedoes, and the nature of the physical environment. Here again, combat between modern naval forces is likely to be short and intense and to result in high
losses.
One of the main features of modern naval combat in an enclosed or
semienclosed sea will be quick and frequent changes in the operational or even
strategic situation. Modern electronic warfare techniques will be extensively
used by both sides. This will cause great difficulties in using sensors and guided
weapons, even make it impossible. The high speed of modern ships and aircraft
and their ability to combine maneuver with “fires” allow one’s side to achieve
surprise as well as to gain superiority in place and time.
Combat actions in enclosed or semienclosed seas will of choice occur largely
at night or in bad visibility. That necessarily means fighting at close range, making the deployment, redeployment, and maneuver of forces more difficult. In a
typical enclosed or semienclosed sea, land-based aircraft will be one of the most
effective means for striking enemy shipping and facilities. Their high degree of
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readiness and maneuverability enables aircraft to concentrate strikes against
transports, warships, or aircraft covering enemy ships at sea.
Elements
A major naval/joint operation in war, regardless of its purpose, comprises three
main phases: deployment, combat employment, and postcombat. As for deployment, naval forces can conduct, depending on the initial bases, only operational
deployment (i.e., within a given maritime theater of operations) or, in some
cases, strategic deployment (movement from one maritime theater to another)
(see figure). If one’s forces are forward deployed, as are U.S. Navy forces currently in the western Pacific and in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf, in case of hostilities they would need to conduct an operational or even merely tactical
deployment. In a typical enclosed or semienclosed sea, however, because of the
generally much smaller area, naval forces would conduct tactical, rarely operational, deployments.
MAJOR NAVAL OPERATION AND ITS MAIN ELEMENTS

The combat phase of a major naval/joint operation would consist of one or
more phases, differing in duration. Normally, combat would take place in a sector of main effort and one or more sectors of secondary effort. The major part of
one’s forces, arbitrarily called “main forces,” would be employed in the former,
while the rest, “supporting forces,” would operate in the latter. The actions of
one’s main forces would be focused at destroying or neutralizing the enemy’s
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operational center of gravity in a series of related major and minor tactical actions. Supporting forces would at the same time try to tie down enemy forces to
facilitate the success of the main forces. Normally, deception would be conducted
in a sector of secondary effort. The cumulative effect should be accomplishment
of the assigned operational objective. In the case of an offensive major naval/
joint operation this operational success must be consolidated by pursuing and
destroying the remaining enemy forces. The shift from combat phase to pursuit
should be seamless, but an operational pause after the end of pursuit might be
required to regenerate one’s combat potential. Thereafter, forces might withdraw
to their base or be redeployed for other tasks in the same or an adjacent theater.
Tactical actions in a major naval operation are not just a random collection of
various combat actions but are all related to each other. They can be fought on
the surface, subsurface, in the air, or, in some cases, on the coast. They are all connected by and conducted within a given operational framework; otherwise, they
would not contribute to the accomplishment of the assigned operational objective
and would therefore represent a waste of resources and sorely needed time.
Naval tactical actions can range from actions in which weapons are not used
(such as patrolling and surveillance) to attacks, strikes, raids, engagements, and
naval battles. As the term implies, they are aimed at accomplishing major or minor tactical objectives in a given part of a maritime theater. In some cases, a series
of diverse tactical actions conducted over time can lead to the accomplishment
of an operational objective.
The lowest and the most frequently conducted tactical action using weapons
is a naval attack, a combination of tactical maneuver and weapons used to accomplish a minor tactical objective. It is usually an integral part of a strike. A naval attack can be conducted by a single or several types of platforms. It is usually
aimed to destroy or neutralize a single enemy platform, tactical groups, or a target ashore. Attacks can be distinguished by the type of weapons used—missile,
53
gun, torpedo, bomb, depth charge, or a combination thereof. A naval attack
can be conducted independently or as part of a strike or raid. The success of a naval attack depends largely on the surprise achieved, the degree of skill in maneuvering a platform or several platforms to obtain positional advantage, and the
range, lethality, and precision of the weapons used. An example of a naval attack
was the action by the U.S. submarines Darter and Dace on 23 October 1944 during the opening phase of the battle for Leyte. This attack resulted in the sinking
54
of two Japanese heavy cruisers (Atago and Takao). The actions of U.S. motor
torpedo boats and destroyers in the battle of the Surigao Strait on the night of
24–25 October are examples of naval attacks conducted by single-type platforms. In the Battle of Samar on 25 October, U.S. destroyers conducted torpedo
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counterattacks against Japanese heavy surface ships of the 1st Diversionary Attack Force.
With the advent of missiles and other long-range, highly precise, and lethal
weapons, it became possible to destroy the enemy force at sea or on the coast at
much longer range than with guns or torpedoes. The long-range missiles and
smart bombs can be fired or dropped by a single or several ships, submarines, or
aircraft and in quick succession. A new method of combat force employment,
called “strike,” gradually replaced the naval battle and engagement as the principal method of accomplishing not only a major tactical but sometimes even an
operational objective in war at sea and in the air. A well prepared strike is difficult to repulse. By using longer-range, more lethal weapons, the attacking forces
55
can achieve success without suffering significant losses.
Depending on the scale and importance of the target to be destroyed or neutralized, strikes can be differentiated as tactical, operational, or strategic. However, destroying or neutralizing these targets is not identical to accomplishing
the corresponding military objective; a number of targets must be struck and
destroyed before an objective is achieved. A naval strike is usually conducted by
two or more platforms of a single type of force—for example, missile surface combatants, submarines, or attack aircraft (helicopters). On an island-studded,
archipelago-type coast, missile- or torpedo-armed surface combatants can conduct strikes from ambush against much stronger hostile forces. A strike can be
carried out using conventional weapons (missiles, torpedoes, guns, bombs, etc.)
or weapons of mass destruction (WMD). During the Yom Kippur (Ramadan)
War, the Israeli navy conducted several successful strikes against the Egyptian
and Syrian ships at sea. For example, a force of five Israeli missile craft struck a
group of Syrian ships off Latakia on the night of 6–7 October 1973, sinking three
56
Syrian missile craft, one torpedo boat, and a minesweeper.
Usually, in a strike conducted with several weapons, longer-range weapons
are used first, to weaken the enemy’s defenses; then short-range weapons finish
off the target. Thus, in a strike by missile-armed and torpedo-armed surface
combatants, antiship missiles would be fired first, followed after a certain interval by torpedoes to finish off the enemy’s ships damaged by the missiles. A
broader form of strike is a naval raid—conducted by a single or several naval
combat arms to accomplish a tactical objective as a part of a major offensive or
defensive naval operation. The aim is usually to deny temporarily some position
57
or to capture or destroy an enemy force, coastal installation, or facility. One’s
temporary or local control of the sea is not a prerequisite for the success of a raid.
The stronger fleet can also conduct raids to divert the enemy’s attention or force
the enemy to react in a secondary sector of effort.
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A naval raid is usually conducted against an objective that the enemy considers so valuable that its loss or serious degradation could not be ignored. A larger
purpose of a naval raid is to accomplish some temporary advantage and also
pose a threat of future repetition. Besides destroying installations, facilities, or
forces on the coast, a naval raid can be aimed to enhance one’s own morale or diminish that of the enemy. The action can range in scale from very small to very
large; a large-scale raid can have many features of a major naval operation.
In the Gulf War of 1990–91, a landing party from a U.S. frigate seized Jazirat
58
Qurah Island in the northern part of the Arabian Gulf. A day later, a landing
party and helicopter from another U.S. frigate captured the oil platforms in the
59
Durah oil field. In contrast, the Allied Dieppe raid (Operation JUBILEE), conducted on 19 August 1942, can be considered a significant military effort; some
6,100 troops, mostly Canadians, and 252 ships were employed. The main purpose of the Dieppe raid was to test German coastal defenses. After heavy fighting
in which the Allies, especially Canadian troops, suffered heavy casualties (about
1,180 killed and 2,190 taken prisoner), the operation ended in unmitigated di60
saster for the Allies; the entire effort was abandoned.
The effect of a raid, like that of surprise, is usually transitory. However, depending on the enemy’s reaction, the consequences of a well executed raid can
be much greater than initially planned. For example, the raid on Tokyo on 18
April 1942, popularly known as the “Doolittle Raid,” carried out by sixteen B-25
medium bombers launched from the carrier Hornet (CV 8) of Task Force 16
(TF-16), was an example of a naval raid that resulted in strategic consequences.
It was launched about 670 miles from Tokyo, had a tremendous psychological
impact on the Japanese, and greatly lifted American morale. A more important
consequence of the raid was that the Japanese navy thereafter won the internal
61
Japanese debate on whether to expand its defense perimeter in the Pacific. This
led to the Japanese decision to initiate a new campaign in the central Pacific, of
which Operation MI was the initial major naval operation. In the end, the Japanese suffered a disastrous defeat in the battle of Midway in early June 1942,
which, in retrospect, was a turning point in the war in the Pacific.
In the past, a naval engagement consisted of a series of related strikes/
counterstrikes and attacks/counterattacks conducted by main forces and aimed
to accomplish the most important tactical objective in a naval battle. The clashes
of opposing carrier forces in the Coral Sea in 1942, the battle of Midway in June
1942, and the battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944 were examples of naval
engagements.
A naval battle was until relatively recently the main method of accomplishing
a major tactical objective as a part of a major naval operation. It consisted of a
series of related attacks, counterattacks, strikes, and counterstrikes coordinated
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in time and place. It was characterized by relatively long duration—several
62
hours or even longer. Several naval combat arms, and often the combat arms of
other services (e.g., air force, or troops defending the coast), participated in a naval battle. In World War II, numerous naval battles took place in almost all ocean
or sea areas. The battles of Savo Island on 9 August and of Tassafaronga on 30
November 1942, fought between the Japanese and the Allied surface ships, are
examples of naval battles. Defeat of the enemy fleet in a naval battle can sometimes result in not only operational but also strategic victory. To complicate the
matter, however, a naval battle can be tactically won but nonetheless represent
an operational (or even strategic) failure. Also, it can be tactically won but operationally lost, as happened to the U.S. Navy in the battle of Santa Cruz Islands on
26–27 October 1942 in the lower Solomons, and to the Japanese in the battle of
Guadalcanal between 12 and 15 November 1942. For the near future at least,
large naval battles are unlikely to be fought because most of the actions would
take place between blue-water and coastal navies and in relatively small sea areas
close to the landmass.
Prerequisites
The success of a major naval/joint operation is highly dependent on synchronization of theaterwide or operational functions. Sound theater command organization, then, is perhaps one of the most important prerequisites for the success
of a campaign as a whole and of its subordinate major operations. All elements
of operational functions are integral parts of the theater command organization. Other prerequisites for the success of a major naval operation include operational intelligence, operational command and control warfare, operational
“fires,” operational logistics, and operational protection.
A major naval operation is the principal method of accomplishing operational
objectives in a maritime theater. It can be the most effective way to achieve decisive results within a given time frame, bringing about a drastic change in the situation in a theater. The only alternative is attrition warfare, which should be
avoided even when an operational commander enjoys numerical superiority.
Nonetheless, Western naval theoreticians and planners have generally neglected
major naval operations as an area of study in operational art. Too much emphasis is given instead to the tactical employment of naval forces and to various
noncombat missions in operations short of war. The real danger is of creating
the impression that no major naval operations will be conducted in the future—
an impression that could not be more wrong. The absence of any serious threat
at sea today should not delude anyone into believing that naval forces will never
be required to plan and conduct major operations in the future. In any case, a
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regional conflict could require the U.S. Navy to plan for and execute a major naval operation. Threats to national interests at sea tend to come with little warning. Fleets are built and maintained primarily not to conduct low-intensity
conflict but to wage war, whether regional or global.
Major naval operations are categorized by their main purposes, the sea or
ocean areas in which they are predominantly conducted, their timing, and the
degree of participation by other services. Certain types have arisen from advances in naval technology and the evolution of warfare in maritime theaters.
While naval forces will always play the most critical role in accomplishing operational or strategic objectives, other services and their combat arms will increasingly participate. This will be especially true in littoral waters, where the
proximity and influence of a landmass allows not only land-based aircraft but
ground forces to take part. Therefore, not only amphibious landings but also
major naval operations against enemy maritime trade and in defense of one’s
own will increasingly become joint or even combined activities.
The focus of theory should be on major naval operations of the types most
likely to be conducted. However, this does not mean that the other types of major naval operations should be neglected. For example, because of the absence at
present of major naval opponents, major naval operations to destroy enemy
fleets at sea are not likely in the near future; nevertheless, it would be very wrong
for theoreticians to ignore them. Likewise, no blue-water navy, focusing on major naval operations in littoral waters, should in the meantime neglect the possibility of encounters on the open ocean.
The current highly unsatisfactory situation in maritime thought and doctrine
can continue only as long as the U.S. Navy and other Western navies do not face a
peer competitor. Adverse consequences may well then result if the opponent
strives for superiority not through number of platforms and advanced weapons
but by thinking and acting operationally instead of tactically.
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TARGETED KILLING AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
Gary Solis

T

here is no consensus definition of “targeted killing” in the law of armed con1
flict or in case law. A reasonable definition is: the intentional killing of a
specific civilian who cannot reasonably be apprehended, and who is taking a direct part in hostilities, the targeting done at the direction and authorization of
the state in the context of an international or noninternational armed conflict.

In the second year of the Redland-Blueland war, an armed conflict between two
states, a Redland sniper squeezed the trigger of his rifle, the crosshairs of the
scope unmoving on his target: a uniformed Blueland
Gary Solis is a 2006–2007 Scholar in Residence at the
soldier. The weapon fired, and five hundred meters
Library of Congress, a U.S. Military Academy professor
of law (retired), and an adjunct professor of law at
away the enemy combatant fell to the ground, dead.
Georgetown University Law Center, where he teaches
Was this a “targeted killing”?
the law of armed conflict. He is a retired Marine with
The Redland-Blueland war continued. After
twenty-six years’ active duty, including tours in Vietnam as an armor officer. He attended law school at the
months of planning and the training of a team of disUniversity of California at Davis, then was a Marine
affected Redland nationals, Blueland was ready to imjudge advocate and court-martial judge for eighteen
years. He holds a master of laws degree from George
plement an operation against the enemy. Days later,
Washington University. After Marine Corps retirement
two clandestinely inserted Redland nationals, trained
he earned a PhD in the law of war from the London
in Blueland and wearing Blueland army uniforms,
School of Economics and Political Science and taught in
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planted an explosive charge under a bridge located inPoint in 1996, he initiated the Military Academy’s law
side Redland. Later, as the limousine of the president
of war program. He retired in 2006. His books are
of Redland passed over the bridge, the charge was detMarines and Military Law in Vietnam and Son
Thang: An American War Crime. He is writing a law
onated and the target killed. The president, elected to
of war casebook.
office when he was a college professor, had been a
thorn in the side of the Blueland government, with his
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anti-Blueland rhetoric and verbal attacks on Blueland policies. Now, Blueland’s
most hated critic was dead, silenced by Blueland agents.
Was this a “targeted killing”?
During World War II, in April 1943, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander in chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet, was on an inspection tour hundreds of miles behind the front lines. Having broken the Imperial Japanese
Navy’s message code, U.S. forces knew his flight itinerary and sent sixteen Army
Air Forces P-38 Lightning fighter aircraft to intercept him. Near Bougainville, in
the northern Solomons, the American pilots shot down their target, a Betty
bomber, killing all on board, including Admiral Yamamoto.
Was this a “targeted killing”?
First, consider the Redland sniper. On the battlefield the killing of combatants—uniformed members of the army of one of the parties to the conflict—by
opposing combatants is lawful. The sniper, a lawful combatant, killed a lawful
enemy combatant in the course of armed conflict between two high contracting
parties to the Geneva Conventions. To kill the enemy in a lawful manner was the
sniper’s mission; it was expected and required of him. A combatant taking aim at
a human target and then killing him is not what is meant by the term “targeted
killing.” “The [1907] Hague Regulations expressed it more clearly in attributing
the ‘rights and duties of war.’ . . . [A]ll members of the armed forces . . . can par2
ticipate directly in hostilities, i.e., attack and be attacked.” 1977 Additional Protocol I, which supplements the 1949 Geneva Conventions, repeats that
3
formulation. The status of “combatant” is crucial, because of the consequences
attached to it. It is the mission of every state’s armed forces—its combatants—to
close with and destroy the enemy. Soldiers who do so are subject to no penalty
4
for their acts. This was not a targeted killing.
The killing of Redland’s president is another matter. He was a civilian and
presumably a noncombatant, not subject to combatant targeting. The leaders of
some states may be considered combatants, however—World War II’s Adolf
Hitler, for example. Saddam Hussein of Iraq, another example, was a combatant
and lawful target, since he customarily wore a military uniform and went armed,
often in the vanguard of Iraqi military units. He decided the tactical and strategic movements of his nation’s military forces. These factors combined to make
him a combatant and a lawful target in time of war.
How about the president of the United States? He is denominated by the Constitution as the “commander in chief ” of the nation’s armed forces. He is the person whom the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff advises. The president is the
final authority for the strategic disposition of U.S. armed forces—“the decider.”5
In time of international armed conflict the president of the United States is a
lawful target for an opposing state’s combatants.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol60/iss2/1
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The United Kingdom’s monarch? The monarch is the honorary colonel in chief
or captain general of many Commonwealth regiments—seventy-one, in the case of
Queen Elizabeth II—and is sometimes in military uniform for ceremonial occasions. But determining if a chief of state is a lawful target is not simply a question of
whether he or she wears a uniform. In this instance, the king or queen exercises no
command of armed forces and has no say in the tactical or strategic disposition of
British forces; those decisions reside in the prime minister and Parliament. The
United Kingdom’s monarch, in uniform or not, is probably not a lawful target.
What little we know of Redland’s president—a noncombatant with no apparent role in directing Redland’s armed forces—suggests that he was not a lawful
target. His killing, even in time of war, even by opposing combatants, was
assassination.
There are many definitions of “assassination,” none universally accepted. The
term does not appear in the 1907 Hague Conventions, 1949 Geneva Conventions,
United Nations Charter, or the Statutes of the International Criminal Courts for
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Confusingly, the term is used differently in peace and in
6
armed conflict. Assassination in time of armed conflict is “the specific targeting
7
of a particular individual by treacherous or perfidious means.” This wartime definition tracks with that in the law of armed conflict (LOAC): “It is especially forbidden . . . to kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile
8
nation or army.” In U.S. practice, that language is “construed as prohibiting assassination. . . . It does not, however, preclude attacks on individual soldiers or
officers of the enemy whether in the zone of hostilities, occupied territory, or else9
where.” One simplistic but adequate definition of peacetime assassination is the
10
“murder of a targeted individual for political purposes [or] for political reasons.”
Former Department of State legal adviser Abraham D. Sofaer has described it simi11
larly: “Any unlawful killing of particular individuals for political purposes.”
In the domestic law of most states, assassination is considered murder. Michael
Walzer writes, “Political assassins are simply murderers, exactly like the killers of
ordinary citizens. The case is not the same with soldiers, who are not judged polit12
ically at all and who are called murderers only when they kill noncombatants.” In
any event, the armed forces of most states are not customarily involved in assassination, that being left to other government organizations.* The killing of Redland’s president was assassination and murder, but it was not a targeted killing.
* An example similar to that described here was the May 1942 assassination of SS Obergruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich, the SS chief of security police, deputy chief of the Gestapo, and the person
largely responsible for “the final solution.” He was killed in Prague by two British-trained Czech
soldiers disguised as civilians. Although Heydrich was a lawful combatant target, his combatant
killers engaged in perfidy by disguising themselves as civilians. His killing was an assassination.
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Nor was Admiral Yamamoto’s death a targeted killing. Like the Blueland
sniper’s victim, Yamamoto was a lawful combatant in an international armed
conflict, killed by opposing lawful combatants. “There is nothing treacherous in
singling out an individual enemy combatant (usually, a senior officer) as a target
for a lethal attack conducted by combatants distinguishing themselves as such . . .
13
even in an air strike.” The fact that Yamamoto was targeted away from the front
lines is immaterial. Combatants may be targeted wherever found, armed or unarmed, awake or asleep, on a front
line or a mile or a hundred miles
What little we know of Redland’s president
behind the lines, “whether in the
suggests that he was not a lawful target. His
zone of hostilities, occupied terrikilling was assassination.
14
tory, or elsewhere.” Combatants
can withdraw from hostilities only by retiring and becoming civilians, by be15
coming hors de combat, or by laying down their arms. The shooting down of
Admiral Yamamoto was not a targeted killing.
These exclusionary examples indicate that targeted killing is not the battlefield killing of combatants by opposing combatants. Targeted killing is not the
assassination of an individual, military or civilian, combatant or noncombatant,
for political purposes. What is an example of targeted killing, then?
On 3 November 2002, over the desert near Sanaa, Yemen, a Central Intelligence Agency–controlled Predator drone aircraft tracked an SUV containing six
men. One of the six, Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, was known to be a senior
al-Qa‘ida lieutenant suspected of having played a major role in the 2000 bombing of the destroyer USS Cole. He “was on a list of ‘high-value’ targets whose
16
elimination, by capture or death, had been called for by President Bush.” The
United States and Yemen had tracked al-Harethi’s movements for months. Now,
away from any inhabited area, the Predator fired a Hellfire missile at the vehicle.
17
The six occupants, including al-Harethi, were killed.
That was a targeted killing. In today’s new age of nonstate actors engaging in
transnational terrorist violence, targeting parameters must change. Laws of
armed conflict agreed upon in another era should be interpreted to recognize
the new reality. While some will disagree, the killing of al-Harethi should be
considered as being in accord with the law of armed conflict.
SELF-DEFENSE
The justification for targeted killing rests in the assertion of self-defense. Israel
argues that “it is the prime duty of a democratic state to effectively defend its citizens against any danger posed to their lives and well-being by acts or activities
of terror.”18 In the United States, the preamble of the Constitution includes the
words, “in order to . . . provide for the common defense.” A prominent Israeli
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol60/iss2/1
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scholar argues, “It may be contended that the right of self-defence is inherent
19
not in jus naturale, but in the sovereignty of States.” In 2004, the United States
initiated an aggressive military-based strategy against suspected terrorists, no
20
longer taking a law enforcement approach to their capture and trial.
An argument against a state’s assertion of self-defense as legal justification is
that “this type of practice [targeted killing] is incompatible with international
21
law, which categorically prohibits extra-judicial executions.” Indeed, 1907
Hague Regulation IV notes, “It is especially forbidden . . . to declare that no
22
quarter will be given.” Human rights organizations say that “suspected terrorists should be detained and put on trial before they can lawfully be punished for
their actions. . . . To kill under these circumstances is simply execution—but carried out without any trial or proof of guilt.”23 The International Committee of
the Red Cross says, “Any order of liquidation is prohibited, whether it concerns
commandos . . . irregular troops or so-called irregular troops . . . or other cases. It
is not only the order to put them to death that is prohibited, but also the threat
24
and the execution, with or without orders.” The prohibition on targeting non25
combatant civilians is considered customary law. Some of these objections
presume the employment of a law enforcement model in combating terrorists.
But that model is irrelevant to targeted killing, which employs military means to
target enemy civilian combatants, albeit unlawful combatants,* during an
armed conflict. “The problem with the law-enforcement model in the context of
transnational terror is that one of its fundamental premises is invalid: that the
suspected perpetrator is within the jurisdiction of the law-enforcement authori26
ties in the victim state, so that an arrest can be effected.”
Even in the law enforcement model an individual—or in this case, a state—
may defend itself from attack, a state’s right to defend itself being embedded in
the Charter of the United Nations. Nor are terrorists, particularly those in leadership roles, easily detained for trial.
THE ISRAELI VIEW
Israel has openly engaged in targeted killing since September 2000 and the second intifada.27 Even before then, Gerald V. Bull, a Canadian civilian artillery expert, was in the pay of Iraq and well along in building an artillery “supergun”
capable of firing a 1,300-pound projectile six hundred miles. From the gun’s location in Iraq, Israel would be an easy target. In March 1990, individuals
* An unlawful combatant is one who takes an active and continuous part in armed conflict who
therefore should be treated as a combatant in that he/she is a lawful target of attack, not enjoying
the protections granted civilians. Because unlawful combatants do not differentiate themselves
from civilians and do not obey the laws of armed conflict they are not entitled to the privileges of
combatants, for example, prisoner-of-war status.
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believed but never proven to be Israeli agents murdered Bull as he entered his
Paris apartment.
In 1996, a notorious Hamas bomb maker known as “The Engineer,” Yehiya
28
Ayash, was killed when he answered a cell phone booby-trapped by the Israelis. His
targeted killing was celebrated throughout Israel, but it also initiated a series of retaliatory suicide bombings that killed more than sixty Israelis. In 2000, helicopterfired missiles killed a Palestinian Fatah leader and deputy of Yasir Arafat; an
29
Israeli general said, “He’s not shooting at us yet, but he’s on his way.” In 2001,
Israeli helicopters fired missiles into the West Bank offices of Hamas, killing
30
eight. Later, in 2002, in Gaza, Salah Shehade, the civilian founder and leader of
Hamas’s military wing and an individual said by the Israelis to be responsible for
hundreds of noncombatant deaths, was targeted. In predawn hours an Israeli
F-16 fighter jet dropped a one-ton bomb on the three-story apartment building
where Shehade was sleeping. He was killed, along with fourteen others asleep in
the building, including nine children. One hundred and seventy were reportedly
31
wounded.
Among the most notable of Israel’s targeted killings was that of the wheelchairbound Sheik Ahmed Yassin, the cofounder of Hamas and its spiritual leader. He
was reputedly involved in authorizing terrorist actions against Jews. In March
2004, he was killed by helicopter-fired Hellfire missiles, along with two bodyguards and eight bystanders. Another fifteen were wounded. “The Bush administration felt constrained . . . to say it was ‘deeply troubled’ by Israel’s action, though
32
later it vetoed a UN Security Council resolution condemning the action.”
These Israeli actions were not taken in a vacuum, of course. Israeli noncombatants have been victims of countless terrorist attacks; Israel has been involved
in numerous international armed conflicts with states employing terrorism, as
well as with individual civilians whom Israel later targeted.
The LOAC problem with the Israeli view is summed up in the general’s
phrase, “He’s not shooting at us yet, but he’s on his way.” The civilian target is
presumed to intend direct participation in hostilities. Professor Yoram Dinstein,
an Israeli and a foremost LOAC scholar, writes, “attack[s] (which may cause death,
injury and suffering) are banned only on condition that the persons concerned do
not abuse their exempt status. When persons belonging to one of the categories
selected for special protection—for instance, women and children—take an active
33
part in hostilities, no immunity from an ordinary attack can be invoked.”
Early in the U.S. conflict against Iraq, Forward, a Jewish daily newspaper, mixing assassination and targeted killing, reported:
The Bush administration has been seeking Israel’s counsel on creating a legal justification for the assassination of terrorism suspects. . . . American representatives were
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anxious to learn details of the legal work that Israeli government jurists have done . . .
to tackle possible challenges—both domestic and international—to its policy of “targeted killings” of terrorist suspects. . . . Unlike Israel, which went public in November
2000 with its assassination policy, the Bush administration . . . officially is opposed to
34
such assassinations and does not acknowledge that it engages in such actions.

With the widely reported November 2002 targeted killing of al-Harethi,
American deniability of the tactic’s use faded, along with American criticism of
Israel’s tactic. The question is whether the United States shares Israel’s broad
view of when a terrorist is a lawful target.
THE AMERICAN VIEW
Although there were dissenters, the United States and much of the Western press
was initially critical of the Israeli practice.35 As early as 1991, however, former
president Richard Nixon said that were he still in the White House he would or36
der the assassination of Saddam Hussein. In 2001, the American ambassador
to Israel, Martin Indyk, scolded, “The United States government is very clearly
on record as against targeted assassinations. . . . They are extra-judicial killings
37
and we do not support that.” Yet, in 1989, Abraham Sofaer, State Department
legal adviser, equivocated: “While the U.S. regards attacks on terrorists being
protected in the sovereign territory of other States as potentially justifiable when
undertaken in self-defense, a State’s ability to establish the legality of such an action depends on its willingness openly to accept responsibility for the attack, to
explain the basis for its action, and to demonstrate that reasonable efforts were
made prior to the attack to convince the State whose territorial sovereignty was
38
violated to prevent the offender’s unlawful activities from occurring.” In August 1998, still viewing lethal attacks on individual targets as assassination, a
U.S. presidential finding allowed the targeting of Osama Bin Laden, seen as the
39
force behind the bombing of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The
United States fired a volley of cruise missiles at an Afghan training compound
linked to Bin Laden, saying, “That prerogative arises from a fundamental right
40
of national self-defense.”
The 2002 killing of al-Harethi in Yemen attracted dissenters, but by then the
United States had found targeted killing a useful weapon in the “war on terror41
ism.” The killing of al-Harethi had “shift[ed] the war on terrorism into a new
42
gear.” The U.S. change of stance was described as reflecting a broader definition of the battlefield upon which the war on terrorism was being fought. Later,
the right of national self-defense was also proffered as justification for targeting
individuals associated with terrorist groups, as well as self-defense under article
51 of the United Nations Charter.43 Under a series of classified presidential findings, President Bush broadened the number of specifically named terrorists who
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44

may be killed if their capture is impractical. In June 2006, the targeted killing of
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of al-Qa‘ida in Iraq, was celebrated as a strategic
and political victory.
In early 2006, it was reported that since 9/11 the United States had successfully carried out at least nineteen targeted killings via Predator-fired Hellfire
missiles. “The Predator strikes have killed at least four senior al-Qa‘ida leaders,
but also many civilians, and it is not known how many times they missed their
45
targets.” The question of whether America shares Israel’s broad view of when a
civilian terrorist is a lawful target has not yet been clearly answered. Further U.S.
attacks will reveal America’s policy.
DOMESTIC LAW
A killing in the name of the state must be based upon, or at least not in contravention of, the state’s domestic law. Targeted killing is not contrary to U.S. law.
The Constitution’s Fifth Amendment, which protects any person from deprivation of life without due process, is not in play. Recent federal case law holds
that the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit American agents from torturing
foreign nationals abroad. The same reasoning would appear to apply to targeted
killing, the court hypothesizes.46 More to the point, federal law authorizes the
use of U.S. military force to “defend the national security of the United States
47
against the continuing threat posed by Iraq.” Additionally, Congress has authorized the use of “all necessary and appropriate force” against those who carried
out the September 11th attacks and all who aided them and “to prevent future
48
acts of international terrorism against the United States.”
As long as the targeted killing is related to the continuing threat against U.S.
forces in Iraq, or is focused on those involved in the 9/11 attack or on those who
aided or harbored them, or is intended to prevent future acts of terrorism
against the United States, it does not violate U.S. domestic law and is in accord
with Congress’s authorizations of force.
CHARACTERISTICS OF TARGETED KILLING
The 1949 Geneva Conventions are silent on targeted killing and who might constitute a lawful target. There is no announced American policy directive regarding targeted killing. Assassination is addressed in Executive Order 12333, which
does not prohibit killing absolutely but does require presidential approval,
which the president may give in secret or otherwise. But assassination and targeted killing are different acts. Given that there is no official protocol, one looks
to LOAC for guidelines for the execution of a targeted killing.
First, an international or noninternational conflict must be in progress.
Without an ongoing armed conflict the targeted killing of a civilian, terrorist or
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol60/iss2/1
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not, would be assassination—a homicide and a domestic crime. Moreover, “IHL
[international humanitarian law, or LOAC] can only be applicable when the terrorists are involved in an existing international or internal armed conflict, or
when the conflict between a state and a terrorist group within its territory rises
49
to the level of an armed conflict.” If one contests the view that an armed conflict is ongoing, the lawfulness of any targeted killing is necessarily contested as
well. It is the predicate armed conflict that raises the right to kill an enemy.
Second, the victim must be a specific civilian. Obviously, civilian victims may
not be random targets. They must be selected by reason of their activities in relation to the armed conflict in progress. Were the identified civilians lawful combatants, uniformed and openly armed, they would be opposing combatants’
lawful targets, with no further
discussion merited. On the other
Now, Blueland’s most hated critic was dead,
hand, it is clear that noncombatsilenced by Blueland agents. Was this a
ants may not be lawfully tar“targeted killing”?
geted.50 But civilians who take up
arms may be. A vital distinction, then, is that between a “civilian” and a “noncombatant.” The two terms are often conflated; such descriptive carelessness is
usually irrelevant, but not in this case. The targeted civilian must be a civilian
unlawful combatant.
A civilian is any person not belonging to one of the categories referred to in
51
Geneva Convention III who is eligible for prisoner-of-war status upon capture.
As Additional Protocol I points out, “Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section [General Protection against Effects of Hostilities], unless
52
and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.” In other words, a civilian who injects himself directly into ongoing hostilities violates the basic concept of distinction and becomes something other than a noncombatant. He
forfeits civilian immunity and becomes a lawful target. “For instance, a driver
delivering ammunition to combatants and a person who gathers military intelligence in enemy-controlled territory are commonly acknowledged to be actively
taking part in hostilities. . . . [A] person cannot (and is not allowed to) be both a
combatant and a civilian at the same time, nor can he constantly shift from one
53
status to the other.”
Only a specific civilian may be singled out for targeted killing. If an unaffiliated gathering of civilians is targeted it is unlikely (although possible) that all
will have violated the distinction above and thereby made lawful targets of
themselves and the entire group, or that all will have shared equally in the unlawful participation in hostilities. Were it otherwise, the forfeiture of immunity by
one member of a group’s taking a direct role in fighting would render all group
members targets. A critical exception is groups—terrorists, for example—
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whose membership as a whole is dedicated to active engagement in unlawful
combatancy.
Third, the individual who has engaged directly in hostilities, the unlawful
combatant, must be beyond possible arrest by the targeting state. Since the focus
of U.S. targeted killing is on noncitizens abroad, where the United States has no
arrest authority, the issue does not arise. Presumably, neither would an allied
state be in a position to make an arrest. U.S. constitutional issues, such as probable cause, do not arise when noncitizens abroad are targeted. If capture is possible, however, that option must be exercised. The status of previously targeted
civilians would be that of arrestees, subject to interrogation and trial for the
54
precapture acts that rendered them unlawful combatants. They fit none of the
various criteria for prisoner-of-war status contained in 1949 Geneva Conven55
tion III.
Fourth, only a senior military commander, as a representative of the targeting
state, may authorize a targeted killing. Of course, the authorizing individual may
also be the president or a senior government official to whom the president has
delegated targeting authority, such as the secretary of defense or the director of
the Central Intelligence Agency.
THE AUTHORIZING DECISION
Under current directives, the president’s personal approval for specific operations is reportedly not required for persons already designated by him as potential targets.56 “As commander in chief, the President has the constitutional
authority to command the use of deadly force by troops in war, whether it has
57
been declared by Congress or thrust upon us by enemy attack or invasion.”
Once beyond targets authorized by the president, what level of military commander may authorize a targeted killing on behalf of the United States? Army
commanders? Battalion commanders? Press reports indicate that in Israel such
decisions must be approved by “senior cabinet members,” which apparently
58
translates to the prime minister. For the United States, the decision to carry out
a targeted killing, with its potential political repercussions, should be made, if
not by the president, only by the most senior military officers. The four-star
commanders of the five geographically defined unified U.S. commands (Northern Command, Southern Command, Central Command, Pacific Command,
and European Command) seem the lowest-ranking military officers who should
59
be delegated such authority.
The military commander’s initial consideration is military necessity: Is the
planned action indispensable for securing the submission of the enemy? The
death of no one person will end global terrorism, but would the killing of this
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particular target constitute a substantial injury to its cause or seriously disrupt
its plans?
60
High among the commander’s considerations is collateral damage. Collateral damage, like proportionality and unnecessary suffering, is a difficult issue
allowing for lenient judgment and moral assessment. In 2002, the Israeli chief of
military intelligence, haunted by civilian deaths in killings he had overseen,
asked a mathematician to write a formula to determine the number of acceptable civilian casualties per dead terrorist. Unsurprisingly, the effort was unsuc61
cessful. Each proposed targeted killing raises its own unique considerations
and moral dilemmas. There are no preconceived solutions.
DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES
The lawfulness of targeted killing turns on interpretation of the term “direct
participation in hostilities.” As 1977 Additional Protocol I specifies, civilians are
not lawful targets “unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”62 For Israel, such activities reportedly include “persons recruiting certain
other persons to carry out acts or activities of terror” and “developing and operating funding channels that are crucial to acts or activities of terror,” among
63
other definitions. These are broad definitions of direct participation in hostilities. Professor Raphael Cohen-Almagor, director of the Center for Democratic
Studies at the University of Haifa, holds that “Israel has the right and duty to kill
these terrorists. . . . Furthermore, it is justified to kill chiefs of terrorist opera64
tions who plan and orchestrate murderous attacks.” Professor Robert K.
Goldman of American University’s Washington College of Law offers a U.S.centric viewpoint, saying, “The basic premise is that the U.S. regards itself as at
war with al-Qa‘ida. That being the case, it regards members of al-Qa‘ida as com65
batants engaged in war against the U.S.” Is mere membership in al-Qa‘ida
enough to make a member a target wherever and whenever he may be found, or
is something more required?
The civilian driver delivering ammunition to combatants and the civilian
gathering military intelligence in enemy-controlled territory are arguably actively participating in hostilities. But when does their participation end? May
the driver be targeted after he has returned to his starting point and walked away
from the truck? May he be targeted when he is being toasted in the mess, late that
evening? The next day? What if he were driving an ammunition truck miles away
from the scene of any combat activity? May the intelligence gatherer be killed before he actually embarks on his task? Is a civilian POW-camp guard directly participating in hostilities? A civil defense worker who directs military traffic
through his town? A civilian clearing land mines placed by the enemy? Is a civilian seated in the Pentagon, controlling an armed Predator over Iraq, directly
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participating in hostilities? The United States authorizes the arming of civilian
defense contract workers in combat zones, and they “may be authorized to pro66
vide security services.” Are they directly participating in hostilities?
But these conundrums, relating to civilians of no particular political import
or military significance, do not describe the probable targeted killing candidate
in a war on terrorism. More apropos, when is Pakistan’s al-Qa‘ida coordinator a
civilian, and when is he an unlawful combatant “directly participating in hostilities”? Only when he is actually engaged in a firefight with American or Pakistani
forces? Only when he is actively directing terrorist activities? Or, by virtue of his
leadership position, is he not always a legitimate target—when asleep, or when
playing with his children? In 2002, was the senior al-Qa‘ida lieutenant,
al-Harethi, who planned the bombing of the USS Cole, a lawful target while he
was on the move in Yemen, fighting no one, formulating no terrorist plan? Israel
takes the view that enemy leaders, including strategists who plan and advise, and
technical experts are not foot soldiers in the army of unlawful combatants and
that they are always legitimate targets, wherever they may be, whatever activity
they are engaged in, and require no warning of attack.
Civilians are protected unless they take a direct part in hostilities, and only for
such time as they do. Professor Antonio Cassese writes, “When civilians taking a
direct part in hostilities lay down their arms, they reacquire noncombatant immunity and may not be made objects of attack although they are amenable to
67
prosecution for unlawfully participating in hostilities (war crimes).” But, one
may argue, by virtue of their positions, civilians who lead terrorist groups seldom literally pick up arms and so, metaphorically, never lay them down. As Brigadier General Kenneth Watkin, judge advocate general of Canada’s armed
forces, says, “It is not just the fighters with weapons in their hands that pose a
68
threat.”
Not all law of war scholars agree that terrorists may be targeted only when actually engaged in terrorist activities:
If we accept this narrow interpretation, terrorists enjoy the best of both worlds—they
can remain civilians most of the time and only endanger their protection as civilians
while actually in the process of carrying out a terrorist act. Is this theory, which has
been termed the revolving door theory, tenable? . . . Another argument is that a
“combatant-like” approach based on membership in the military wing of a group involved in hostilities, rather than on individual actions, should be adopted in deciding
whether persons may be targeted. If we adopt the restricted theory, according to which
international terrorists are civilians who may only be targeted while taking a direct
part in hostilities, the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter . . . may
become meaningless.69
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Is the civilian cofounder of Hamas, Ahmed Yassin—half-blind, paralyzed, and
wheelchair-bound, killed as he left morning prayers at a local mosque—immune
from attack because he was engaged in innocent activity at the moment of his
death? Is Yehiya Ayash, the civilian who constructed diabolically effective bombs
but led no combatants, gave neither orders nor instructions, who acted only as a
fabricator of tools of insurgency, a lawful target only when actually constructing a
bomb? A combatant general—for example, Dwight Eisenhower during World
War II—is by virtue of his position of command and authority a legitimate target
whenever and wherever he can be found by enemy combatants. Eisenhower,
whether in London or Kansas, in civilian clothes or uniform, was always on duty,
always an Allied commander, and could have been lawfully killed by any Axis
combatant. Should civilian terrorist leaders, and terrorists with critical warmaking skills, be free from the same threat by consciously avoiding lawful
combatancy? Should not they, like the uniformed lawful combatants they target,
be considered legitimate targets whenever and wherever they are found? It is reasonable that “the effect of the ‘temporal’ wording found in Article 51(3) of Addi70
tional Protocol I is significantly more limited than commonly believed.”
Columbia University School of Law professor George Fletcher points out:
This phrase “direct part” conjures up a picture of someone picking up a gun and
aiming it at the enemy. But . . . ordinary principles of self-defence apply against people
pointing guns, whether they are civilians or not. Targeted assassinations are usually
aimed at the organizers of terrorist attacks—not those who are aiming weapons. . . .
The targets are the key figures behind the scenes who organize the suicide bombings,
the hijacking and other terrorist activities. Are they “taking direct part in hostilities”?
I think the phrase lends itself to this construction.71

Two hundred years ago, the great eighteenth-century legal scholar Emerich de
Vattel wrote, “Assassins and incendiaries by profession, are not only guilty in respect to the particular victims of their violences, but likewise of the state to
which they are declared enemies. All nations have a right to join in punishing,
72
suppressing, and even exterminating these savages.”
One may ask: If civilian terrorist leaders and terrorists with critical skills may
be targeted, why not all terrorists? If it is lawful for some to be killed, is it not lawful for all to be killed? Logic compels a positive response: yes, it is lawful for all
terrorists potentially to be subject to targeted killing, regardless of their positions or “duties.” But logic and practicality similarly dictate that only senior
leaders and particularly dangerous specialists in groups dedicated to unlawful
combatancy be singled out for targeted killing. The availability of resources—
Predator drones and laser-directed munitions, for example—will severely limit
the number of terrorists who may be targeted. The availability of mission
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planners and support personnel—intelligence officers and agents, communications analysts, and interpreters—is similarly limiting. Just as in past wars, in which
only senior combatants—Isoroku Yamamoto, Dwight Eisenhower, Bernard
Montgomery, and Erwin Rommel—could be singled out for the demanding effort required for their targeting, so it would inevitably be for today’s terrorists.
Finally, the judgment and reason of the senior leaders permitted to authorize
targeted killing would also act as a natural brake upon the tactic.
That is not to say that a terrorist is a target for life. A soldier is a lawful target
only so long as he or she remains a soldier. Soldiers who have retired from armed
service and, in the words of 1949 Geneva Convention common article 3, “members of armed forces who have laid down their arms” are no longer combatants
or lawful targets. A civilian terrorist who lays down his arms or, more significantly, lays down his arms and departs the combat zone would no longer be a legitimate target. Again, the reason and judgment of those authorized to order
targeted killing would act as a brake upon targeting simple terrorist apostates.
Determining an individual’s “direct participation” should not be confused
73
with testing for lawfully targeting objects. The criteria for targeting “people”
and “objects” differ. Direct participation remains the thorniest issue in targeted
killing, something that states and their political leaders and military commanders must resolve in each case, recalling that their resolutions may eventually be
under international review. The law of armed conflict boldly states the criteria
for targeting but does not clearly apply its criteria to kaleidoscopic real-world
situations.
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
Killing senior terrorists, expert bomb makers, and those who provide philosophical guidance for terrorists may spare countless noncombatant victims
while, at the same time, forgoing risk to friendly combatant forces. A successful
targeted killing removes a dangerous enemy from the battlefield and deprives the
foe of his leadership, guidance, and experience. The targeted killing of terrorist
leaders leaves subordinates confused and in disarray, however temporarily. Successors will feel trepidation, knowing they too may be in the enemy’s sights. Targeted killing unbalances terrorist organizations, making them concerned with
protecting their own membership and diverting them from their goals.
But targeting mistakes are made, whether the intended victim is killed one on
74
one or by missiles. In 1973, in Lillehammer, Norway, Israeli Mossad agents
murdered a Moroccan waiter they mistook for a Palestinian involved in killing
75
Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics the year before. On the PakistanAfghanistan border in February 2002, a U.S. Predator tracked and killed a tall in76
dividual in flowing robes believed to be Osama Bin Laden. He was not. Tactical
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situations may change in the moments between the order to fire and impact—
women and children enter the impact area, the target moves to cover. Stuff does
77
happen.
Innocent bystanders are often killed in targeted killings. Crowded city streets,
even isolated houses, inevitably yield “collateral damage.” Are the anticipated
deaths proportional? What level of probable noncombatant lethality is acceptable? “An extremely strong case has to be made to justify an attack on suspected
terrorists when it is likely, not to mention inevitable, that the attack will cause
the death of civilians. After all[,] . . . the military advantages to be gained by targeting them are based largely on speculation.”78 Does a more significant targeted
individual justify a greater potential number of innocent deaths? Does the possible death of Osama Bin Laden justify the probable deaths of five bystanders?
Ten? Fifty? In January 2006, in the village of Damadola, Afghanistan, seventeen
Afghans died in a futile U.S. missile strike on several houses. The attack was
79
aimed at al-Qa‘ida deputy Ayman Zawahiri. American commanders apparently thought the risk of multiple noncombatant deaths was outweighed by the
possibility of killing Zawahiri.
Targeted killings may prove counterproductive, in that they can instigate
greater violence in revenge or retaliation. “I hope it will reduce the violence and
bring back reason to this area,” an Israeli major general said in 2000 after three
80
missiles killed a Palestinian leader and two middle-aged female bystanders. Instead, the killings touched off a week of the most intense fighting seen in that
round of the conflict.
In a world where the enemy has missiles too, a targeted killing by the United
States “makes every American official both here and in the Middle East a target
81
of opportunity.” If an expanded interpretation of who constitutes a legitimate
civilian candidate for targeted killing is accepted, we must accept that our own
nonuniformed leaders and weapons specialists will become legitimate targets.
“The United States and countries that follow its [targeted killing] example must
be prepared to accept the exploitation of the new policy by adversaries who will
not abide by the standards of proof or evidential certainty adhered to by Western
82
democracies.” Some believe the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie,
Scotland, on 21 December 1988, killing 270, was Muammar Qaddafi’s revenge
for the 1986 U.S. bombing of his Libyan home that killed his fifteen-month-old
83
daughter. “Many past and present military and intelligence officials have expressed alarm at the Pentagon policy about targeting Al Qaeda members. Their
concerns have less to do with the legality of the program than with its wisdom,
its ethics, and, ultimately, its efficacy.”84
It is argued that civilian victims of targeted killing, not afforded an opportunity to surrender, are deprived of due process and denied the “inherent right to
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85

life.” The victim is unable to contest that he is a terrorist, seek judicial review, or
86
lodge an appeal; no legal assessment of the legality of the targeting is available.
But these objections accompany the initial question of direct participation in
hostilities; if an individual is directly involved in hostilities, he forfeits noncombatant immunity and becomes a lawful target. Soldiers engaged in armed conflict are not afforded due-process rights. Even away from the battlefield,
“deprivation of life shall not be regarded as a violation of the right to life when it
results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary in . . .
87
defence of any person from unlawful violence.” If considered a case of proportional self-defense, targeted killing would not violate the right to life off the
battlefield.
With the limitations discussed here, targeted killing is within the bounds of law
of armed conflict. Terrorists should not be permitted the shield of Additional
Protocol I, article 51.3. This conclusion requires a broader interpretation of article 51.3, granting civilians targeting immunity except when they are directly
participating in hostilities, than is currently universally accepted. But expansive
interpretations of treaty provisions are not novel. (Although the United States
has not ratified Additional Protocol I, article 51.3 is widely considered an expression of customary law.) Dean Anne-Marie Slaughter, of Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and a former
president of the American Society of International Law, argues that the United
Nations should itself target individuals identified by the Security Council as
murderous despots. (She adds, however, “Such a course would never be accept88
able, if undertaken by a single nation.”) Still, LOAC is not contravened if a targeted killing is carried out by a nation acting within the parameters described
here. In U.S. law, and in the law of armed conflict, the targeting killing of civilians taking a direct part in hostilities, while they are taking a direct part, is not
forbidden. The issue is in deciding what constitutes “a direct part.” As always, the
devil is in the details.
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LEONARD WOOD: FORGOTTEN GREATNESS

Richard J. Norton

McCallum, Jack. Leonard Wood: Rough Rider, Surgeon, Architect of American Imperialism. New York: New York Univ.
Press, 2006. 357pp. $23.07

Leonard Wood was one of the towering figures of U.S. political and military history. He had a profound impact on the history of three countries, played an important role in one of the most important medical advances of the twentieth
century, and was very nearly president of the United States. He was, in every sense
of the word, a man of destiny, a man of action, a man of his time. Yet like so many
men of their time, he is all but forgotten, at best remembered as an answer to a
Trivial Pursuit question about the Rough Riders or as the name of an Army post in
Missouri. There are probably several reasons for his
Richard J. Norton is a professor of national security afpassage into obscurity. First, a similar fate befell many
fairs at the Naval War College, where he teaches courses
of Wood’s Victorian-era contemporaries. Their military
on military history. He is also the director of the policy
accomplishments, which loomed large at the time, seem
making and process course in the National Security Decision Making department. He holds a doctorate in ininsignificant beside the massive battles and technologiternational relations from the Fletcher School of Law
cal fury of the two world wars. Their politics, especially
and Diplomacy. As a commander in the U.S. Navy, he
served at sea on cruisers and destroyers, and as a senate
those who favored the building of empires, appear to beliaison officer he served on Capitol Hill with the Navy’s
long to a different and less complicated age, and their
Office of Legislative Affairs and in several politicalvirtues, formerly extolled in prose and poetry, gradually
military assignments on senior staffs. He retired from
the Navy in 1996. He has published articles on failed
became identified as racist and chauvinist. The fact that
states, humanitarian early warning, Africa, South
McCallum’s book is only the third biography of Wood,
America, and emerging security issues, as well as nuand the first published since 1931, is indicative of how
merous case studies. His most recent area of research involves “feral cities,” cited by the New York Times as one
completely this remarkable man has been forgotten.
of the “new ideas of 2004.”
Wood was indeed remarkable. McCallum takes
Naval War College Review, Spring 2007, Vol. 60, No. 2
pains to prove this, as he traces Wood’s life and time.
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Wood’s early years read like a Horatio Alger story. Born into a poor Massachusetts family, Wood tried and failed to enter West Point, and then worked his way
through Harvard Medical School. Successful completion of his studies resulted
in an internship at Boston City Hospital, where the young Wood, presumably on
his way to a successful medical career, ran afoul of hospital authorities for performing operations without proper supervision. Hemorrhaging money and
faced with a massive fiscal crisis, Wood sought relief in the U.S. Army. Failing to
obtain a commission, he was hired as a contract surgeon and sent west, where
the Army was trying to find, fix, and capture the great Apache medicine man and
spiritual leader Geronimo.
The Apache campaigns were some of the most grueling the U.S. Army had
undertaken, and to the surprise of many Wood thrived in this environment, setting a rare example of endurance and stamina. As the ranks of the officers
thinned, Wood occasionally found himself in command of line troops, where he
experienced his share of deprivation, disease, and hardship, and he was there
when Geronimo surrendered. As a result of this campaign, Wood found himself
the recipient of practical lessons in civilian-military relations, the patronage of
Gen. Nelson Miles, and the Medal of Honor. A series of relatively quiet posts followed, until at the age of thirty-five, ignoring the advice of his seniors, he actively sought a posting to Washington, D.C., where he made political enemies.
When the Republicans came to power in 1897, however, Wood was in the right
spot at the right time, becoming the personal physician to Ada McKinley (the hypochondriac wife of the president) and a staunch friend of Theodore Roosevelt.
One of the book’s shortcomings is that this real and deep friendship is not seriously explored.
With access to the White House, social connections to Roosevelt, a thirst for
adventure, and promotion, what Wood needed now was an opportunity to
prove himself. That opportunity came in 1898, with the Spanish-American War.
The story of the Spanish-American War is in many ways a tale of the suspension of the laws of probability. There was perhaps a no more outrageous example than the success of the 1st U.S. Volunteer Cavalry, the “Rough Riders.”
Although Teddy Roosevelt was always the unit’s dominant personality, he refused command and made it clear he would not join unless Wood was placed in
charge. So it was that Leonard Wood, army surgeon, became the commanding
officer of perhaps the most flamboyant and media-friendly military unit the
United States ever created. He and Roosevelt pulled every string and called in every favor when outfitting and training their unit. The story and success of the
Rough Riders is well known, and much of that success is owed to Leonard Wood.
Following the war, Wood commanded occupation forces in Santiago and
made the city a model of modern health and services. He allowed no obstacle to
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stand in his way in improving the city and its occupants. By all accounts Wood
was a model administrator, and he used this reputation to good advantage, consistently pressuring the White House to make him governor general of Cuba.
While not without controversy, Wood’s tenure in Havana was successful.
Among his more significant accomplishments were active support and advancement of the effort that led to the discovery of the origin of yellow fever, and although Walter Reed would rightfully reap the lion’s share of the credit, Wood’s
role was not an insignificant one—implementing health and sanitation protocols that for the first time prevented yellow fever epidemics.
In 1902, when the pacification of the Philippines was nearly complete, Wood
was selected to be its governor. By now a brigadier general in the regular Army,
Wood was also due for promotion. The result was a political firestorm in Washington that saw Theodore Roosevelt pitted against political strongman Mark
Hannah. The fight would last four months and demand all of Wood’s connections
and Roosevelt’s pull and clout, but it would ultimately result in victory for Wood.
The fight Wood faced in the Philippines would last six years. Unlike Cuba,
where Wood did not condone or use violence, in the Philippines he waged war
with ferocity—indiscriminate killing, scorched-earth tactics, assassinations,
and torture were common tactics on both sides. His methods were brutal and his
tools of choice almost exclusively military. To be sure, Wood was, by the measure
of the day, effective. Revolts were put down, revenues were collected, and the islands were made quiet.
By 1910, Wood was the senior general in the Army. As chief of staff, Wood devoted himself to repairing a thoroughly antiquated, disorganized, and ineffective force. He had seen modern European armies and was intent on creating
something similar in the United States when problems with Mexico diverted his
efforts. Wood moved forces to the southern border and fumed when the president refused to do more. The experience convinced Wood more than ever that
the Army needed an overhaul. Possessing perhaps more vision than many of his
counterparts, he was convinced of the power of aviation and from the beginning
was enthusiastic about advances in metallurgy. He sought higher pay and more
respect for private soldiers. Above all, Wood wanted a larger army, in fewer
bases. His biggest defeat was his failure to create a large, well-trained reserve or
appreciably expand the Army. His most powerful enemy was Woodrow Wilson.
The president and the general clashed over U.S. preparedness for war, and if
history bore Wood out, he paid a heavy price for being right. In part this was due
to his penchant for name-calling and to his devotion to Theodore Roosevelt,
who delighted in excoriating Wilson. That a serving general should not openly
disagree with a sitting president apparently never occurred to Wood. It also
never occurred to him that when the United States did enter the war, Woodrow
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Wilson would find another general to command the American Expeditionary
Force. Wood spent the war training troops in Kansas.
With the war over and Roosevelt dead, Wood briefly became the political
hope of the Republican Party. While still on active duty he hammered the Wilson
administration, but as the 1920 Republican convention opened Wood lacked the
required votes for the party’s nomination. Warren G. Harding emerged the
victor.
Wood returned to the Philippines as governor general. But he had become a
bitter man, afflicted by a brain tumor and acute bouts of memory loss. By 1927,
his health rapidly deteriorating, Wood left for the United States, where he died
on the operating table.
McCallum’s book does a fine job of laying out the life story of Leonard Wood.
It is well organized, credibly documented, and, in the best sense of the term, an
easy read. Given that there is so little known about Wood, this book’s major contribution may simply be to acquaint American readers with this fascinating man.
However, there is more to a man than simply his history. Readers hoping to
gain insight into Wood himself are likely to be disappointed. It may simply be
that Wood, the man of action, was not a man of introspection. For example, as
McCallum notes, on the day Roosevelt died, Wood penned only the briefest of
entries in his diary. In a similar vein, the book contains little contextual or comparative analysis. Wood dealt with many of the issues that beset military leaders
today, such as insurgencies, asymmetric opponents, military transformation,
the need for interagency cooperation, and the nature of the civil-military relationship in a changing world. Deeper investigation of these issues and a search
for meaningful lessons, however, is left to future writers.
McCallum suggests that part of the reason Wood has been forgotten is that
his strengths and weaknesses remind us too much of ourselves. Perhaps, but if
this is so, then the life and fate of Wood are more deserving of study than ever.
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AN AMERICAN WAY FORWARD?
Lind, Michael. The American Way of Strategy: U.S. Foreign Policy and the American Way of Life. New York:
Oxford Univ. Press, 2006. 259pp. $24

This is a finely composed and extremely
timely exposition on American grand
strategy. Michael Lind, former editor of
The National Interest and now a fellow
at the New America Foundation, lays
out an interesting thesis about a distinctly American strategic foundation.
Where the late Russell Weigley described the “American way of war” (The
American Way of War: A History of
United States Military Strategy and Policy, Indiana Univ. Press, 1977) as direct,
offensive, and absolute, Lind argues
that its strategic counterpart always
strives to retain a more delicate internal
balance. Operationally, the U.S. military seeks annihilation; strategically,
U.S. foreign policy avoids absolutism in
order to preserve a distinctly American
and limited conception of government.
The real purpose of American strategy,
according to this thesis, is the preservation of the American way of life by ensuring that the rise of a foreign hegemon
does not inadvertently corrupt or sacrifice
our own liberties at home. Lind argues
that this American way of life is founded
upon a constitutional order of checks and
balances, a free-market economy not
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unduly constrained by government’s
reach or interference, and a sacrosanct focus on individual freedoms. The author’s
worst nightmare is the rise of a foreign
opponent that would trigger an internal
reordering of American government that
undercut essential liberties and its carefully constructed institutions.
Such an idea would not have been foreign to the founding fathers. Benjamin
Franklin once noted that those who
would sacrifice a bit of liberty for more
security deserved neither. This antistatist perspective may also be seen in
Princeton professor Aaron Friedberg’s
well regarded book In the Shadow of the
Garrison State (2000). Friedberg demonstrates that U.S. Cold War success was
achieved by tapping into the creativity of
the American people and the vitality of
the American economy without creating
a state that arrogated too much authority or control. This antistatist preference
guided a series of U.S. administrations,
even as the Soviet Union’s power continued to grow. Instead of becoming a garrison state, the United States ultimately
outpaced its overly centralized and statist rival.
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Lind contrasts his definition of the
American creed—“republican liberalism”
—against a set of alternative futures.
These involve the rise of “Caesarism,”
the establishment of a garrison state,
subjugation to a tributary status, and
the emergence of a “castle society.” A
Caesarian tyranny would usurp individual freedoms, while the surrender of
American sovereignty would result
from either national defeat or intimidation. The garrison state would ultimately
absorb the freedoms and economic energy of the population; a castle society,
characterized as a country internally
wracked by anarchy and massive insecurity, would also extinguish personal
freedom.
In applying this American creed to contemporary challenges, Lind castigates
the neoconservative thrust of the past
few years, especially its focus on amassing military power and the extension of
U.S. hegemony. Rather than perpetual
military dominance, the author advocates a more prudent grand strategy
consistent with preserving the American way of life. Lind argues that the
United States should employ a “concert
of power” that would prevent any hostile state from dominating the three key
regions of the globe, “without requiring
the United States to seek to perpetually
control these areas alone.” Additionally,
instead of an “irrational” post–Cold
War strategy of isolation, the United
States should seek “a special relationship” with Russia. However, Lind never
addresses how such concerts and relationships might appear to China and
Russia, powers that have not fully accepted the existing international system; nor does his approach offer much
in terms of transnational threats.
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Overall, Lind finds much of value in
classical realism and state-based power
balances. This approach, eschewing as it
does crusades for democracy, may lack
a moral compass, but it has a growing
appeal, given the imbroglio we know as
the Middle East. Lind is aware that a
classical balancing approach does not
apply to every region of the world—for
example, in the Gulf region—but he
encourages the United States to keep a
lower profile, as an offshore balancer of
last resort—“the least bad of several bad
options.” Lind forcefully argues against
what he perceives as the goal of global
primacy that dominates current U.S.
strategy. Such an approach is at odds
with what Lind believes to be timetested American traditions: “When
American leaders have followed the
American way of strategy, they have led
the American republic from success to
success, and when they have deviated
from it the results have been disastrous.”
It is impossible not to find this book
relevant to the ongoing debates over
America’s strategy against global terror
and the domestic implications of that
strategy. Many have cautioned that we
now live in the shadow of a security
state. The advent of the Patriot Act,
extraordinary renditions, aggressive
surveillance protocols unchecked by judicial review, extended detentions without recourse to representation or due
process, and military tribunals all suggest that concerns about a security state
are well founded.
While its policy prescriptions are less
than satisfying, this is a relevant and
thoughtful book to be read and discussed by almost anyone involved in
international relations and the American national security establishment. It
could serve as a useful primer on
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American foreign policy, as well as a
cautionary tale on the dangers of trying
to achieve preeminence overseas at the
cost of undermining security at home.
The American Way of Strategy could
also inform today’s emerging maritime
strategy, for which its characterization
of the benefits of various grand strategies has value.
F. G. HOFFMAN

Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities
Quantico, Virginia

Kagan, Frederick. Finding the Target: The Transformation of American Military Policy. New York:
Encounter Books, 2006. 432pp. $29.95

How has American military strategic
thought evolved since the fall of Saigon?
How did each service reinvent itself,
shake off old ghosts, and restore morale
and purpose? How did each decide
upon a different doctrine to guide its
training, procurement, and deployment? How much influence do civilian
defense officials wield over strategy and
doctrine? Is the country well served by
the process that produces strategy and
doctrine inside the services? Military
historian Fred Kagan provides here a
tremendous primer on these issues. He
has written a clear, definitive, and opinionated history of the development of
strategy and doctrine in the American
military since 1975. His clarity of prose
and the evenhandedness of his presentation enable the reader to separate the
history from Kagan’s interpretation.
That is the mark of a fine scholar.
Kagan is well known among military
historians. A serious researcher and author of a major work on the Napoleonic
wars, his greatest strength is his down-
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to-earth, friendly, inquisitive style. As
the resident military scholar at the
American Enterprise Institute, Kagan
has the venue and cachet to draw ambassadors and four-star generals routinely to his conferences, where they
join captains and majors fresh from the
battlefield. Building upon his years as a
professor at West Point, Kagan has developed a broad network of military
contacts that makes this book a blend
of scholarship and insider knowledge.
Though he is plugged into the daily
skirmishes of Washington’s political
arena, as a historian Kagan’s chief interest lies not in the immediate issues but
in focusing upon the underlying trends.
The author blends brief synopses of
such past campaigns as Bosnia, DESERT
STORM, and IRAQI FREEDOM with portraits of strategic iconoclasts like John
Boyd, John Warden, Douglas MacGregor,
and Arthur Cebrowski, emphasizing
how doctrine changed and with what
results related to budgets and force
structure. Kagan does not believe that
force structure evolves slowly over the
decades. Instead, he illustrates how the
few influence the many, and how strategic leadership affects the direction of
each service for good or ill.
On the positive side, Kagan recounts
how in 1978 the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas Hayward, came
to believe that the downward spiral in
the naval budget was the result of an intuitive strategy held by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and his senior
staff. These civilian defense leaders were
concerned that the Soviet Union was
increasing its geopolitical pressure
across Europe, gaining both economic
and political advantage in the shadow
of its presumed superiority in land
forces. Accordingly, the Office of the
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Secretary of Defense was focused on
building up Army and Air Force strength
in Western Europe, while naval forces
languished because they were seen as of
lesser utility. Hayward set out to challenge this strategic vision by commissioning and then championing a naval
force-planning study called “Sea Plan
2000.” The essence of this plan was the
assertion that any assault across the
inner-German border would result in a
global war. Naval forces provided strike
capabilities that could be marshaled
anywhere, while protecting the sealanes. The redoubtable head of the Soviet
navy, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, had
enunciated a strategy of protecting his
ballistic missile submarines in their
northern bastions. Sea Plan 2000 advocated naval-based offensive strikes
against the Kola Peninsula and against
Soviet attack and missile submarines
worldwide.

technologies, with the attendant assumption that fewer forces will be
needed as a consequence. Further, he
questions whether the process of transformation is really advanced by grafting
an “Office of Force Transformation”
(since abolished) onto the Department
of Defense, arguing that the services
were in fact taking full advantage of information technologies for a decade before a “revolution in military affairs”
was decreed.

When President Ronald Reagan took
office in 1981, John Lehman became
secretary of the Navy and aggressively
supported such an offensive maritime
strategy. The U.S. Navy budget increased, and the Soviets worried. Their
self-confidence was dented, as they later
freely admitted. No one could predict
what would occur in an actual war, but
according to Kagan, “Hayward’s realization that the Navy’s greatest weakness was its strategic thinking made
possible a transformation of the Navy’s
capabilities with few new technologies.
As a result, the Navy regained a considerable degree of balance against a waning Soviet threat.”

Finding the Target will make an excellent textbook for those whose operational jobs have not left sufficient time
to keep abreast of the changing strategic
perspective in the services.

Conversely, Kagan cites the efforts of
former secretary of defense Donald
Rumsfeld to “transform” the services as
flawed in both concept and process. He
criticizes the recent focus on information
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On balance, Kagan gives the services
good marks for their stewardship over
the past twenty-five years as the nation’s guardians. The current war in
Iraq, however, worries him, because the
military did not adapt swiftly enough.
He is too good a scholar to make
sweeping assertions about American
martial superiority. Instead, he argues
that the process of adapting in order to
win is the nation’s greatest strength.

F. J. “BING” WEST

Newport, Rhode Island

Goldstein, Lyle J. Preventive Attack and Weapons
of Mass Destruction: A Comparative Analysis.
Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2006.
268pp. $50

Do nuclear weapons represent a source
of stability in world politics, or does the
acquisition of these weapons create incentives for established nuclear states or
longtime rivals to destroy nascent nuclear weapons programs before they actually coalesce into significant strategic

160

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

Naval War College: Full Spring 2007 Issue

forces? The answer to both key questions, according to Lyle Goldstein, is
yes. The acquisition of nuclear weapons
creates the incentive to prevent war, exacerbate existing rivalries, and produce
crises, but over time even asymmetric
nuclear balances tend to moderate enduring rivalries and calm more acute
conflicts.
Goldstein’s primary purpose is to address the contemporary debate between
“proliferation optimists” and “proliferation pessimists.” Proliferation optimists suggest that nuclear weapons will
have a moderating effect on international relations. Because nuclear arsenals provide mechanisms for states to
protect their fundamental security concerns while increasing the potential
costs of war, leaders tend to be moderate when dealing with not only their
own nuclear weapons but their opponents’ arsenals as well. Optimists also
believe that governments everywhere
tend to be good stewards of their nuclear capabilities, generally treating
them as political instruments, not as an
enhancement to their war-fighting capabilities. Proliferation pessimists,
however, argue that a situation of mutual assured destruction (MAD), not
nuclear weapons per se, is what induced
caution between competing capitals
during the Cold War. In the absence of
MAD, they believe, states face mounting pressure to launch preventive war
to destroy nascent nuclear weapons
programs. New nuclear states, according to the pessimists, lack the resources,
technical expertise, and stable governments that are needed to construct survivable nuclear arsenals, especially
those that remain under negative control and in times of extreme stress.
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Goldstein addresses this debate with a
survey of the most significant international confrontations involving nuclear
and nonnuclear states, exploring the
incentives, perceptions, and judgments
of nuclear-armed leaders as they contemplate the prospects and pitfalls of
launching preventive war to disarm
emerging nuclear powers. His comparative case studies span the entire nuclear
age: from the U.S. reaction to the emergence of a Soviet nuclear weapons program, American and Soviet responses to
the Chinese nuclear program, and the
Israeli strike against Iraq’s Osiraq reactor, to both U.S. counterproliferation
wars against Iraq. His case studies reveal
that although the leaders in dominant
states often contemplate preventive war,
a host of issues conspires to prevent them
from launching strikes to destroy emerging nuclear forces and infrastructures.
Goldstein’s finding that preventive
counterproliferation strikes are rare is
offset by several observations that are
not at all reassuring. Counterproliferation attacks have been contemplated
from the start of the nuclear age, but
actual attacks are a relatively recent
phenomenon. Goldstein’s analysis suggests that the revolutions in conventional precision guidance and global
reconnaissance capabilities have tipped
the balance in favor of preventive war,
although risks still remain. U.S. officers
and officials, for instance, were deeply
concerned about the prospect that
Saddam Hussein might retaliate with
chemical or biological weapons when it
became clear that the regime in Baghdad itself was the target of coalition operations in 2003; nevertheless, members
of the administration were ultimately
undeterred by what they considered to
be a credible threat. Goldstein concludes
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with an even more disturbing observation: that world politics might be
entering a period of pronounced instability as the proliferation of nuclear
weapons and associated delivery systems accelerates. More opportunities
will soon present themselves to stop ambitious nascent nuclear states in their
tracks.
Goldstein’s narrative is compelling, theoretically informed, well written, and well
organized. His comparative study sheds
light on the proliferation optimism/
pessimism debate, even though his conclusions are unlikely to satisfy either
camp. Skeptics might point out that his
case studies are a bit cursory and lack
documentary evidence drawn from the
various capitals in question. To its
credit, however, Goldstein’s work is relatively comprehensive and provides a
global perspective on how preventive
war dynamics play out among Western
and non-Western antagonists. It also
provides a chronological perspective on
how the phenomenon of preventive war
might, in fact, be changing. His work
thus constitutes a significant and enduring contribution to the literature on
nuclear proliferation, deterrence, and
preventive war.

JAMES J. WIRTZ

Naval Postgraduate School
Kennedy, Paul. The Parliament of Man: The Past,
Present, and Future of the United Nations. New
York: Random House, 2006. 384pp. $26.95

An institution as central to the contemporary world’s political and geostrategic
landscape as the United Nations is constantly in need of thoughtful, scholarly
attention. Paul Kennedy delivers just
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this with The Parliament of Man. Kennedy, the author of The Rise and Fall of
the Great Powers and Grand Strategies in
War and Peace, approves of the idea of
the UN but is not blind to its failings.
He believes that “since this is the only
world organization that we possess, we
need to make it work in the best way
possible, in order to help humankind
navigate our present turbulent century.” Consequently, while the book is
mostly historical, a consistent tone of
apology runs along with the narrative.
It is a story, Kennedy writes, of “evolution, metamorphosis, and experiment,
of failure and success,” but a story that
is ultimately justified.
A solid introductory chapter traces the
deepest roots of the UN back to post–
Napoleonic Europe, but Kennedy very
naturally spends most of his time examining events in the wake of World War
I. Here Kennedy rehearses the prehistory of the UN from the advent of its
predecessor, the League of Nations,
through that organization’s failures and
the consequent outbreak of World War
II. While this chapter contains little in
the way of new information or startling
revelations, it is well written, succinct,
and peppered with insights.
What follows are several thematic chapters on such topics as the working of
the Security Council, the execution of
peacekeeping missions, the idea of human rights, UN economic policies, and
so on. Here one comes to appreciate the
true breadth of the United Nations.
Kennedy’s examination of the Security
Council is especially timely, given the
growing pressures for its expansion and
restructuring. Kennedy’s account of the
UN’s track record in peacekeeping operations (arguably its highest-profile
role in much of the world) is prefaced
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by a keen observation, one that is rarely
mentioned in more critical examinations
and that forces us to take fresh stock of
such missions: “The most astonishing
thing,” he writes, “is that the UN Charter contains absolutely no mention of
the word peacekeeping and offers no
guidelines as to this form of collective
action.” This will be news to many.
The greatest effect of this worthwhile
volume is the appreciation one gains
for the great complexity of the United
Nations and, more to the point, of the
tasks it faces. Kennedy also shows the
institution to be worthy of a bit more
sympathy than many are currently inclined to give it.
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issues as what patient rights caregivers
must respect; how best to distribute
scarce material and health manpower
resources; which among the wounded
should receive priority within the triage
process (and the related question of
what military utility should be assigned
to certain casualties); changed priorities
of informed consent and confidentiality
among soldiers; the dilemma of torture,
ill treatment, and the role of physicians;
the legitimacy of physician contribution
to the development of chemical and biological weapons; physician civil disobedience and assistance in draft evasion;
and the widely presumed but equally
debatable status of medical neutrality,
impartiality, and immunity during war.

DAVID A. SMITH

Baylor University

Gross, Michael L. Bioethics and Armed Conflict:
Moral Dilemmas of Medicine and War. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006. 384pp. $26

Debate rages today in Congress and
amid the public on the tolerable limits
of coercive interrogation and torture
associated with armed conflict, and the
alleged complicity of military health care
professionals in these purportedly nefarious activities. These allegations make
this tome of ethical analysis a pertinent
starting point for academics interested in
contemporary issues affecting the practice of military medicine during war.
The author is neither a professional soldier nor physician but a former conscript in the Israel Defense Forces, and
currently professor of applied and professional ethics in international relations at the University of Haifa. The
book confronts multiple subjects of
practical relevance, among them such

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2007

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Spring 2007.vp
Monday, May 14, 2007 3:57:50 PM

Michael Gross argues that medical ethics in times of armed conflict are not
identical to medical ethics in times of
peace. Military necessity, reasons of
state, and the war effort impinge upon
moral decision making and often overwhelm the axioms that animate medical
ethics during peacetime. He repeatedly
emphasizes that during war the everyday principles of biomedical ethics
must compete with equally relevant and
conflicting principles anchored in military necessity and national security, where
the welfare of the individual has far less
importance than the welfare of the state
and the political community. During
armed conflict, military necessity trumps
the right to life, self-determination, and
patient welfare. Physicians care for sick
and wounded soldiers for reasons different from those applicable to other
patients: soldiers are treated to preserve
manpower and to protect the vitality of
a collective fighting force. In fact, the entire range of moral decision making
changes under the exigencies of war. Collective interests overwhelm individual
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welfare, and this extends even to the
moral authority of the military to enforce its regulations regarding administration of such agents as Anthrax vaccine
to military forces, or to new but not yet
fully recognized scientific discoveries.
Equally provocative is the thesis that
medical contributions to interrogational
torture may be morally defensible under
conditions that offer the possibility of
preventing egregious harm to others.
As a treatise addressing contemporary
ethical issues in military medicine, this
is a useful contribution. Unfortunately,
the writer’s style at times intermixes elements of the arcane phraseology of the
professional academic ethics community. “The uninitiated” must read and
reread some passages if they are motivated to comprehend fully the ethical
dilemmas being debated and dissected.
ARTHUR M. SMITH, MD

Captain, Medical Corps
U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)

Vego, Milan. The Battle for Leyte, 1944: Allied
and Japanese Plans, Preparations, and Execution.
Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2006.
479pp. $55

There have been many books published
about the battle for Leyte Gulf. This
book, however, is unique, because it is
not only a narrative but also a critical
analysis of the planning, preparation,
and execution of that famous battle as
viewed by both the Americans and the
Japanese. Milan Vego, professor of military operations at the Naval War College and author of a textbook on
operational warfare, is also a former
merchant marine officer. He has tackled the subject of this work with much
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vigor and depicts the battle with clarity
and in great depth.
The book is organized into eleven chapters. Chapters 1 through 5 show how
both sides planned and organized for
the battle, and chapter 6 discusses the
background and operations just before
the engagement. However, the heart
and soul of the book are in the final section that depicts the battle itself.
Vego begins by noting that in the early
days of the Pacific War the Americans
split their command arrangements,
with General Douglas MacArthur in
charge of the South West Pacific Area
(SWPA) and Admiral Chester Nimitz
commanding the Pacific Ocean Area
(POA). This scheme worked well
enough until the Leyte operation, when
it produced much confusion over command relationships, leading to problems between Fleet Admiral William F.
Halsey and Vice Admiral Thomas
Kinkaid, Commander Allied Naval
Forces that almost lost them the battle.
Vego is critical of the delays in communications between various American
components. He concludes that the
Americans relied too much on Japanese
intentions—as interpreted via information gleaned from the MAGIC intercepts
—and less on actual capability. He believes that the Americans’ strength was
in their operational-logistic plans and
programs.
However, Vego argues, the Japanese
were even worse in comparable ways.
Parochial competition between the
army and navy cost them dearly. The
Japanese had little intelligence that
could compare with that of the Americans, and they had serious logistical
problems that were never properly
resolved.
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Among the book’s strengths are the
subheadings of each chapter, which allow the reader to skip around. Vego’s
sixty-seven pages of notes are excellent,
enabling the reader to delve deeper into
the battle, and his bibliography is outstanding. There are sixteen appendixes
showing the order of battle of the adversaries, as well as six excellent maps.
Vego’s conclusion, while offering nothing new, does an outstanding job of
summarizing the battle. Also, his summary of Halsey’s failure in the battle is
superior. Professor Vego concludes that
“the Japanese came close to accomplishing their mission not because of
their skills but because of the mistakes
that Halsey made.”
DONALD M. GOLDSTEIN

University of Pittsburgh

Tyerman, Christopher. God’s War: A New History
of the Crusades. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ.
Press, 2006. 1,024pp. $35

Christopher Tyerman, a lecturer in medieval history at Oxford University, offers this work at a crucial moment. With
world attention focused as it is on the
Middle East and on the social, political,
religious, and military interactions between the Muslim East and Christian
West, God’s War could not have come at
a more opportune time, especially for
those who wish to have a better understanding of this exotic and violent period. Over the past decade, the subject of
the Crusades has become a popular one
for writers, but Steven Runciman’s
three-volume History of the Crusades remains the primary standard of comparison. Tyerman accurately, if perhaps with
a bit of hubris, notes that Runciman’s
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work is now outdated and seriously
flawed. What makes Tyerman’s work
stand out is the extent of his knowledge
of the entire crusading era and his ability to deploy that knowledge in a clear,
concise, and generally readable manner
in the course of a single (if massive)
volume.
God’s War is reasonably if not totally
comprehensive. The first four Crusades
are covered in minute detail, the later
Crusades less so. Tyerman, however,
also discusses many related movements
not normally considered as crusades,
such as the Reconquista in Spain and
Teutonic campaigns in the Baltic, and
even the expansion of the concept of
holy war to the conquest of the New
World. This breadth of coverage makes
up for an occasional lack of depth. At
times the book does suffer from an
overreliance on name-dropping, some
of which is repetitive and, for the novice, confusing.
Tyerman stresses that one cannot know
how the Crusaders thought or felt—
making it ironic when he comments, as
he frequently does, on what did or did
not motivate them. This is peculiar, as
one of the strongest points of the book is
its explanation of how the movement
originated and the ways in which the
Crusades were products of the sometimes
paradoxical social, religious, and political
forces of the Middle Ages. Another strong
point is his descriptions of the personalities of the Crusaders. Tyerman fleshes out
the leaders, men like the Christians
Godfrey of Bullion and Bohemond,
Frederick Barbarossa, or Richard of
Anjou, and the Muslim leaders Saladin
and Baybars. These people are described
from the standpoint both of their apologists and their critics and enemies,
and thus as true three-dimensional
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personalities. Through these descriptions,
Tyerman creates after all a snapshot of
how the crucesignati and jihadi thought,
and in particular how they were influenced by the concept of holy war.
Tyerman avoids the controversy of the
influence of the Crusades on events in
the Middle East today. He outlines the
Christian concept of just war and holy
war without assessing whether the Crusades were just. He describes the Muslim concept of jihad, yet does not pass
judgment on the initial conquest or
reconquest of the Hold Land by the
Arabs. Additionally, he does not address Western guilt over the Crusades
or the Islamic feeling of having been
wronged. Only in passing does he mention a certain pope’s apology and a certain politician’s ill-timed use of the
word “crusade.” In a word, he neither
condemns nor apologizes for the actions and violence of Christians or
Muslims but clearly lays out the social,
religious, political, and economic
causes and results of the Crusades.
For readers searching for a single-volume
survey of the crusading movement,
Christopher Tyerman’s God’s War is
invaluable.
MARK K. VAUGHN

Naval War College

Reynolds, David. From World War to Cold War:
Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International History
of the 1940s. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2006.
363pp. $45

In this insightful and elegantly written
set of essays in international history,
David Reynolds ruminates on the
causes, evolution, and consequences of
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what came to be called the “special relationship” between the United States
and Great Britain during the Second
World War and thereafter through the
Cold War. Geostrategically, this relationship originated with the fall of
France in May 1940, which Reynolds
treats quite rightly as the “fulcrum of
the Twentieth Century.” Until then,
British leaders had counted on France
to contain Germany, with England
making only a limited commitment of
ground forces to the continent and relying on a powerful deterrent based on
strategic bombing. In 1940, with the
French knocked out of the war and
England’s small army in ruins, whether
the British could fight on against Germany’s Wehrmacht depended above all
on support from the United States.
Winston Churchill’s decision to continue fighting turned out to be the right
policy chosen for the wrong reasons,
because Franklin D. Roosevelt was initially unwilling to supply more than
material aid and was later unable to
bring Americans into the war until both
Japan and Germany declared war on
the United States. Shared hatred of a vicious enemy, a more or less common
language, generally similar liberal political principles, shared intelligence,
combined military staffs, summitry,
and the industrial prowess of the
United States was to make the AngloAmerican alliance perhaps more effective than any other in history.
Year by year, however, British influence
within the Grand Alliance waned as
American power waxed. In the spirit of
Woodrow Wilson, Roosevelt sought an
alternative to traditional alliances in his
vision of postwar international peace
and security cooperation by means of
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the “Four Policemen”—the United
States, the United Kingdom, China, and
the Soviet Union—each of which would
earn a permanent seat at the United
Nations Security Council. Despite
Roosevelt’s hopes of extending wartime
cooperation with the Soviet Union into
the peace, the ever more closed systems
of government established within Sovietoccupied East-Central Europe increasingly induced both British and American
leaders to begin to fear the USSR as the
Second Coming of the Third Reich.
This shared perception, fueled (somewhat unintentionally, Reynolds claims)
by Churchill’s “iron curtain” speech in
Fulton, Missouri, in 1946, brought the
two wartime allies ever closer together
again. Fears that appeasement would
merely whet the aggressor’s appetite for
more then sustained the growing transatlantic consensus that the Soviet Union
needed to be contained.
As the Cold War heated up, the British
and the rest of Western Europe needed
American power; Americans needed
British bases around the world, as well
as the legitimacy and self-assurance that
the support of this ally, especially,
might supply both at home and abroad.
Although the Pax Britannica collapsed
in the eastern Mediterranean in 1947, it
was replaced rapidly and smoothly by
the Pax Americana, as exemplified in the
Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan,
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with the especially close relationship between Britain and the
United States serving as the foundation
of transatlantic unity and cooperation.
Henceforward, England would play
Robin to America’s Batman, gambling
that loyalty to the United States would
enable it to punch above its weight.
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Loyalty would purchase Britain a disproportionate influence in American
foreign policy, though some in England
might occasionally wonder whether the
price in national honor was too high,
especially when prime ministers appeared to be mere “poodles” serving
American masters.
Reynolds does not romanticize the special relationship. The Suez crisis of 1956
made it clear that Americans would not
prop up declining empires; indeed, it
was American policy to hurry them into
their graves. Nonetheless, Americans
were there when the British needed
them, with satellite intelligence and
other support, in the Falklands War.
However, the Iraq war of 2003 suggests
that sometimes Robin might be too
loyal to the caped crusader, who needs
to look before he leaps and benefit from
wiser counsel from his most loyal ally.
For all these difficulties, Reynolds
shows that the current international order rests on common Anglo-American
liberal principles and overlapping political cultures that shaped how both the
British and the Americans defined their
interests from World War II to the end
of the Cold War and beyond. Though
the relationship may always have been
more special to the British than the
Americans, Reynolds shows why it
needs to continue to be especially close.
Arguably far more than Roosevelt’s
United Nations, Churchill’s union of
English-speaking peoples saved civilization from barbarism again and again in
the twentieth century. Our prospects in
the current century require us to keep
that union especially in mind.
KARL WALLING

Naval War College
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Till, Geoffrey, ed. The Development of British Naval Thinking: Essays in Memory of Bryan Ranft.
New York: Routledge, 2006. 214pp. $125

This collection of nine essays on British
naval thought from the eighteenth
century to the present is both useful in
itself and a fine testimonial to an individual significant in the field of maritime and naval historiography. Bryan
Ranft (1917–2003) fought as a gunner
in World War II and then went on to
teach generations of British naval officers at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, England. For many years Ranft
occupied a rather lonely position, academically speaking. Amateur naval historians like Richard Hough abounded
but made no impression upon scholarship and methodology. The two modern
giants Stephen Roskill and Arthur
Marder were for various reasons not
equivalent to the likes of Sir Michael
Howard in developing military history.
Naval matters were hardly taught in the
academy; the Vere Harmsworth Chair
at Cambridge University (Richmond’s
former seat) had been long lost to colonial historians, and Greenwich itself
was a service institution.
However, Bryan Ranft persisted in
teaching, writing, and editing naval history. His output was not great; I count
two of his edited works, The Beatty Papers and Technical Change and British
Naval Policy, 1860–1939, among the
best of a half-dozen volumes. By the
early 1980s, however, Ranft was a visiting professor of naval history at King’s
College, London, which was among the
first of the United Kingdom’s academic
institutions to recognize the stupidity
of ignoring British and international
naval history.
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Within another fifteen to twenty years
this subject would witness an escape
from those scholarly doldrums, indeed
a serious revival, particularly in such
forward-looking universities as Exeter,
Southampton, Hull, and London,
which were at last recognizing their
own cities’ deep maritime heritages.
Many of the contributors to this volume teach, or have taught, in those very
institutions.
Professor Geoffrey Till—in many ways
Ranft’s natural successor—has edited a
tight and coherent Festschrift, which
hangs together in large part because all
essays concentrate upon naval thinking
and writing rather than operations or
technology. It is difficult, then, to single
out for special praise certain contributions, for they range from Nicholas
Rodger’s chapter on eighteenth-tonineteenth-century British naval strategic thought to Eric Grove’s equivalent
piece regarding the close of the twentieth century. Readers might take special
interest in the contributions by Jock
Gardner and Richard Hill, longtime naval officers become significant authors
of maritime and strategic matters.
There is a useful bibliography, but the
index is rather thin. However, these
days one is grateful to see such an item
at all. This is, in sum, a most useful addition (volume 38) to the Cass series on
Naval Policy and History, of which Professor Till is the general editor.
PAUL KENNEDY

Yale University

Gilbert, Alton Keith, ed. A Leader Born. Drexel
Hill, Pa.: Casemate, 2006. 230pp. $32.95
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Alton Keith Gilbert, a retired naval officer, uses a descriptive survey method
of research through letters, operational
documents, fitness reports, personal
accounts, and awards to chronicle the
biography of Admiral John “Slew”
McCain.
The book builds a strong sense of the
character and tenacity of McCain and
his ability as a warfighter through one
of the most difficult periods of World
War II. From his commissioning as an
ensign to admiral, McCain was influenced by the Navy’s greatest leaders.
The author describes the development
of McCain as he progressed through his
sea and shore assignments. The study
culminates in a detailed description of
the war in the Pacific and the tactics
used, particularly when dealing with
Japanese kamikaze pilots, under
McCain’s operational leadership.
An intriguing aspect of this book is the
detailed description of the political
dealings among the Navy’s senior leaders. This allows the reader to understand some of the activity behind the
scenes that ultimately shaped the outcome of the war. It is clear that McCain
was a warrior’s warrior who literally
worked himself to death: “After Japan
surrendered on September 2, 1945,
McCain flew back to his home in the
U.S. and died in his bed the next day—
perhaps from heart failure but more
probably from exhaustion.” His dedication to the country, accomplishment of
the mission, and loyalty to his superiors
are constant themes of the book.
The extensive resources and the author’s
personal experience as a naval officer
make this a credible, historically accurate work. Gilbert’s style brings to life
the experience of the Pacific War. In
addition, specific data regarding the
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losses of personnel and equipment only
enhances the understanding of the impact of that war on both the U.S. and
Japanese forces. The bibliography is a
great resource for anyone who desires
additional information on the topic.
The only criticism I have relates to the
title. The book comes up a little short
on the actual leadership characteristics
of McCain, and I found myself searching for those qualities in his style and
character. Yet this is a must-read for
anyone who desires to learn about another one of the great admirals of
World War II.
THOMAS ZELIBOR

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Naval War College

Osborne, Eric W. The Battle of Heligoland Bight.
Indianapolis: Indiana Univ. Press, 2006. 141pp.
$27.95
Butler, Daniel Allen. Distant Victory: The Battle of
Jutland and the Allied Triumph in the First World
War. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2006. 251pp. $44.95

After two decades of unrelenting publishing on the land war of 1914–18, it is
nice to see attention being paid to the
war at sea, for that effort ranged from
distant blockades, mine warfare, unrestricted submarine warfare, and dashing
destroyer melees, to the largest pitched
surface fleet battle to that time. Both
authors tell their stories with a passion
for narrative, paying close attention not
only to admirals but also to the “common sailor” at war. Both come well prepared: Osborne, of Virginia Military
Institute, has published Britain’s Economic Blockade of Germany, 1914–1919
(2004) and Cruisers and Battle Cruisers:

169

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

164

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 60 [2007], No. 2, Art. 1

An Illustrated History of Their Impact
(2004), while Butler, a former U.S.
Army officer and media commentator,
is the author of The Age of Cunard
(2004).
Osborne’s Battle of Heligoland Bight is
solid naval history. On 28 August 1914
British cruisers, destroyers, and submarines descended into the Heligoland
Bight and surprised German scouting
forces, which lost the light cruisers SMS
Mainz, SMS Koln, SMS Ariadne, and
the torpedo boat V-187, as well as 1,251
officers and men killed, wounded, or
captured. The British, in contrast, suffered damage to one light cruiser and
three destroyers, as well as thirty-five
officers and men killed and forty
wounded. Beyond these losses, the importance of the battle lies in the fact
that it reinforced the already timid
stance of the German High Sea Fleet
command.
Osborne’s two major contributions are
at the command level and at the tactical
level. Senior commanders, British and
German, performed woefully. There
was a lack of coordination with the
forces at sea and among the forces engaged in battle. There were also problems with communication (delays in
decoding messages and jammed transmissions) and an overall failure to provide commanders with intelligence on
the composition and position of enemy
forces.
Officers who today fear that in a “real”
war the enemy may well deprive them
of cybernetic capabilities must read this
book. Heligoland showed what it was
like to fight “blind” and under adverse
conditions. Clausewitz’s “fog of war”
was omnipresent, especially on the British side: battle signals were misread;
major units put out to sea without
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notifying other commands; cruisers attempted to ram their own submarines;
submarines made attack runs on their
own cruisers; and destroyers engaged a
Norwegian neutral, mistaking it for a
German minelayer. The German command did not perform much better. It
failed to appreciate the size of the British force and refused to recognize that
it was supported by battle cruisers. It
also hesitated to send out its own battle
cruisers in time to assist. The fact that
German battleships had to wait hours
for high tide so they could cross the
Jade Bar at Wilhelmshaven did not help
matters, nor did the true “fog of war,”
namely, a heavy fog that swirled around
Heligoland all that day. In short, this is
a superb book on the all but forgotten
first surface battle of World War I.
Distant Victory, of course, has the advantage that it is about a well known
battle, the greatest in history to that
date. On 31 May 1916, off Denmark’s
Jutland Peninsula, twenty-four British
dreadnoughts and their escorts squared
off against sixteen German dreadnoughts and their escorts—in all, 151
British warships against ninety-nine
German warships. Butler relates the resulting battle in gripping, dramatic
style. He has a keen eye for the bold
narrative, whether speaking of a destroyer or a battleship, a commander or
a gunner. He follows the traditional
reading of Jutland, that it was a tactical
German victory (fourteen British ships
were lost to the Germans’ eleven, and
6,784 British casualties as against 3,058
German) but a British strategic victory,
insofar as the High Sea Fleet failed to
break the Grand Fleet’s iron grip on the
exits of the North Sea. As the New York
Herald trenchantly put it on 3 June
1916, “The German fleet has assaulted
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its jailer, but it is still in jail.” Unfortunately, Butler fails to draw on the greatest strategic lesson for the Germans: on
4 July Admiral Reinhard Scheer, the
“victor of the Skagaerrak,” informed
Kaiser Wilhelm II that further fleet actions would be futile and that only “the
defeat of British economic life, that is, by
using the U-boats against British trade,”
could swing the balance in the war.
Lamentably, Butler’s lack of familiarity
with German documents and recent
historiography mars an otherwise interesting book. Apart from misspelled
German words and ships’ names, there
are major howlers. Thus Ludendorff is
raised to the nobility as “von,” Hugo
von Pohl in 1914 is listed as the High
Sea Fleet’s chief of staff rather than as
Chief of the Admiralty Staff in Berlin,
Karl Doenitz is cited as a World War I
“destroyer captain,” and German diplomatic and naval files are situated at
Koblenz rather than at Berlin and
Freiburg, respectively. Further, while
one can accuse the German naval command of timidity, it seems unjust to ascribe “cowardice” to them. Hyperbole
abounds. Did Jutland really “dictate”
that “Germany would lose the First
World War”? Was it “the decisive moment of the First World War”? Did it
“decide” the “very course of the war”?
Was the German failure to intercept
British cross-Channel troop transports
in August 1914 the “lost opportunity”
that “ultimately decided the course of
the war”?
Finally, Butler’s claims that “three generations of histories” have failed to look
at the “strategic aftermath” of the battle
and that they have failed for ninety years
to ask why the Germans never again
faced the Grand Fleet in battle, or why
they turned instead to unrestricted
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submarine warfare, are not just inaccurate but make a mockery of that scholarship. Careful editorial work could
have averted some of this. Regrettably,
it did not.
HOLGER H. HERWIG

University of Calgary

Henriques, Peter R. Realistic Visionary: A Portrait
of George Washington. Charlottesville: Univ. of
Virginia Press, 2006. 256pp. $26.95

The man who was “first in war, first in
peace and first in the hearts of his countrymen” is also first as a subject in the
contemporary revival of popular interest in the founding fathers. In this work
Peter Henriques has provided a concise,
balanced, and scholarly companion
piece to the more comprehensive recent
books concerning George Washington.
Rather than a conventional biography,
Peter Henriques, a professor emeritus
of history at George Mason University
and a distinguished scholar of the vast
collection of Washington’s writings, has
provided an analysis of ten of the arguably most important issues and relationships Washington dealt with during
his life. Especially for those familiar
with Washington’s basic biography,
these thoughtful and fair-minded essays
will inspire further reflection on the
character and career of the indispensable man of the American founding.
Henriques’s erudition and balanced
judgment may be at their most effective
in his consideration of the private
Washington, including an examination
of his beliefs on slavery and religion,
and a reflection on his final illness and
death. Washington, who can be justifiably criticized as a slave owner, in

171

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

166

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 60 [2007], No. 2, Art. 1

Henriques’s view experienced a “tortuously gradual” evolution on slavery that
mixed increasing moral consideration
with ever-present economic assessments. Washington never publicly took
a stance against slavery or called for its
end, although his personal growth on
the issue of slavery and race is impressive—in his will he ultimately freed his
own. Henriques writes that Washington
was a realist, a man who should be judged
against the standards of his day, and notes
that he made the unity of the new republic a higher priority than attacking slavery,
an institution Washington came to write
of as “the only unavoidable subject of
regret.”
Perhaps the most moving chapter in
this well written book is the last, where
Henriques addresses Washington’s
death. His detailed research reveals that
Washington’s last day of life was excruciatingly painful, that orthodox Christian beliefs had no apparent influence
on his actions during his final hours,
and that important aspects of his
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character were highlighted by his behavior throughout this tormenting
struggle. (Washington slowly suffocated
to death over many hours, almost certainly from acute epiglottis, a virulent
bacterial infection of the throat.) As
Washington wrote some four months
before he died, “When the summons
comes I shall endeavor to obey it with a
good grace.” He endured the attempted
treatment from his doctors and an agonizing death with stoic courage, patience, and grace, completing his life
with his honor intact.
Henriques’s accessible book illuminates
Washington’s character through, in
some measure, the lens of his honor
and the importance to Washington
throughout his life of preserving it. Realistic Visionary provides a trustworthy
and insightful guide to a further understanding of Washington and confirms,
in the words of his secretary, Tobias
Lear, that “he died as he lived.”
WILLIAM M. CALHOUN

Naval War College
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MONDAY MORNING QUARTERBACKING?

Sir:
Professor Owens’s article “Rumsfeld, the Generals, and the State of U.S. CivilMilitary Relations” (Autumn 2006, pp. 68–80) provides a welcomed counterpunch to Rumsfeld’s retired uniformed critics and rightly places Rumsfeld’s
involvement in military planning in historical context. However, in criticizing
the “generals in revolt” for overstepping their bounds, Owens unfortunately
(and unjustly) gives Secretary Rumsfeld a near-free pass for his missteps in
Iraq.
Owens aptly contextualizes Secretary Rumsfeld’s actions in light of a distinguished American tradition of civilian control of the military. As he notes, it is
not unprecedented for a civilian leader to ignore military advice or to exercise
a heavy hand in operational planning (Owens omits the helpful example of
President John F. Kennedy, who ignored military advice in advocating the use
of special operations forces in counterinsurgency operations). He also provides helpful perspective on why Rumsfeld might have dismissed military advice. The 9/11 Commission, along with several critics, has pointed out that
senior military leadership has resisted deployment requests since Somalia and
looked for situations where it would be assured victory; Iraq was far from such
an instance. It is reasonable that a civilian leader might selectively heed military advice if he believes that his military advisers are not adequately considering his position.
Yet by focusing on the errancy of the generals’ public criticism, Owens loses
sight of Rumsfeld’s missteps. Owens argues that Rumsfeld’s key mistake was
that he was “much more optimistic than the facts on the ground have warranted” and that Rumsfeld “acknowledged changes in the character of the war
and adapted to them.” Rumsfeld’s mistake was not that he was optimistic; it
was that he was out of touch entirely with critical facts on the ground and did
not exercise leadership once the consequences of his bad decisions were
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apparent. Rumsfeld’s “stuff happens” attitude turned out to be a strategic miscalculation of the highest order. De-Baathification and the disbanding of the
Iraqi military were likewise strategic misjudgments that flew in face of civilian
and military advice. We now know that no one in the secretary’s office even
asked the advice of General Jay Garner, who was at the time working to include
both groups in post-Saddam Iraq before the decision was made to exclude
them. These decisions were not products of “optimism” but were rather woeful
misreadings of the realities.
To state that Rumsfeld “acknowledged changes in the character of the war
and adapted to them” is also generous. Who can forget that Rumsfeld strenuously resisted calling the war “an insurgency” until the commander of U.S.
Central Command had already contradicted him publicly and the facts were
nearly indisputable? The onus rests on Owens to demonstrate how a leader
who refused to call the situation on the ground an insurgency, who hesitated to
reconfigure civil support elements, and who did not solicit advice or execute
new strategies for the spiraling situation in Iraq “adapted to change” and provided an effective counterinsurgency strategy.
Owens rationalizes the folly of deploying with a smaller force as Monday
morning quarterbacking, and he notes that there were potential consequences
to a larger buildup, namely “losing the opportunity to achieve surprise.”
Owens cherry-picks here—there were numerous foreseeable consequences of
deploying a smaller force to Iraq, some of which were voiced to Secretary
Rumsfeld prior to the invasion. This is not “hindsight”; it is fair analysis of a
bad decision. As a tactical matter, the element of surprise was relatively insignificant in attacking Iraq. Saddam, like most viewers of CNN, had extensive
warning during the slow buildup to war that the United States would attack.
Regardless, by minimizing criticism of Rumsfeld as the product of hindsight,
Owens creates a nearly impenetrable defense of Rumsfeld; it is difficult to
prove a negative of how the invasion could have unfolded had Rumsfeld not
made the decisions he did.
Finally, Owens attempts to save Rumsfeld’s legacy by arguing that “[his]
critics have been no more prescient than he.” True, but Rumsfeld’s critics—by
Owens’s own admission—were not the ones pushing to go to war. Lumping the
generals with Rumsfeld gives the impression they all agreed with the secretary’s planning and eventual decision to attack, when, in fact, many officers
were dumbfounded by the decision.
If Owens wants to position Rumsfeld’s meddling in war planning as part of
the American tradition of strong civilian oversight, he should also hold
Rumsfeld accountable for the profound mistakes made on his watch. By minimizing Rumsfeld’s mistakes, Owens implicitly justifies them as part of Lincoln’s
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and Roosevelt’s legacy of firm civilian leadership. This is both a disservice to
the tradition of civilian-military relations and a poor reading of recent history.

BRIAN QUINN

Stanford, California

PSI AND UNCLOS

Sir:
In his response (“Is the PSI Really the Cornerstone of a New International
Norm?” Autumn 2006, pp. 123–30) to my article on the subject in the Spring
2006 issue (pp. 29–57), Mark J. Valencia opines “that the implementation, if not
the conception of the PSI, was and is seriously flawed” (quoting Valencia at p.
128). He fears that the primary goal of PSI is to stop vessels without consent, undermining the freedom of navigation in the process. To the contrary, the foundations of the PSI are the sovereign powers of nation states and their authority, as
flag-nations, to provide consent for boarding and search of their vessels. Valencia
forgot that PSI participants have already produced six bilateral agreements to facilitate WMD inspections at sea that “raise the percentage of vessels accessible to
consent boardings to well over half ” (Doolin, p. 36). The remainder of this rebuttal highlights other aspects of PSI.
PSI was initiated precisely because there is no blanket legal authority to interrupt a ship’s navigation for a WMD inspection and because the situations in
which national self-defense could and should be used to seize WMD are extremely limited (see Doolin, pp. 29–31, on the So San incident and origins of
PSI, and pp. 46–48 for Article 51). The strategy PSI uses to correct this gap is
multinational cooperation. The 9/11 Commission recognized the potential of
multinational cooperation and specifically recommended garnering support for
PSI (Doolin, p. 45, for discussion and citation of the 9/11 report). PSI core members have done so, and “over 40 countries have participated in fourteen training
exercises” (Doolin, p. 43; pp. 41–44 outline steps to improving interoperability
among the expanding membership of PSI).
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Contrary to Valencia’s assertion, PSI works within the United Nations system.
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides the framework
for consensual boardings. President Reagan established the policy of the United
States “to exercise and assert its navigation and overflight rights and freedoms
on a worldwide basis in a manner that is consistent with the balance of interests
reflected in the Convention” (A. R. Thomas and James C. Duncan, eds., Annotated Supplement to the Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations,
International Law Studies 79 [Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1999], p.
43). Although UNCLOS does not list WMD transport as an act prejudicial to the
coastal state, Valencia failed to tell the reader that “any threat or use of force” violates innocent passage; moreover, three other provisions of UNCLOS Article 19
may also be used as authority to deem illegal WMD transport inconsistent with
innocent passage. (Here I quote UNCLOS Article 19[2][a]. Article 19 establishes
the regime of innocent passage; the other provisions that could be used as authority are 19[2][b], prohibiting exercise or practice with weapons of any kind;
19[2][f], prohibiting the launching, landing, or taking aboard of any military
device; and 19[2][l], barring “any other activity not having a direct bearing on
passage.”) Valencia ultimately concedes that coastal nations may criminalize
and enforce laws against transporting WMD in their territorial seas and contiguous zones (Doolin, pp. 34–35, for a complete discussion, including the premise:
“Weapons of mass destruction are by definition dangerous materials, transportation of which must be consistent with custom laws”). This is consistent with
Valencia’s observations (pp. 124–25) that a coastal nation “would probably have
to have laws criminalizing WMD transport” and UNCLOS Article 19 codification that innocent passage cannot be prejudicial to the coastal state. Indeed,
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1540 calls upon member
states to, among other things, perfect their legal systems and enforcement
against WMD trafficking (see Doolin, pp. 45–46, for a complete discussion,
mentioning that China supported UNSC Resolution 1540). But Valencia buried
discussion of UNSC Resolution 1695 in an endnote: “UNSC Resolution 1695 of
15 July 2006 does prohibit all UN member states from providing to or receiving
from North Korea WMD and related materials or technology, specifically including missiles” (p. 130, note 22).
It remains my prediction that “PSI activities, exercises and operations” will
leverage UNCLOS and numerous conventions against WMD to make “maritime searches for WMD more common, the first steps toward a change in international practice” (Doolin, p. 50, elaborated pp. 50–51). PSI will continue to
harness the collective sovereignty of its membership, and of our CNO’s thousandship navy, to execute mostly consensual (and more rarely nonconsensual)
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boardings. As I asserted last year (p. 31), “Over time, PSI will make seizure of
weapons of mass destruction at sea an international norm.”

JOEL A. DOOLIN

Dr. Valencia replies:
Doolin: “He [Valencia] fears that the primary goal of PSI is to stop vessels without consent, undermining the freedom of navigation in the process. To the contrary, the foundations of the PSI are the sovereign powers of nation states and
their authority, as flag-nations, to provide consent for boarding and search of
their vessels.”
This may be the present practice, although the secretiveness surrounding PSI
interdictions prevents a conclusion one way or the other. However, it was not the
original intent of its founders, and leading advocates and U.S. government policy
makers may well still harbor such intent. Early on, John Bolton, then Under Secretary of State of Arms Control and International Security and the point man for
the PSI, stated that “we are prepared to undertake interdictions right now, and, if
that opportunity arises, if we had actionable intelligence and it was appropriate,
we could do it now” (“US Interdiction Poses Legal Problems,” Oxford Analytica, 30
June 2003). He further asserted that the countries concerned had reached an
agreement authorizing the United States to take action on the high seas and in international air space. Indeed, the United States insisted that the boarding of ships is
permitted if there is “reasonable cause”(Virginia March, “US-led Group Takes to
High Seas in First Drill against WMD Trade,” Financial Times, 13–14 September
2003, p. 5). On 2 December 2003, Bolton again asserted that the United States and
its allies are willing to use “robust techniques” to stop rogue nations from getting
the materials they need to make WMD—including interdicting and seizing such
“illicit goods” on the high seas or in the air. These remarks were reportedly cleared
by Secretary of State Colin Powell and senior White House officials (David Ensor,
“U.S. to Seize WMD on High Seas,” CNN, 2 December 2003). And in October
2005, at a meeting in London of PSI core participants, it was agreed that the PSI is
aimed at preventing transfers of WMD and related material “at any time and in
any place” (“Chairman’s Conclusions,” Proliferation Security Initiative: London, 9–
10 October, M2 Presswire, 13 October 2003).
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The actualization of this intent was constrained only by the objections of core
PSI participants. The United Kingdom was surprised by the U.S. interpretations
and intentions. Its representative at the July 2003 Brisbane Conference said that
all eleven participants agreed that any action taken under the PSI would need to
be consistent with international law. Others in the PSI coalition felt that the
United States was moving too quickly and too aggressively for them (“Japan
Moves Forward to Hinder WMD Smuggling,” Asahi Shimbun, 18 July 2003;
“Korea, Trade Top PM’s Agenda,” Sunday Mail, July 2003). Indeed, at the extreme there were concerns that the proposal could evolve into a multinational
force roaming the seas and skies in search of transporters of illegal or undesirable weapons. To underscore this concern, Javier Solana, the European Union’s
“foreign minister,” said, “The fight against terrorism, in which the EU is fully engaged, has to take place within the rules of international law” (Robin Wright and
Henry Chu, “Bush Defends Israeli Strike,” Los Angeles Times, 7 October 2003). After the Brisbane meeting, a team from the eleven PSI nations was assigned to work
on reaching a consensus regarding the relevant principles of international law.
Although the PSI’s operating principles include compliance with international law, some participants may still harbor intent to change it. This is because
PSI effectiveness is constrained by the legal prohibition against interdiction of
flagged ships and planes of North Korea, Iran, and other “countries of proliferation concern” without their consent. Indeed, the six U.S. bilateral boarding
agreements that Doolin considers to be so important are likely to have little or
no effect on WMD trade to or from these nations.
Doolin: “Contrary to Valencia’s assertion, PSI works within the United Nations system.”
The PSI was purposely conceived, initiated, and implemented without UN
authority outside of the UN system. Indeed, Bolton argued that Annan’s insistence on the Security Council’s being the sole source of legitimacy in the use of
force is “unsupported by over 50 years of experience with the UN Charter’s operation,” referring in particular to the non-UN-sanctioned U.S./NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 (John Bolton, “Remarks at Proliferation Security
Meeting,” Paris, France). And Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated that the
PSI provides an effective way to deal with North Korean attempts to trade in
WMD and that it does not need or require Security Council authorization
(“Rice: U.S. Has Not Lost Patience with Six-Party Talks,” 27 April 2005).
In March 2004 the United States tried to obtain a UN Security Council resolution specifically authorizing states to interdict, board, and inspect any vessel or
aircraft if there were reason to believe it was carrying WMD or the technology to
make or deliver them. But Russia and China prevented a specific endorsement of
interdiction and the PSI (Ralph Cossa, introduction to “Countering the Spread
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of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Role of the Proliferation Security Initiative,” Issues and Insights 4, no. 5 [July 2004], pp. 1–6). Indeed, the text was agreed
upon only after the United States accepted China’s demand under a threat of a
veto to drop a provision specifically authorizing the interdiction of vessels suspected of transporting WMD, a cornerstone of the PSI. China also objected to
any suggestion that the Council would endorse ad hoc frameworks like the PSI.
Doolin: “Valencia failed to tell the reader that any threat or use of force violates innocent passage.”
The transport of WMD components, related materials, and their means of
delivery does not in itself necessarily imply a threat of use of force against the
coastal state. The other three provisions of Article 19 mentioned by Doolin are
not relevant to transport of WMD, related materials, and their means of delivery.
Doolin: “Valencia buried discussion of UNSC Resolution 1695 in an
endnote.”
The note was added in press to acknowledge this most recent development.
However, as the endnote said, the resolution does not authorize the use of military force to ensure compliance, and it applies only to North Korea. As it turned
out, China, South Korea, and Japan declined to interdict North Korean vessels or
aircraft at sea despite strenuous U.S. pressure to do so—either under UNSCR
1695 or the PSI. Their refusal to do so underscored the ineffectiveness of the PSI.
Its effectiveness can only be enhanced if it and high seas interdiction are endorsed by the UNSC as advocated by a measure passed in March 2007 by the
House of Representatives. Only then will PSI seizures of WMD at sea become an
accepted international norm.
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OF SPECIAL INTEREST
STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY
To commemorate the U.S. Air Force’s sixtieth anniversary, the Air University has
announced the inauguration of Strategic Studies Quarterly, a peer-reviewed forum
for ideas on strategy, international security, defense policy, and the contributions of
air, space, and cyberspace power. Prospective authors are invited to submit
five-to-fifteen-thousand-word articles for consideration, in MS Word–compatible
format, to strategicstudiesquarterly@maxwell.af.mil or via mail (please include
disk) to Managing Editor, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Air War College, 325 Chennault
Circle, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 36112-6427.
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